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Financial systems can be compared according to the degree volatile assets are 
transformed into more stable assets for households and private investors. A discrete­
time macroeconomic portfolio model distinguishes between financial systems via a 
parameter for this transformation by financial intermediaries, which build up and draw 
on reserves. A comparative-static analysis shows that aggregate income in market based 
financial systems is less sensitive to profit expectations unless the capital gain effect and 
its impact on consumption becomes dominant. Depending on the transformation by 
financial intermediaries, both credit and equity finance can in principle be analysed in 
the same way but especially venture capital companies in market based systems refrain 
from offering any degree of transformation. A UK-German survey indicates 
considerable funding gaps. German respondents perceive a higher degree of normative 
equity gaps and risk mitigation as the most effective policy instrument. Guarantees 
reinforced the differences between the financial system and motivated companies to 
invest in higher risk areas for which they have riot developed adequate instruments of 
relationship funding. In a downturn public guarantee pay outs reduce losses for private 
investors and exert a stabilising effect on the industry but hamper a restructuring.
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“The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind 
manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with an 
organised and orderly method of thinking out particular problems; and after we have 
reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we 
then have to go back on ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable 
interaction of the factors amongst themselves. This is the nature of economic thinking. 
Any other way of applying our formal principles of thought (without which, however, 
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A considerable number of theoretical and empirical comparisons between financial 
systems have been conducted over the last decades. They form the context for this PhD- 
thesis. The academic discussion was mainly motivated by European monetary 
integration and the question whether a single monetary policy would be suitable for 
different financial systems. Comparisons between financial systems also resurfaced 
with regard to the transition process in Eastern Europe and to competitive advantages 
for funding high-technology innovations and new start-up companies. A common 
distinction is usually drawn between so-called US and UK style market-based 
economies and German style bank based economies. In the later case the banking 
sectors plays a dominant role in providing funding for investment and business 
activities. Whereas in the UK the capital market is seen to play the dominant role in 
corporate governance of firms and in providing funding.
For Germany the impact of globalisation is often perceived as a driving force towards 
liquid asset markets, which are diminishing the traditional role of banks. New 
regulations may reinforce this development. Public state guarantees for state owned 
banks had to abolished according to an EU ruling. New liabilities created after July 
2005 do not have the benefit of the guarantee anymore. Basle II with its increased 
capital adequacy ratio for banks that provide loans to firms with high risk investment 
projects will come into effect in 2007 and may further diminish the dominant role of 
banks in providing funding for investment. German banks may, however, partly divert 
their activity towards consumer loans which entail a more straight forward individual 
risk assessment, especially when they are backed by consumer assets.
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The dominant view in the economic literature suggests that the comparative advantage 
of banking in providing finance to firms might be diminished when capital markets 
become more liquid and deep (for example Stiglitz 1992a, Schneider-Lenne 1992, 
Walter 1993, Schroeder/Schrader 1998 and Walter/Smith 2000). This argument is also 
put forward by the French circulation school, when credit creation and endogenous 
money are interpreted as features of an underdeveloped overdraft economy, that would 
disappear in a developed financial market economy (Renversez 1996). However, in 
contrast to the dominant view path dependencies of economic systems may rule out any 
automatic development towards a market based system (Schmidt/Hackethal/Tyrell 
2001).
A development towards market based systems may not necessarily increases the 
efficiency of the economy. First, some financial intermediaries build up or draw on 
reserves and hence transform volatile investment assets into more stable assets for 
households. This transformation has been coined ‘intertemporal smoothing’ (Allan/Gale 
1995). This intertemporal smoothing effect in intermediary based economies has an 
obligatory character, direct investment facilities provided by a liberalised capital market 
offer arbitrage opportunities and undermine this feature. A larger set of alternatives, that 
is, markets plus financial intermediaries, might not make individuals better off than 
intermediaries alone (Allan/Gale 1995: 190). Second, a long term orientation in the 
economic systems could decrease. Miles (1993) tested for short-termism in the UK 
stock market and found that profits expected five years after the start of an investment 
project are undervalued by 40 percent. In comparison, the interest rate spread between 
short and long term loans in Germany, often interpreted as a signal for an inefficient 
system (Horn 1994), looks rather small. The main corporate governance argument 
applied to this short or long term orientation is based on an approach that refers to 
implicit contracts. These allow stakeholders of a firm to form a long-term orientation. 
Hostile take-overs in a market based system of corporate control may disrupt these 
implicit contracts. Another explanation focuses on the finance options of firms. 
Dewatripont/Maskin (1995) argue that markets have difficulties in signalling the long­
term orientation of an investment project. Therefore promising investment projects with 
low intermediate pay-outs but with intermediate finance needs are not funded because
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the capital market pools them with less promising investment projects and endangers 
the refinancing in the intermediate state. Third, with fierce competition on liability side 
of banks (Wilson Committee 1980) and better refinancing conditions for large 
companies on the capital market, the typical cross-subsidisations for SMEs and the 
availability of long term finance to SMEs are reduced.
Many theoretical microeconomic studies on financial systems are based on a neo- 
institutional approach and focus on agency problems, asymmetric information and 
incentive effects. New institutional economics, the introduction of transaction costs and 
its incorporation into the theory of finance is a successful scientific programme, which 
explains a variety of existing institutions in developed market economies by their 
contribution to reducing the cost of controlling and enhancing contracts. It helps to 
assume that existing institutions must be efficient and reduce transaction costs, 
otherwise they would have perished in a competitive environment. However, the 
introduction of asymmetric information and incentive effects leads to stark deviations 
from assumptions and conclusions of basic neoclassic models (Alan/Gale 2000). And 
once asymmetric information and incentive effects are introduced, slight changes in the 
basic assumption can easily lead to opposite conclusions. In spite of some eclectic 
arguments the interaction of institutions is still puzzling (Herten/Holscher 2000). 
Relevant differences of institutional factors and corporate governance may simply be 
complementary in financial systems (Vitols 1995, Schmidt/Hackethal/Tyrell 2001). It 
would therefore be useful if these were analysed simultaneously.
Attempts haven been made to integrate the theory of finance and macroeconomics (for 
example Bemanke/Gertler 1989, or Greenwald/Stiglitz 1993). Recently these 
approaches have been applied to financial systems by focussing on empirical 
macroeconomic research. Some authors highlight the role of long term and fixed 
interest liabilities, others the differences in the money, bank lending or balance sheet 
channel of public policies or differences in the wage bargaining process. These attempts 
appear so far as very arbitrary since they often select one specific institutional factor for 
their analysis. Macroeconomic fluctuations and the transmission and channels of 
monetary policy and exogenous shocks in different financial systems are, for example,
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tackled in Devereux/Schiantarelli (1990), Borio (1995), Bockelmann (1996), StoB 
(1996), Baran/Coudert/Mojon (1997), Chirinko (1997), Guender/Moersch (1997), 
Kashyap (1997), Elston (1998), Dombush/Favero/Giavazzi (1998), Morley (1998), de 
Bondt (1999), Mojon (2000), Fountas/Papagapitos (2001) and Gambacorta (2003). To 
highlight some puzzling conclusions: Guender/Moersch do not find any indication of a 
credit channel in Germany despite a dominant role of bank finance in Germany and 
argue that this would be a consequence of relationship banking, although German type 
economies show a stronger relation between bank credit and investment whereas Anglo- 
American economies show a stronger relationship between investment and the stock 
market (Black/Moersch 1998). De Bondt (1999) finds that aggregate income and 
consumption in Germany is more sensitive to the valuation on the stock market, 
although market capitalisation in bank based economies tends to be much lower than in 
market based financial systems and Mankiw/Zeldes (1990) have shown that the 
consumption of stock holders is more volatile and is highly correlated with excess 
returns. Other works have highlighted that consumption plays a crucial part in the 
process that determines income and argued that the parameter is not constant over the 
business cycle in the UK and the US (Frowen/Karakitsos 1996, Arestis/Karakitsos 
2003b). The consumption ratio appears to be pro-cyclical in the UK, whereas it is rather 
stable in Germany (Frowen/Karakitsos 1998). Allan and Gale (1995) also hint towards a 
stronger relation between share prices and consumption in the market based US system 
than in comparison to the bank based financial system in Germany.
Considering that coherent data for different countries is seldom available and that 
authors often refer to different data sets to back up their conclusions some puzzling 
differences may at least not be surprising. Furthermore, in the run-up to and first years 
of the European Monetary Union influential factors in different countries were related 
to interest rate changes and were hence hardly similar in some countries under 
investigation. A ‘ceteris paribus’ assumption cannot be applied. With regard to the UK, 
it cannot be applied either. Not joining EMU means that the exchange rate of the pound 
to the Euro still remains an important factor whose impact should be analysed 
simultaneously, which considerably complicates comparisons that are based on 
regression analysis. To put it in a general way, the causal link between finance,
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economic activity and growth “is crucially determined by the nature and operation of 
the financial institutions and policies pursued in each country”, so that cross country 
regression studies can hardly capture these differences (Arestis/Demetriades 1997: 785).
Studies on finance patterns in different financial systems have added a further puzzle. 
The analyses of net-flow and how finance means are channelled towards firms 
concludes that there are hardly any differences between the real world financial systems 
(Corbett/Jenkinson 1997, Mayer 1988). Internal finance is by far the dominant form in 
both market based and bank based financial systems. In fact a flow analysis shows that 
companies in the US and in the UK were net financier on the stock market during the 
1980s. This suggests that profits or debt have been used to buy previously issued shares 
back instead of being used to invest. In other word, disinvestment took place with 
regard to the stock market. However, Hackethal/Schmidt (1999) analysed gross flows 
and concluded that these financing patterns in contrast to net flows mirror the structure 
of corporate governance in different financial systems.
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Existing differences of the institutional settings in both countries may on the one hand 
lead to distinctive macroeconomic fluctuation and require policies adopted to a given 
design of the financial system. In part, however, the institutional settings may be a result 
of different policy instruments and aims. Both sides of this relationship should be 
analysed. The purpose of the thesis is twofold. One aim is to apply the approach of 
traditional macroeconomic analysis to comparing financial systems and demonstrate its 
usefulness for this purpose, a second is aim is to analyse the private equity and venture 
capital industry in both countries and the implications of the recent rise in the funding 
activities by these financial intermediaries for the wider macroeconomic context.
In contrast to recent academic developments, which aim to integrate the latest findings 
made in the area of the Theory of Finance into macroeconomics, one aim of the thesis is 
to demonstrate the usefulness of traditional macroeconomic analysis. The traditional
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analysis is applied to financial systems and the differences between market and bank 
based systems by focussing on the role of financial intermediaries in transforming the 
volatility of assets. In comparison the UK market based financial system Germany’s 
bank based financial systems transforms a larger amount of volatile assets into fixed 
income assets for private households. The traditional analysis can also be applied by 
analysing the role of endogenous money and credit finance for autonomous demand, be 
it investment or consumption. A re-interpretation of the macroeconomic income 
multiplier, which equally permits autonomous consumption, adds a further theoretical 
aspect for analysing differences between financial systems. Both elements of the 
traditional analysis support the argument that the market based economic system of the 
UK is more consumption driven in comparison to the German bank based system.
Before turning to the second aim of analysing the private equity and venture capital 
market in both countries, a general form the macroeconomic income relationship is 
outlined here in order to illustrate the finance-macro-nexus. In contrast to empirical 
studies about the role of banks and markets, and in particular the quantitative 
contribution of bank finance, equity and internal finance to the funding of investment 
this short excursion uses a macroeconomic identity based analysis and sets out to 
explore the theoretical spectrum of how investment is funded.
Starting point of the formal analysis is the equality of aggregate demand and income 
distribution, whereby investment I  is autonomous demand. W is wages, Q is profits, /  is 
investment and C is consumption. Suffixes indicate consumption or savings of wage or 
profit recipients:
(1) W + Q = I  + C
(2) <>Q = I+ C -W
(3) o Q  = I+ CQ- S w with C = CQ+ Cw and W = Cw + Sw
The classic view sees the causality differently and would rather interpret investment as 
independent variable:
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(4) I  = Q -C q + Sw
The following equation shows the income multiplier of autonomous investment in the 
general form and reduced form1:
(5) Y =
I
Q -C + W
Y
I  I
q - cq + s w -  sq + s w
Y Y
Sy
In equilibrium profits Q are equal to the cost of capital. If investment was exclusively 
financed by external sources, profits would exactly cover the interest on capital, so that 
interest on loans and dividends on shares are covered. The capital coefficient of the 
economy is k, the interest rate on capital is r:
(6) r -k -Y  = I+ C -W  =I+CQ- S W
An increase in autonomous demand may, however, not only incur quantity but also 
price effects, which causes Q-profits for firms (Keynes 1930):
(7) GQ= I + C - W - r - k - Y  = I+CQ- S iy - r - k 'Y >  0
Combining the multiplier of the General Theory with Q-Profits of the Treatise allows to 
split the effects of the multiplier into a quantity and price effect (Riese 1986: 48f). The 
price level is given by:
y  y
Yf, is factor income. Since this chapter does not aim to analyse income inflation, the 
factor income can be set equal to real income. For YF = y  the price effect of a profit 
inflation is isolated:
1 Please note that the multiplier is o f  course the partial derivative o f the dependant variable income to the 
independent variable autonomous demand in this equation and also in the following income equations.
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This is the index form. Entering this into PG = 1 + pG for the relative change the result is:
With classic assumptions CQ = 0 and S^ = 0 the quantity effect for autonomous 
investment becomes (Riese 1986: 50):
The price effect, in Keynes’ terms coined profit inflation, reduces the quantity effect 
and changes the distribution of factor income. Although increases in productivity 
tamper the price effect, wage rises, in Keynes’ terms coined income inflation, may 
follow to reinstate the original distribution of income, so that a cumulative inflation 
process begins.
So far autonomous investment is the crucial element of the process. It is fully 
autonomous and not reinforced by further investment spending from the additional 
factor income created. The following formal analysis treats consumption and investment 
in a similar way: consumption can be autonomous and investment may be reinforced by 
factor income created. This general form of the multiplier reveals a denominator that 
expresses the share of the factor income that is neither consumed nor invested. The 
amount of this ‘non-demand’ is denoted ND and shall express a distinction to previous 
Savings S. D4 is autonomous demand, either investment or consumption, which may be 
understood as being financed by credit ‘ex nihilo’:
y
(11) y  = - —
r -k  + pG
since — = r • k represents the equilibrium profit ratio.
y
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Entering ND = NDQ + NDW resolves in:
(13) Y =
D4
, n d w 
y f y f
This can be written in terms of ‘non-demand’ ratios for Q and W:
(14) Y =
D4
ndQ ' yT + nd>T
So far the identity based analysis distinguished between factor income from capital and 
labour. In order to be able to distinguish further between internal and external funding 
flows a more detailed analysis splits up the factor income from capital. Original profits 
at firms’ level lead to further flows in form of consumption by capital owners or 
internally and externally funded investment; cQ, ifG and efQ reflect the respective ratio 




(1 ~ CQ ~tf<2 ~ ef o ) '^ V Jrn^w
This shows the income multiplier in the general form. The idea of Riese (1986) to split 
the traditional multiplier into a price and quantity effect can be applied to the general 
form of the multiplier. The price and profit effect is again:
Gn
(16) p(;= -2 -
y
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Since — = r -k  represents the equilibrium profit ratio the quantity effect in a general
y
form is:
(17) y  = -
DJ
W
(1 - c Q- i f Q - e f0 )< r-k + p G) + ndw —
y
An extreme theoretical case of a financial system in which the banking sector 
exclusively provides funding for consumption purposes is therefore conceivable. 
Autonomous consumption is funded ‘ex nihilo’. Households take out loans, and these 
liabilities provide the productive sector indirectly with finance means, via internal or 
external finance. Investment may not be credit financed at all and external finance can 
theoretically depend entirely on private equity or share emissions, or even be fully 
neglected. The latter theoretical extreme case in which investment is exclusively based 
on internal finance would, on the basis of a flow analysis at least, reverse the evolution 
of capitalism, which is in general characterised by a separation of ownership and 
control. In the case that households solely depend on wage income it is likely that the 
liabilities created by autonomous consumption have to be backed by housing or other 
real assets.
Depending on the non-demand ratios in the denominator a small amount of autonomous 
demand, either for investment or for consumption, can induce a large increase of 
aggregate demand and income. With regard to the sustainability of autonomous 
consumption one aspect should be noted. Whereas investment flows create a capital 
stock that may generate future income, credit driven consumption merely creates 
liabilities for the consumers in the first instance and imbalances may build up. The 
growth rate of these liabilities cannot be consistently larger than the growth rate of the 
economy. A consumption boom based solely on mortgage equity take-outs or credit 
finance in expectation of rising equity prices can therefore not last indefinitely. If this 
additional demand is induced by a one-off structural adjustment of the economy, for 
example a general expectation of lower interest rates in the future due to institutional 
changes within the banking system, imbalances will not necessarily have to be corrected
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but monetary and fiscal authorities may still find it difficult to engineer a smooth 
transition to other forms of demand when the expansionary impact of the autonomous 
credit financed consumption comes to an end.
Given the recent rise of the private equity and venture capital industry in many 
industrial countries, a second aim of the thesis is to analyse how this financial sector 
contributes to the funding of investment in the different institutional and political 
settings of the market based system in the UK and the bank based system in Germany, 
and how the growth of this industry impacts on the distinctive features of the existing 
financial system. On the one hand, private equity and venture capital companies are 
often perceived as market based actors, since they mainly seek a return on their initial 
investment via IPOs on the stock market. On the other hand they are financial 
intermediaries that provide intensive management advice and have inside knowledge of 
the investee company, which may struggle to raise funding on the capital market 
directly. The question arises whether the growth of this industry in Germany and the 
UK re-enforces or changes features of the existing financial systems. Although these 
financial intermediaries are in general supposed to depend only to a low degree on 
credit finance and to be reluctant to transform the volatility of assets for investors, 
which would suggest a tendency towards a more market based system, the final 
outcome depends on how these actors are embedded in the institutional framework of 
the financial system and on the design of specific policies implemented in both 
countries to promote this industry.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Based on the endogenous money approach in 
macroeconomics the following chapter 2 develops a discrete-time portfolio model that 
distinguishes between financial systems via the contribution that financial 
intermediaries make in transforming volatile assets. A two-asset, discrete-time portfolio 
model is used to analyse the macroeconomics of financial systems by applying the 
framework of Tobin-Brainhard type models of asset accumulation with outside money.
11
Financial intermediaries transform a volatile capital asset into a stable asset, named 
money, for households. Here it is endogenous and represents inside money. Its net- 
effect is not zero because the financial sector builds up and draws on reserves, which 
are not priced on any market, whereas households make portfolio decisions. Equity 
finance and not only credit finance can be understood as being created ‘ex nihilo’, 
depending on the transformation by the financial intermediaries. With a focus on the 
wealth effect of changing capital prices a comparative-static analysis explores whether 
aggregate income in market based financial economies is less or more sensitive to profit 
expectations than in bank based financial systems.
Chapter 3 discusses theoretical and empirical aspects of equity finance gaps. Recent 
developments about conceptual issues and definitions of funding gaps and the concepts 
of ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ equity gaps are elaborated. The latter are those that should 
be tackled by government policies. Subsequently, economic paradigms are applied to 
the equity finance gap and also related to regional economic theories. It then 
investigates the explanatory power of location quotients with regard to finance gaps and 
other empirical methods used to detect finance gaps. Whereas economic approaches 
have so far only tried to detect ‘positive’ equity gaps, the superiority of surveys, and 
hence self-investigations, in providing empirical data about ‘normative’ equity gaps is 
eventually discussed which provides the link to a survey based analysis of UK and 
German private equity and venture capital industry in the next chapter. Chapter 4 
presents detailed survey results about the perception of equity funding gaps and of 
effective policy instruments in both countries, the differences between both countries 
are related to the distinctive institutional settings of a market based or bank based 
financial system.
The final chapter finally provides concluding remarks linking the micro- and 
macroeconomic issues of financial systems tackled in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
MACROECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:
A DISCRETE-TIME PORTFOLIO MODEL OF FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES AND MARKETS*
ABSTRACT
A two-asset, discrete-time portfolio model is used to analyse the macroeconomics of 
financial systems and to distinguish between so called bank (intermediary) and market 
based economies via a parameter for the transformation of assets by financial 
intermediaries. These institutions transform a volatile capital asset into a stable asset, 
named money, for households. It is endogenous and represents inside money. Its net- 
effect is not zero because the financial sector builds up and draws on reserves, which 
are not priced on any market, whereas households make portfolio decisions. In 
comparison to Tobin-Brainhard type models of asset accumulation with outside money 
the potential outcome of perverse results is considerably reduced. The comparative- 
static analysis shows that aggregate income in market based economies is less sensitive 
to profit expectations as long as the capital gain effect on consumption is not dominant. 
The aim of the chapter is fourfold. First, it argues, that Tobin only derived at Keynesian 
results, because he focussed his analyses on fiscal policy. These policies have, however, 
always a dominant effect in his models. Second, it argues that the design of models with 
endogenous money is superior. Third, limitations of previous Post Keynesian 
endogenous money approaches are overcome since the analyses incorporate portfolio 
decisions. Furthermore, equity finance and not only credit finance can be understood as 
being created ‘ex nihilo’, depending on the transformation by the financial 
intermediaries. Fourth, the model is applied to a comparison of financial systems.
JEL: E44, PS1, E12, Gi l ,  E20, B40
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* The equations o f  the models were presented at the thirtieth annual conference o f the 
‘Money Macro and Finance * Research Group at The Management School, Imperial 
College, London, 9-11 September 1998 and at the inaugural conference ‘Money, 
Investment and Risk’ at The Nottingham Trent University, 3-6 June 1998. I  would like 
to thank participants for useful hints.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The financial system of Anglo-American and German type economies are often 
described as market and bank (or intermediary) based. Yet, most of these studies refer 
to microeconomic arguments, recent developments in the theory of finance or empirical 
findings with regard to the financing of investment. They often highlight, how specific 
informational asymmetries are tackled within a different institutional design. Although 
the Neo-Keynesian approach seeks a micro foundation of macroeconomics the current 
Neo-Keynesian models have not been applied to a proper macroeconomic comparison 
of financial systems. From a macroeconomic point of view, it looks rather fruitful to 
start the analyses the other way around and to investigate the differences in the 
composition and distribution of assets and liabilities between households, banks, other 
intermediaries and firms. Whether they are a consequence of the institutional design of 
the economies or not, can be neglected in the first steps.
In this chapter a discrete-time portfolio model is developed which distinguishes between 
bank (intermediary based) and market based economies via the share of credit financed 
or intermediary transformed investment. The financial sector is assumed to build up or 
draw on (hidden) reserves (Alan/Gale 1995, Alan/Gale 2000). Money in the form of 
deposits is, as commonly understood, the reflex of bank lending, but it can also be the 
reflex of the investment by financial intermediaries, who transform assets in more stable 
assets for households. It represents endogenous inside money. In contrast to previous 
macroeconomic models with inside money this model explicitly incorporates the 
transformation function of financial intermediaries. In several papers Tobin had applied 
his ‘New View” to different forms of banking regulation and their effect on the ability 
of commercial banks to create money. Long run effects of reserve requirements have 
been analysed in Romer (1985). The first part of the chapter demonstrates the
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shortcomings of Brainhard’s and Tobin's approach when the focus is on pure outside 
money as net wealth and on fiscal policies. In the following main part the focus shifts 
from outside to inside money. The comparative static analyses of potential outcomes 
demonstrates that under common assumptions with regard to investment, consumption 
and portfolio behaviour perverse results do not happen. The comparison between 
intermediary and market based economies finally shows that the former are more 
sensitive to profit expectations. In other words, Keynes' marginal efficiency of capital 
exerts a stronger influence on aggregate income.
2.2 TOBIN RECONSIDERED
Portfolio theory in the tradition of Brainhard and Tobin offers a general framework for 
macroeconomic and monetary analyses. Within these models asset and liability options 
can be chosen according to their importance in a specific country under investigation 
(Tobin 1969). Early portfolio models of the Brainhard and Tobin type were continuous­
time models, which allowed a separation of portfolio and saving decisions. In other 
words, the flows, which represent additional stocks, were not incorporated into portfolio 
theoretic considerations. However, via the introduction of multiple discount rates 
according to the number of assets under investigation, these models are superior to the 
simplified Keynesian IS/LM-model, which focuses exclusively on monetary interest 
rates. In an elaborated portfolio-model a link between the interest rate on money, or 
government bonds, and the discount rate relevant for investment still exists, more 
indirectly though, and has to be established through postulated assumptions with regard 
to the portfolio behaviour of households. The shortcoming of the IS/LM model in which 
the long-term government bond rate is equated with the discount rate on capital 
investment is overcome. The general framework with the possibility to introduce a 
menu of relevant assets clarified many controversial issues of macroeconomics. A 
simple version in form of a two asset, money-capital model, can still be expressed 
within the standard IS/LM terms, the difference is that the vertical is the required return 
on capital equity by the financial markets and not the long-term government bond rate 
(Brainhard/Tobin 1977). The crucial factor for investment in these models is the relation
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between the demand and supply price of capital. The ratio of both, called q, would 
determine investment behaviour. Tobin refers to Keynes (Tobin 1978: 4):
"... The daily revaluations o f  the Stock Exchange, though they are primarily made to 
facilitate transfer o f  old investm ents between one individual and another, inevitable 
exert a decisive influence on the rate o f  current investment. For there is no sense in 
building up a new  enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a similar existing  
enterprise can be purchased; w hilst there is an inducement to spend on a new project 
w hat m ay seem  an extravagant sum, i f  it can be floated o f f  on the Stock Exchange at 
an im m ediate profit." [K eynes 1936]
Another criticism of the IS-LM model was that it conflates stocks and flows. Yet flows 
change stocks as Keynes' description of investment as an arbitrage process and of the 
link between the primary and secondary equity market stresses. Tobin neglected this 
link in his earlier models, which were, as the IS/LM-model, continuous-time models. 
Savings and portfolio decisions can be separated in these models. The former is 
typically not analysed, although the investment process must in the end lead to the ex 
post similarity of Saving and Investment via output. This is the autonomous investment 
assumption which reverses the causal link between saving and investment. The crucial 
question hereby is not how investment is financed in an ex ante sense but in which form 
created capital assets are held by the public and the transformation of these assets by 
financial intermediaries as a kind of ex post financing.1
In the late seventies Tobin presented some discrete-time models, in which asset 
accumulation is explicitly analysed. Savings add to financial asset, investment adds to 
the capital stock and also the government deficit has to be financed, either by printing 
money or through the emission of government bonds . In contrast to the monetarist 
view of a full crowding out of fiscal policy, he intended to demonstrate that even with 
regard to the government budget equation a full crowding out only happens under very 12
1 For a further discussion see chapter 1 and the remarks on disequilibrium stages with internal profits for 
the financing o f investment.
2 For a general discussion o f  this approach see Tobin (1980), Portfolio Choice and Asset Accumulation. 
For an application to fiscal policy see Tobin (1979), Deficit Spending and Crowding Out in Shorter and 
Longer Run, as well as the extended analysis in Tobin/Buiter (1980), Fiscal and Monetary Policies, 
Capital Formation and Economic Activity.
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restrictive and special conditions. However, his focus on fiscal policy avoids a problem 
which arises when rising profit expectations alone change the valuation of equity. It can 
be traced back to "Pitfalls of Financial Model Building", in which Brainhard and Tobin 
(1968) mention, that capital gains might later be realised. But this would in turn include 
declining equity prices and hence a declining q with negative effects on investment. 
Consequently, the reallocation of capital gains is the only item not shown in a table 
showing all other possible effects of their dynamic simulation. These effects can, 
however, be demonstrated quite clearly in discrete-time model.
2.3 THE OUTSIDE MONEY-CAPITAL MODEL
The following model describes the restrictive conditions under which rising profit 
expectation are expansionary and lead to investment in a discrete-time model of the 
Tobin type (Tobin 1979). To avoid the effects of fiscal policy in this model it shall be 
assumed that there is no government deficit, but a given amount of outside money. The 









There are two endogenous variables, the interest rate on capital rK and income Y which 
take only one value within the period1. The exogenous variables are the expected future 
profits R and Money M . The amount of outside-money is given because a variation 
would express the financing of the fiscal deficit with high powered money. The price 
level is given so that the values can be interpreted as nominal and real values 
simultaneously.
In this case the accounting identities and saving functions of Tobin (1979) are reduced 
to:
(1) Y = C + 1 = C + S
(2) S = I  = q K - AK
(3) = F K AqK -K_x + FM (...)
C is private expenditure on goods and services. S  saving, AK is the change in the capital 
stock for this period, qz is the value of one capital unit. Equation (3) expresses a 
definition of saving as asset accumulation. Saving and in addition capital gain or loss on 
the initial holdings change the public wealth. Each function expresses the
decision of wealthowners to hold values of either asset, K  or M , at the end of the 
period. It is a function of within-period variables. The endogenous variables are rK and 
Y . is the capital stock at the beginning of the period. The exogenous variable is 
Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital R . Investment depends on Tobin’s q :
(4) /  = 6{q) with 0'{q) > 0
1 For an overview o f  the symbols used refer to the end o f this chapter, where the notation is explained.
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which in turn is function of R and rK :
(5) q = R irK
This results into two equations for accumulation in the two assets:
(6) IK: F k (...) -  AqK • K_x -  6{q) - K _ ^ 0
(7) IM: __________ = 0
Note that the capital gain may make SR < 0 even if FR + FR > 0. The marginal 
propensity to save in traditional terms and in terms of asset accumulation is identical if 
the capital gain term is independent of Y : S Y = FyK + FY .



















Under common assumptions with regard to the demand for money F™ is positive and
the sign pattern of the Jacobian is
+  + / -  
+ / -  +
. The determinant is:
j |  = Fru -(F; - «  • K_, -  f f  qrr K _ ,)-f ;  ■ F ‘K
+ +
dY I dR —
(9)
K  ~  %rK ' K -\ ~  0 '-<IrK '  ^ - 1  <lrK ' K -\ +  0 '^ r K *  ^ - 1  
F„m 0
/IJI
- F “ *{qR -K_l+ 0'-qR -K_x)
FrM ~<lrK • * - ,-0 '-qrK -K_x) - F yk -F “
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This result is illustrated by the following graphs. IK and IM represent a equilibrium 
combinations (rK, Y) of asset accumulation in the specific asset. Case a) can be 
considered as normal case as IK is downward and IM is upward sloping. An increase in 
R leads to an outward shift of IK.
Diagram 2.1: Case a) Outside Money-Capital Model
dY / dR > 0 if < 0 and | J| > 0 (wealth increases)
IK2
The slope of the IM curve is drk /dY  = -F y / F ^  and the slope of the IK curve given
by drk /d Y  = -
F kr Y
K  •*-. - * * *  K-i
(implicit function theorem).
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Diagram 2.2: Case b) Outside Money-Capital Model
dY / dR < 0 if > 0 and | j |  > 0 (wealth declines)
rK IM
The second case can be considered as the monetarist case as discussed in Tobin (1979). 
The wealth effect dominates the substitution effect: A higher interest rate leads to 
additional saving but some of it goes into money. Despite a higher profit expectations 
R , Tobin’s q might stay constant or even decline with negative effects on investment 
and income.
There is a third case for which the result is negative. An increase in R leads to an 
inward/upward shift of a positively sloped IK curve if FYK is negative. The denominator 
of the general results refers to the slope of the curves. Its sign pattern depends on their 
relative slope to each other. If both, IK and IM, have positive slopes but IM is flatter, 
the result for dY I dR will also be negative even though is negative.
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Diagram 2.3: Case c) Outside Money-Capital Model
3YtdR<  0 if F "  < 0 and |j| < 0rK I I
Tobin developed discrete-time models to demonstrate how restrictive the conditions are 
at which monetarist conclusions regarding fiscal policy apply. We can now more 
generally remark that these are effectively the same conditions which also lead to 
perverse results of rising profit expectations in these models. As a result Tobin's 
analyses of deficit spending can hardly be called a study on the potential of a full 
crowding out as such. Without being mentioned it was rather an analyses on the features 
of the basic model and assumptions. His kind of deficit spending is unambigous and has 
always positive effects as long as the model does not show perverse results. However, 
the real problem lays deeper. There are two ways out of this dilemma. One line of 
reasoning could argue that the monetarist assumption are really restrictive and 
unrealistic, so that perverse results can hardly happen. More pronounced: As perverse 
results do not happen these monetarist assumptions have to be unrealistic. The other line 
would argue that models with such a structure suffer a fundamental shortcoming if such 
perverse results may occur even though the conditions for this to happen are slightly 
restrictive. Especially from a Keynesian point of view, models in which rising profit 
expectations are not sufficient for an investment and income expansion look at least 
odd.
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2.4 THE INSIDE MONEY-CAPITAL MODEL
In the following Tobin’s model is modified. The focus on money as state deficit and net 
wealth is changed. Investment can partly be financed by money creation. Banks and 
other financial intermediaries build up or draw on hidden reserves, which are not 
correctly and immediately valued on the capital market (Allan/Gale 1995, Allan/Gale 
2000). In other words, there is no Walrasian auctioneer for these assets. The model 



















To return to Keynes' citation, the inducement to spend on new investment projects is 
typically not financed by the emission of new equity alone, it rather financed by other 
means, internal or external finance. The traditional credit view described a monetary 
economy as one in which credit and money can be created ex nihilo (Wicksell 1898, 
Trautwein 1997). Investment can then be understood as an arbitrage process of the 
productive units, which takes some time and may later lead to a flotation of the new 
investment on the stock market. The valuation on the stock market is therefore rather a 
necessary condition for investment. However this line of reasoning came out of fashion 
after the discussion on inside and outside money and the Modigliani/Miller theorem on 
the irrelevance of financial structure.
The difference between a bank and market based financial system is seen in the share of 
investment financed through intermediaries yM which simultaneously creates additional 
liabilities or Money M  In a market based system the share of bank-credit financed 
investment is usually lower. The reasons might be found in an arm-length relationship 
between banks and firms, the availability of long-term bank credit for investment or a 
comparative advantage of banking via subsidies, taxation and regulation in the bank 
based system. During the development of the financial system the comparative 
advantage of banking might, however, diminish, when capital markets become more 
liquid and deep (Renversez 1996).
The accounting identities and saving functions are as follows:
(10) Y = C + I = C + S
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(11) S = I  <=> y K *qK -AK + AM = qK -AK = —!—-AM
Ym
(12) S(...) = F K( . . . ) -yK -AqK • K_, +FM(...)
Note in equation (11) the similarity to the traditional credit view I  = S + A M . The 
important difference in this model is that AM is part of the saving and also the portfolio 
decision of households. In an equilibrium it is part of the public portfolio and it is not 
additional to saving in capital assets but replaces partly the need for saving in capital 
assets for the public due to the transformation of assets by financial intermediaries. In 
this sense the model is in line with the ‘New View’. The ‘widow’s cruse’ or the ability 
of commercial banks and financial intermediaries to create money is somewhat limited 
(Tobin 1963). Equation (12) expresses again a definition of saving as asset 
accumulation. Created money is part of the end-of-period portfolio decision and hence 
‘ex post’ deliberately held. Otherwise, price effects and inflationary pressure, which are 
not analysed in this basic model, are likely to occur. Please note again that the capital 
gain, which here depends on the share of volatile assets held by the public yK, may
make SR < 0 even if FR + FR > 0. Finally, please note that these functions in this 
model only represent asset accumulation and saving of the households. Due to the 
transformation of assets by financial intermediaries, aggregate asset accumulation is 
likely to differ. According to the model a change in the valuation of capital in 
comparison to the previous period would be the necessary condition for this to happen. 
If q was not a simple within-period-variable a difference between aggregate and 
household’s saving and investment would also occur.
Asset accumulation is expressed in both assets and according to the share of their 
contribution to investment financing through the following equations:
(13) IK: F K( . . . ) - rK hqK- K ^ - r K •*(*)•£., =0
(14) IM: F u (...) - r u - m - K .  ,= 0
'--------------------- --------------------- / '------------v------------'
S I
with y K =1 - y M and 0 < yM,yK <1
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For reasons of simplicity we hereby imply that the parameter yM = 1 - y K is stable over 
time so that it describes new investment and accumulated stocks.
We derive partial derivatives in matrix form:
( 1 5 )
X  ̂
* 1 drK / dR - i k r -
f y cYldR _ j m k_
(16)
X  -  Tk ■ • K_, -  r K • ■ K_, FrK ' drK 1 dR Yk 'Qr 'K .  i Yk ' ^ ' ^ r '^-- i
_ K  X _d?!dR _ ~Yu i
(17) dY!dR =
- I K rK-IMR+IMrK'IKR 
IK,k •Fym - F yk •IMrK
This is positive if both nominator and denominator are positive:
(18)
dY!dR> 0
- I K fK •IMr +IMrK •IKr >0 a  IKKk -Fym - F y -IMrK >0
Entering the derivative functions of (16) and dividing by F^  and FY (assuming that 
FrK > 0 and FYM > 0) we rearrange the second condition in (18) for the denominator:
(19) 1-
1V+ Fy
-Yk * f k
rK
" Fym




assumptions and simply state that an increase in the interest on capital has a relative 
advantage in absorbing capital and an increase in income in absorbing money, the
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denominator is always positive. The left side of the inequality is also always positive.
’A/
Entering the maximum value for —Y—----—  = 1 into (19) we derive:
(20) yM <l + 0'=>yM <1.
After multiplication of the terms and division by qR • K_, and qfK • K_, the first 




< r M 0' for y M >0
K  a - ru ) o+o ')
K  < °  for y M =0
(22) is always fulfilled if F "  < 0. However, for yM > 0 the condition is also fulfilled 
for a positive range of , which increases with yM . This is the main difference to the 
former Tobin type model for which yM = 0 . Allegorically speaking the relative 
advantage of absorbing capital for an increase in its interest rate must be larger than the 
separated effect of increased profit expectations on the ratio of additional assets that 
have to be hold due to new investment and the increased value of the capital stock. An 




for y u > 0
Another relationship may make the structure of the model more transparent: Which 
conditions have to be fulfilled so that there is no change in the interest on capital despite 
changing profit expectations? The interest rate would not respond, if the relative 
advantage of absorbing money for an increase in income is exactly the same as the ratio 
of assets that have to be hold additionally due to increased profit expectations:
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We can now summarize:
dY!dR>  0
for Yu
(1 -ym) (1+0'Y < 1, Fr* > 0 and Fyu > 0
The graphical interpretation shows that IM pivots to the left and that IK will be less flat 
if financial intermediaries transform assets.
Diagram 2.4: Inside Money leads to a Pivoting of the Curves
IM
Secondly, an increase in R shifts both curves to the right1. In comparison with the 
outside money model this further ensures a positive result. The relative amount of the
1 From a technical point o f model construction this effect is similar to an increase of the external 
parameter bank reserves in the credit channel model o f Bemanke/Blinder (1988), which shifts both CC 
(former IS) and the LM curve outwards. Economically, investment increases the supply of the capital 
and simultaneously o f the money asset. An increase in the external parameter is also in general more 
expansionary (see part 5).
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shifts depends on the share of finance and whether a change in income relatively 
absorbs more money or capital. The change in rK is ambiguous depending on the 
relative shift of both curves.
J >0
Ft1 IF? > -I
K  -  qrr ■ k ., -  rK ■ f f -qrr ■ K~i
Diagram 2.5: Inside Money, Profit Expectations and the Shift of both Curves
IK2
The extreme case of a negative outcome is illustrated in diagram 2.6. It shows a 
situation in which IM has a negative slope and shifts only slightly to the right with an 
increase in R. IK shifts further upwards than IM:
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Diagram 2.6: Inside Money and the First Extreme Case
IK2
To complete the story there is one even more extreme case left. In which both curves 
have a negative slope, but in this case IM is flatter and IM shifts further upwards than 
I K  ( F rk very strong).
Diagram 2.7: Inside Money and the Second Extreme Case
IM2
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2.5 BANK AND MARKET BASED ECONOMIES WITH INSIDE MONEY
The previous analyses have shown that perverse results are less likely with financial 
intermediation. A further question is, whether increased profit expectations are always 
more expansionary in a system with a higher degree of intermediation:
(26) f f n m ' ( Y u )>(.)<=>F" +6>X  K_, for c¥lc>R(.yM)> 0
Equation (26) is the main final result of this chapter. A bank based system is more 
sensitive to profit expectations, or in Keynesian terms, to the marginal efficiency of 
capital. Only in the extreme case that an increase in the interest rate on capital has a 
stronger effect on dis-saving in the money asset than on the volume of investment the 
result may be the opposite. A larger degree of intermediation would, however, hamper 
the relative increase of the interest rate. Overall, consumption has to dominate 
investment in this case. Graphically, the IM curve is nearly horizontal, the positive 
effect of the larger outward shift is dominated by inward pivoting of the curve.
The overall result for the degree of intermediation consists of two effects. One is the 
capital gain effect on consumption. This positive effect for aggregate income is smaller 
in systems with a higher degree of intermediation since public wealth increases less, but 
the second effect on the interest rate on capital, that investment creates additional assets 
including the money assets, which is also sought as income increases, is larger. Splitting 
both effects and arguing that consumption might adopt faster, the dynamic movement 
might also be different: Market based systems react faster but not stronger, which is also 
a result of empirical studies. Finally and somewhat contrary to this view, Allan and 
Gale (1995) argue that the oil price shock in the seventies had a lower negative impact 
on income in bank based systems because the financial intermediaries smoothed 
consumption. However, they fully neglect the role of investment, the other part of 
aggregate demand. At first glance decreased profit expectations should have a stronger 
effect on income in bank based systems according to the above model, yet, in a deep 
crises, when investment becomes rather tiny, the result depends mainly on the capital
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gain effect on consumption, which has a larger negative impact in market based 
systems. Hence, in this specific case the findings of Allan and Gale are similar to the 
model presented here.
The above analyses so far implicitly assumed that the behaviour of households is 
identical despite different financial systems. However, a reasonable criticism could be, 
that households partly adopt to the system they live in, so that the differences in their 
responses to the systems are not as pronounced as described above. In an extreme case 
of structural neutrality flows are treated exactly similar to accumulated stocks and the 
asset accumulation behaviour of households with regard to income and interest rate 
changes is proportionate to the degree of intermediation. The response of either 
financial system to exogenous shocks with regard to income and interest rates then 
show similar effects. In a world with more than two assets, structural homogeneity 
would also imply that an increase in income leads to an automatic proportionate 
increase of all other assets including for example state bonds as a reflex of deficit 
spending. For a higher degree of substitution between inside and given outside money 
than towards real assets, inside money created partly replaces outside money in the case 
of an income expansion.
2.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter a discrete-time portfolio model was developed which distinguished 
between bank (intermediary based) and market based economies via the share of credit 
financed or intermediary transformed investment. The financial sector is assumed to 
build up or draw on (hidden) reserves. Money is, as commonly understood, the reflex of 
bank lending, but it can also be the reflex of the investment by financial intermediaries 
who transform assets in more stable assets for households. It represents endogenous 
inside money. The chapter demonstrated the shortcomings of Brainhard’s and Tobin's 
approach when the focus is on pure outside money as net wealth and on fiscal policies. 
In the following part the focus shifted from outside to inside money, whereby financial 
intermediaries build up and draw on reserves. The comparative static analyses of
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potential outcomes demonstrated that under common assumptions with regard to 
investment, consumption and portfolio behaviour perverse results do not happen. The 
comparison between intermediary and market based economies finally showed that the 
former are more sensitive to profit expectations, in other words, Keynes' marginal 
efficiency of capital, exerts a stronger influence on aggregate income. Since this is only 
the case when the capital gain effect on consumption is not dominant and furthermore 
since it could be argued that consumption adopts faster than investment, future research 
might aim to develop a dynamic version of the model. Further potential extensions look 
also promising. These would obviously include the introduction of policy variables. 
Another extension could integrate the stock of reserves, their changes in value and the 
consequences for the stability of intermediary based systems. Finally, an important 
question is also, whether the parameter, that reflects the transformation by financial 
intermediaries, is stable over the short term of the business cycle. All of these 
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CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES OF EQUITY FINANCE
GAPS
ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses theoretical and empirical aspects of equity finance gaps. Recent 
developments about conceptual issues and definitions of funding gaps and the concepts 
of ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ equity gaps are elaborated. Subsequently, economic 
paradigms are applied to the equity finance gap and also related to regional economic 
theories. Since the explanatory power of location quotients with regard to finance gaps 
is very limited the chapter investigates other empirical methods used to detect finance 
gaps. Surveys, and hence self-investigations, can provide information about ‘normative’ 
equity gaps, whereas economic approaches have so far only tried to detect ‘positive’ 
equity gaps.
JEL: G24, G28, R12
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the vagueness of the term ‘gap’ it is hardly surprising that its discussion is 
diffuse and does not concentrate on a specific issue. A common assumption in the 
discussion of equity gaps is, however, the idea that in some specific market segments -  
whether particular deal sizes, types of firms, maturities of finance, stages of firm 
development, economic sectors, or specific regions -  the quantity of capital supplied is 
for one reason or another insufficient relative to the demand. In other words the realized 
market outcome in a segment is lower than expected und could be increased if the 
supply of equity capital was not hampered by some factors.
Policies to fill a finance ‘gap’ are confronted with two interrelated problems. First, the 
concept of a ‘funding gap’ is vague and controversial. Different authors present 
diverging definitions and arrive at opposite conclusions. Second, even with a precise 
definition the empirical measurement of funding gaps remains equally problematic.
The research leading aims of this chapter are four-fold:
1. To examine the state of the art in economics with regard to the definitions of 
equity gaps and to present an elaborated version of these definitions
2. To apply general economic paradigms to the equity finance gap and also relate 
them to regional economic theories
3. To analyse the explanatory power of location quotients with regard to finance 
gaps
4. To assess empirical methods used to detect finance gaps
3.2 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES: WHAT IS A ‘GAP’
Different authors highlight different aspects of finance gaps. Lonsdale (1997) provides 
an extensive historic overview on the political discussion in the UK and for example 
defines the UK equity gap as “the shortage in the availability of equity capital in
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amounts of less than £ 400.000 to businesses with a reasonable prospect of profitability” 
(Lonsdale 1997: 4). Virtanen (1996: 43) would detect a finance gap, if there is some 
form of price discrimination. Either marginal return on investment exceeds the marginal 
cost of capital due to discontinuities in the supply to some firms so that investment does 
not take place at all, or these firms suffer from a form of price discrimination. Affected 
firms incur a higher cost of finance even if this is adjusted for differentials in risk and 
administration cost. Norton (2001: 241) analyses the market activity across risk and 
return combinations. Companies that have a default rate above 2% do not receive loans 
from banks, in the case that these companies also have an expected return rate below 20 
percent they are not a target for the venture capital industry or IPOs, so that they suffer 
from a finance lack in the ‘gap’ area. For the UK context Cruikshank (2000: chapter 6) 
argues that “there is clearly a mismatch between the needs of firms requesting small 
scale equity investments and the supply of these investments. Venture capital deals tend 
to be too large and business angel finance is underdeveloped. This gives rise to the long 
recognized market failure known as the equity gap.”
The questions where the gap stems from and which finance needs should actually be 
fulfilled are still not answered, however, in a neoclassical world of perfectly 
competitive capital markets, costless and perfect information and complete contracting, 
there would be no market failure. All resources of the economy would be fully 
employed and individual preferences of investors would not matter because the market 
value of a company would always be the sum of all claims on its assets due to the 
market’s ability to provide the required split of assets and liabilities without any cost. In 
this case the financial structure of a company becomes irrelevant for its market value 
(Modigliani/Miller 1958). Persistent gaps, or ‘mismatches’ to use Cruickshank’s phrase, 
imply an equilibrium situation in which the volume of investment in a particular 
segment of the economy is below that which would emerge in a perfectly competitive 
market.
A symposium published in the Economic Journal tried to clarify the issue using 
arguments based on economic theory; the articles of contributors and aspects involved 
demonstrate that the concept of a funding gap is a complex issue. Cressy (2002)
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summarizes the two approaches that emerged from the debate. He defines an 
equilibrium, in which the volume of funding is below that which would emerge in a 
perfectly competitive market in the aforementioned sense, as a ‘positive’ funding gap. A 
‘normative’ funding gap is defined as a market failure, for which the appropriate policy 
response leads to an increase in the volume of funding. A ‘positive’ funding gap is then 
interpreted as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a ‘normative’ funding gap.
Since the two definitions provided on the symposium as an overview represent only the 
two extreme ends of possible market situations it seems worthwhile to analyse the 
issues involved in more detail. Two further market situations should be added. The first 
one tackles transaction cost which do not imply a market failure. The second is a market 
failure where a policy to increase funding is not appropriate. Furthermore one should 
become embroiled in further issues related to market failures. In general a market 
failure can exists for (at least) two reasons: incomplete markets and information 
failures, though these are not mutually exclusive and are often inter-related. A market 
failure in private markets exists whenever the market fails to provide a good or service, 
even though the cost of providing it is less than what individuals are willing to pay 
(Greenwald/Stiglitz 1986). Positive spill-overs from R&D also belong into this category 
as the market fails to co-ordinate the actions and preferences of market participants.
3.2.1 An Elaboration of Conceptual Issues of Equity Gaps
The following figure illustrates potential market situations (see Figure 3.1). A positive 
gap in the sense that investment is lower than it could be under optimal conditions is a 
necessary condition for a market failure as defined above. The existence of a market 
failure (and also the existence of a ‘positive’ funding gap as previously argued) is itself 
a necessary condition for a gap in the normative sense, where policies may increase 
overall efficiency. A situation of an overinvestment put forward by de Meza (2002) 
intersects with some of these definitions.
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Figure 3.1: Sets of Market Situations and the Equity Gap
Even when a ‘positive’ funding gap exists according to the definition that compares the 
market situation with a perfectly competitive market with costless contracting, there 
“may be good reason that private producers have failed to provide a particular good or 
service. There may be large transaction costs associated with providing it” (Stiglitz 
1988: 78). If the probability of default or transaction cost are genuine and cannot be 
changed there is no market failure and no need to close the equity gap perceived as 
‘deficiency of supply’. Transactions costs associated with venture capital deals do not 
vary sufficiently with deal size, thus making small deals disproportionately expensive to 
execute. Thus it is often argued in the UK that the basic costs associated with due 
diligence and related project screening and evaluation do not differ appreciably whether 
the deal size is, say, £250,000 or £5m. The deal costs/deal size ratio thus tends to
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militate against new small projects, and it is this segment of the market that has most 
often been identified with the equity gap (Cruickshank 2000).
A form of a market failure exists when markets are incomplete because they are 
segmented. For the venture capital industry there is often a hierarchy of market steps 
involved, for example from initial cash injections by friends or family, to investments 
by informal business angels, to investments by active institutional venture capital 
companies, and finally exit via some route in order to liquidate the fund and realise 
gains (through an IPO, trade sale, etc). Norton (2001: 242) gives an illustration of a 
venture capital cycle in which investors from family and friends, to passive informal 
investors, active informal to institutional venture capital market support the 
development stages of the product from concept over working model, prototype to 
production introduction and finally sales. If this chain or tiered system of venture capital 
co-ordination is incomplete for certain types of investment, a resultant market failure 
may emerge. For example investors will be reluctant to invest and specialise in seed 
stages of companies if there is no relay/following market segment in which other 
investors provide an exit option for the original investor. Venture capital activity 
remains constrained if it suffers from shortcomings on both side of its market segment -  
when it is not fed by developing early stage projects on the one hand, and when the state 
of the stock market and of the unquoted market for trade sales restricts later exit options 
on the other hand (Murray 1993). A government task could then be to co-ordinate and 
build the surrounding infrastructure for these markets because independent decisions 
made by market actors will not create these adjunct markets and also will not close the 
gap. Hence, there may be a need for a tiered system of venture capital co-ordination, 
that relates to the different growth phases of VC start-up companies (Harding 1999: 20).
One reason for market failures that can render policy intervention useful in order to 
reach a social optimum are positive knowledge spill-overs in R&D (Lemer 2002). If 
firms cannot extract the value of innovation exclusively for themselves, for example via 
patents, other market participants, firms and consumers, will participate in the benefits 
of the innovation. Therefore the incentive to invest in R&D for an individual firm is too
40
low to reach a social optimum. In comparison, costless and complete contracting would 
make all benefactors contribute to the cost of developing the innovation.
Policies could try to reduce the transaction cost for the individual firm by creating an 
infrastructure that promotes the possibility of negotiations between the market 
participants, or policies could try to improve the incentives for the firm and investors to 
engage in R&D investment directly. The following figure illustrates the relationship 
between private and social rates of return when there are positive spill-overs.




Private Hurdle Rate Private Rate o f Return
Source: Design of Graph adapted from Link/Scott (2001)
As there are no negative external effects but only positive spill-overs, all investment 
projects are located on or above the 45 degree line. The social return rate is at least 
similar to the private return rate. Private investment decisions made individually will 
only take place if the private return rate covers at least the private hurdle rate, which 
mainly represents the private refinancing cost. Therefore these projects have to be 
located to the right from the ‘private hurdle rate’, for example investment project C. The 
social hurdle rate is lower in comparison to the private hurdle rate because public 
institutions have in general lower refinancing cost than private investors. Either public 
institutions proceed with their projects on their own behalf, or they encourage private 
investors to take out investment projects that would otherwise be below the private
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hurdle rate, for example projects A and B, that are initially below the private hurdle 
rate. Delegating private actors to invest may increase the efficiency due to a market 
approach and competitive forces. Hence the arrows express the potential for higher 
social return. In the same way, private investment projects covering the private hurdle 
rate can be influenced to take account of and to target social returns, so that project C 
reaps a higher social return rate than initially and individually planned.
In the UK, for example, not only has the venture capital market preferred MBOs to new 
high-tech start-ups, but annual rates of return on early stage investments have tended to 
be lower than those on later stage investments (Bank of England 2001). This experience 
leads venture capitalist investors to give young high-tech enterprises a wide berth, in 
favour of large established companies, that have a proven track record, are involved 
with less risky and tested technologies and have a more certain rate of return. While this 
may reflect problems on the demand side (too few good early-stage projects), it can also 
be a consequence of the high transaction and agency costs of this kind of investment.
Another important cause for market failures that is often discussed concerns information 
failures and asymmetries, and the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection to 
which these give rise. One area of the venture capital market where these problems may 
be most damaging to capital supply is again that of young high-tech firms 
(Carpenter/Petersen 2002). Such ventures are by their nature very risky, the failure rate 
is high, and potential financial returns are uncertain. Disagreement between the investee 
company and the venture capital company may simply arise due to a divergence of 
belief. Disagreement stems from divergence of beliefs about the pay-off probability 
distribution or from conflict of interests that stem from asymmetric pay-offs, different 
utility to risk or different endowments portfolios (Hirshleifer/Riley 1992). The investee 
company may have to invest too much to provide information in order to persuade the 
venture capital company of the ‘real’ value of its idea. These problems are further 
aggravated when entrepreneurs, as such, are considered to be in general over-optimistic 
in their assessment of success and growth or are considered to maintain ‘animal spirits’.
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Although the process of due diligence is intended to bridge this information gap, and 
venture capitalism is itself based on ‘relationship investment’ (in which the venture 
capital company takes on a close and continuing relationship with the firms in which it 
invests), nevertheless major information asymmetries, which can be defined by a 
consensus that one side has better information, are likely to characterise new, especially 
high-tech start-ups. The opaqueness of new technologies, the lack of a track record, and 
in certain cases few physical assets, imply that venture capitalists are typically less well 
informed about these projects compared to their entrepreneurs. Without collaterals, 
capital does merely exist in the form of an option value to produce and size the 
investment opportunity based on the idea of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs, who do 
not contribute a significant amount of their own assets to the project, have three reasons 
to put the value of an investment opportunity in a better light than it is. First, 
successfully communicating a higher than ‘real’ value of their ideas will bring them a 
bigger negotiated share of future income. Second, entrepreneurs will merely participate 
in the upside chance of the investment leading to tendencies not to be transparent about 
the risks involved. Third, once the project starts hidden action and moral hazard give 
rise to opportunities for consumption on the job. Due to the asymmetric pay-outs 
entrepreneurs, who are not risk averse, will also aim to switch to riskier investment 
strategies if these promise a higher expected return rate.
Signalling and screening may offer a way out of this dilemma and lead to better 
investment decisions, but, of course, cost are involved. Producing a signal about the 
quality of an investment project should be sufficiently more expensive for entrepreneurs 
with less promising investment opportunities, so that they refrain sending a signal. For 
investors screening the quality of an investment project can lead to a solution in which 
capital is only offered with attached strings that an entrepreneur with less promising 
investment opportunities would not take. The ‘ex ante’ design of incentive compatible 
contracts between investee company and the venture capital company is a complex task 
as it has to reflect individual characteristics of the project and potential future 
developments without restricting the flexibility in upcoming managerial decision. It 
cannot be done in a perfect way that avoids all of these conflicts. Reid (1999) analysed 
relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and concluded that settled
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implicit and explicit contracting embodies “much specialized ‘time and place’ 
information so that the notion of a typical or representative optimal contract was 
meaningless” (Reid 1999: 300). The fine details of information provision and 
monitoring within the investor/investee relationship defy a unique contracting outcome. 
Whereas screening, signalling and designing a contract bear costs even before an 
investment decision is made, monitoring the behaviour of the investee’s management is 
an ongoing undertaking, that also proves to become more difficult and costly the larger 
the geographical distance between investor and investee becomes. A ‘hands on‘ 
approach provides managerial advice but also implies that major conflicts between 
entrepreneurs and investor can be avoided. In comparison to business angels, venture 
capital companies rather attempt to reduce their risk via ‘ex ante’ contracting and less 
via flexible ‘ex post’ monitoring (von Osnabrugge 2000). Entrepreneurs are, however, 
reluctant to give up management rights and control. Having to do this upfront may 
explain why they tend to mistrust venture capital involvement.
Some authors argue that there is no deficiency in the supply of venture capital, but a 
demand gap. Rather than sponsoring venture capital funds, policies should attempt to 
fill knowledge and information gaps on the side of the entrepreneur and make them 
‘investor ready’ (Harrison/Mason 2000, Mason/Harrison 2003). The case for a theory of 
overinvestment is put forward in one article of the 2002 Economic Journal symposium 
on equity gaps. If problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are inevitable or not 
tackled by government policies, programmes to increase the funding of the venture 
capital industry may lead to overinvestment and lower efficiency. Especially when 
entrepreneurs are overoptimistic with regard to their investment projects and request 
amount of finance that is not justified by the projects expected returns and probability of 
default, a reduction of the finance available would reduce adverse selection. Less 
capable entrepreneurs, who received finance simply because they could pledge more of 
their own capital to the project or provide more collaterals then other entrepreneurs, 
would have to leave the market and become employees. Therefore funds could be 
directed to entrepreneurs with a higher competence (de Meza 2002).
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Though a theory of overinvestment somehow rests on the assumption of full 
employment and will probably be put forward less often after the boom years of the 
venture capital industry was followed by a pronounced slum, it indicates clearly that 
market failures induced by information problems are not easy to solve. Straight forward 
policy advice is therefore hardly available. Furthermore policies with their own inherent 
potential failures and debt weight losses may not necessarily improve the overall 
outcome for the economy even when there is an insufficient supply of funds. When 
information problems are, however, the cause of market failures, one emphasis in 
developing financial institutions could “be on the national collection of investment 
opportunity information rather than just on pooling national funds” (Greenwald et al 
1993:91).
3.2.2 Economic Paradigms and the Regional Dimension of Equity Gaps
The development of regional and local financial institutions and their financial position 
may foster regional development (Porteous 1995). It can also contribute to this task of 
collecting investment information. Regional differences in venture capital investment 
intensity may arise because of geographical variations in economic structures, such as 
the rate of small firm start-ups, the sectoral composition of industry, the relative 
significance of innovative and high-tech enterprise, the overall level of regional 
economic buoyancy, and so on. When venture capital and private equity finance is a 
preferred solution for specific market structures, and when regions differ with regard to 
these market structures, it is to be expected that VC and PE activity is uneven in the 
regions. Such structurally based regional differences can hardly be interpreted as 
‘regional equity gaps’. This interpretation would only be justified if regional differences 
in venture capital investment reflected not just geographical variations in economic 
structures, but also a specific regional risk perceptions, the operation of explicit spatial 
proximity or related clustering effects of the venture capital industry that led to under- 
funding in some regions relative to others.
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Split in different paradigms, economic theory offers several different starting points to 
explain regional funding gaps (see table 3.1; for an overview of some issues involved 
see Dow/Rodriguez-Fuentes 1991). For Neo-Ricardians regional differences in the 
profit rate direct capital flows and determine regional economic activity. The profit rate 
is itself determined by the regional wage bargaining process or regional productivity 
differentials. In the neoclassical view regionally segmented capital market hamper 
capital mobility and transaction costs imply price and cost dispersals in finance. 
Opportunity cost in obtaining information on returns increases with the remoteness of 
the investee company and is easily added into the neoclassical framework 
(Roberts/Fishkind 1979). Within the Neo-Keynesian approach incomplete capital 
mobility is interpreted as a result of regional information-based capital market 
imperfections with asymmetric information. Problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard induce more severe finance constraints when investors from other regions have 
less local information. The regional supply of funds consists therefore primarily of those 
provided by regional financial institutions and depends on the wealth of these 
institutions (Greenwald et al 1993). The Post-Keynesian approach highlights the role of 
regional liquidity preferences. These influence both demand and supply for regional 
funds. However, there is the general danger that regional risk and also regional 
uncertainty are simply categories used to explain finance constraints that could not be 
explained otherwise and hence serve as a black box. If less favourable finance 
conditions in a specific region cannot be explained by differences in firm specific 
variables and the variables of the financing relationship between investee company and 
financial institutions it may be concluded that companies in the region suffer from 
higher regional risks or are simply discriminated against (Neuberger 2000). “The 
determinants of regional risks are explained by regional theories, which analyze how 
birth, growth, and death of firms depend on regional variables and why some regions 
have higher economic growth rates than others.” (Neuberger et al 2001: 3-4) The danger 
of a circular argument looms large, since it is not clear whether it is the real sphere of 
the economy that determines the financial sphere, or whether it could not also be the 
other way around.
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Table 3.1 aims to provide a short overview of different economic paradigms, their 
arguments and policy advices.
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Table 3.1: Economic Paradigms and the Equity Gap
N eoclassic N eo -K ey n esia n P o stk eyn esian N eo-R icard ian
P arad igm atic  focus
microeconomics, intertemporal preferences, 
efficient ressource allocation
asymmetric information, micro 






F actors lead in g  to  
gen era l finance gap s
deviations from underlying assumptions of 
general equilibrium model: frictions, 
transactions costs
asymmetric information liquidity preference
G en era l policy  ad vice avoid distortions for markets
design and promotion of an 
infrastructure for incentive 
compatible contracts
F actors con tr ib u tin g  
to reg ion al gaps
market segmentation
asymmetric information due to 




regional activity depends on regional 
profit rate determined by wage rate and 
productivity
A p p lied  to eq u ity  gap
irrelevance of capital structure except for 
tax incentives favouring debt and 
bankruptcy cost
hidden action and hidden 
information within equity finance
P olicy  advice
increase capital mobility and avoid market 
segmentation
promote local financial institutions
promote local financial 
institutions
B la ck  sp ot
unemployment of resources and 
macroeconomics
uncertainty (not measurable risk)
monetary and finance 
issues not applied to equity
no finance approach (except with 
circulation sphere as add-on)
3.3 EMPIRICAL ISSUES: WHERE IS A ‘GAP’?
For obvious reasons it would be far easier to analyse and measure phenomena that 
actually exist in the real world rather than setting out to detect funding gaps. Detecting 
equity gaps and quantifying their magnitude is not straightforward. Some difficulties 
involved are mentioned in the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter.
3.3.1 Economic Approaches to Empirical Issues
Empirical research on finance constraints and investment behaviour is first and far most 
confronted with the task to identify and measure investment opportunities of firms. 
These are not directly observable, so that adequate proxies for investment opportunities 
have to act as substitutes. Tobin’ q, the ratio of the supply and demand price of capital 
for the firm, or in other words, the shadow value to firms of additional investment, is 
hardly measurable. Empirical studies have also not been able to relate it sufficiently to 
the investment behaviour of firms. Furthermore, to relate it to new investment 
opportunities it should be based on a marginal analysis according to the neoclassical 
approach and hence distinguish between the value for the existing capital stock and 
additional investment. This is, for example, obvious in the case of imperfect 
competition and also, when investment decisions are not independent from financing 
decisions. However, the introduction of a marginal q renders the analysis and the 
measurement even more complicated when expectations are taken into account 
(Abel/Blanchard 1986). New investment opportunities and new investments are rather 
linked to expectations of their future profitability than to current profitability. These 
expectations in turn depend on individual managers, entrepreneurs, firms and 
investment projects. The problems of measuring marginal q are, however, avoided in a 
neoclassical approach which uses an Euler equation for describing the firms optimal 
capital stock and for modelling investment decisions. Here, the investment function is 
substituted by a dynamic optimisation of capital stock equations and the outcome is 
compared to the ideal conditions of a classical competitive model without transaction 
cost (Hubbard 1998: 209). Yet, problems with regard to expectations are neglected.
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If firms and entrepreneurs exhibit a maximising behaviour the degree of investment 
opportunities used should be negatively correlated to finance constraints experienced by 
these units. However, to detect and measure finance constraints is equally difficult. 
First, an ‘a priory’ identification via proxies for constrained firms may oversee that 
firms may shift groups over time and that hence a cross sectional data pool may not be 
sufficient to capture important changes of firm’s characteristics. Second, proxies for 
finance constraints have there own shortcomings. For example, a spread between 
internal and external funding rates is also determined by the risk perception of external 
investors, which is not simply a function of information cost and incentive problems but 
also of risk related differences of firms and investment projects. Since the net worth of 
firms could be a good proxy for finance constraints but cannot be observed directly, 
many studies use the cash flow of firms as proxy for net worth and hence finance 
constraints. More elaborated approaches distinguish several proxies, for example, 
dividend policies and low pay-outs as proxy for finance constraint and cash flow to 
measure the change in net worth. A positive correlation between a firm’s cash-flow and 
investment is derived (Fazzari/Hubbard/Petersen 1988). However, a link between cash 
flow and investment may simply reflect conventional neoclassical assumptions and not 
a constraint of firms in time or cross-sectional. The proxies for net worth and for 
changes in net worth may also not be independent from changes in investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, another study found that companies which published most 
statements about finance constraints in annual reports appeared to be the least sensitive 
to cash flow with regard to investment. Cash flow would hence not be a good proxy for 
finance constraints (Kaplan/Zingales 2000). An overview article on financing 
constraints and determinants of investment, however, concludes that economist agree on 
two principal findings. First and ceteris paribus, investment is significantly correlated 
with proxies for changes in the net worth or internal funds. Second, the importance of 
this finding is especially relevant to firms facing information related capital-market 
imperfections (Hubbard 1998: 193).
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In regional economics exists the general danger that regional risk and also regional 
uncertainty are simply categories used to explain finance constraints that could not be 
explained otherwise and hence serve as a black box. If less favourable finance 
conditions in a specific region cannot be explained by differences in firm specific 
variables and the variables of the financing relationship between investee company and 
financial institutions it may be concluded that companies in the region suffer from 
higher regional risks or are simply discriminated against (Neuberger 2000). “The 
determinants of regional risks are explained by regional theories, which analyze how 
birth, growth, and death of firms depend on regional variables and why some regions 
have higher economic growth rates than others.” (Neuberger et al 2001: 3-4) The danger 
of a circular argument looms large, since it is not clear whether it is the real sphere of 
the economy that determines the financial sphere, or whether it could not also be the 
other way around.
The recent article by Neuberger et al (2001) exemplifies the problems involved. It 
concludes that there is an East-West gap in lending towards SMEs in Germany, because 
firms located in East Germany pay significantly higher interest rates on loans and also 
provide more collaterals, which can not be fully explained by the firm specific variables 
used. Hence the authors point to regional risk factors of regional economic theories. It is 
however astonishing that the debt-equity ratio is not included as one variable in the 
analyses as data shows a lower ratio in East Germany and the authors write that the 
“equity gap between East and West Germany could not be closed, despite large public 
equity aid programs. The scarcity of equity capital is most severe for SMEs which have 
no access to the capital market and are not owned by West German or foreign firms” 
(Neuberger et al: 2). 1 Contrary to the article’s result it may well turn out that bank 
finance is actually stretched to the limits of a suitable capital structure and of the 
increased risk that goes with it. Therefore banks demand higher collateral and interest
3.3.2 The Regions and the Limited Explanatory Power o f Location Quotients
1 D’Auria et al 1999 and Ewert/Schenk 1998 use the debt-equity ratio as a variable and find that it is 
positively correlated to the interest rate on loans. D’Auria et al also apply their analyses to regional 
economics in Italy: A South-North interest rate gap remains even with the debt-equity ratio included in 
the analyses.
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rates. In this case equity finance could be the bottleneck of development and the 
conclusion would be an East-West equity gap and not a bank lending or general funding 
gap. Even in this case, however, a change in the regional market expectations of risk 
and return and a revaluation of equity can change the debt-equity ratio dramatically (and 
also subsequently the willingness of banks to lend). This demonstrates the circularity of 
arguments in regional financial economic theories. Changes in the perception of 
regional risk change the capital structure, whereas equally the capital structure of firms 
change the risk of investments.
Location quotients can provide a crude measure of potential gaps by comparing actual 
regional shares of national venture capital investment with ‘expected’ shares based on 
some measure for the regional share of local ‘potential’ demand in the form of 
investment opportunities. A result below one indicates a lower than expected share and 
vice versa. But what is the most meaningful measure of local ‘potential’ demand and 
investment opportunities? Investment opportunities can hardly be quantified. Regional 
shares of population, of national GDP, of the national stock of small enterprises, of the 
national stock of high tech companies, of new start-ups and so on, may all give different 
results. Assuming, that the creativity of humans across the regions to detect investment 
opportunities and that investment opportunities are similar across the regions, a ‘fair’ 
measurement would relate venture capital investment to the population and analyse 
whether the flow of these investments increases absolute inequality. A relation to GDP 
would show whether these investments increase relative inequality between the regions. 
Many studies (Mason/Harrison 1991 and 2001, BVCA 2002, Martin et al 2003) relate 
regional venture capital investment to the regional stock of enterprises registered for 
VAT within the specific region even though headquarters of firms are often located in 
centres of national economic activity, for example London, which tends to distort the 
expected values. An alternative is to relate the figure to formation rates, which seems to 
be a better approach (for example Martin 1989). Partly one cannot avoid the bias 
mentioned above, but SMEs without activity outside the registration region make up a 
large share of registrations and de-registrations. A further advantage for an analysis of 
venture capital investment is that a location quotient for ‘early stage’ investment can be 
based on an appropriate share. London and the South East have, however, not only the
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highest birth rate but simultaneously the highest death rate. If firms in these regions are 
characteristically more risky, the capital structure of firms should reflect this, and equity 
finance should play a disproportionate larger role in comparison to debt finance. A 
location quotient based on formation rates would partly cover this effect. The following 
tables show the regional distribution of venture capital investment and different location 
quotients based on the stock of companies and formation rates for both countries1. For 
the UK a location quotient based on the population is added. They all indicate a relative 
concentration of venture capital investment in London. Only the location quotient for 
expansion finance, based on the stock of companies (North West Merseyside) and based 
on formation rates (North West-Merseyside and Scotland), show some higher results in 
other regions. For London the indicated concentration declines coherently with the 
specific location quotient used. It is highest for the population based quotient, lower 
with the stock of companies, and the lowest with a location quotient based on newly 
registered firms. A vibrant economy with fast changes in local consumer preferences 
and high adaptability and innovation potentials of companies represents growth 
potentials and a high level of individual risk. Given such an economy with higher 
individual down side risks yet upside chances the relative use of equity for external 
finance compared to credit should also mirror the structure of the local economy. 
However, the problem of circularity looms large. Does the financial or real sector of the 
regional economy determine the other? Is it perhaps simply the regional availability of 
equity finance and other innovative financial instruments that lead to this ‘real’ structure 
of the economy, or is it the other way around?
1 Unfortunately, the German Venture Capital Association (BVK) does not provide a regional breakdown 
according to business stages. The corresponding data was thankfully provided by KfW. It is obviously 
biased since it only covers investments in which this public institution was involved. Further remarks on 
the regional distribution o f  public subsidies and their related location quotients based on the stock of  
companies are in Martin et al (2003). One argument, provided by KfW, for the relative large share of 
subsidies to the New Bundeslaender, is that the start-ups rates there are comparatively high. The table 
confirms this view as all location quotients based on start-ups are lower than those based on the stock of 
companies. However, the results in ‘early stage’ for Sachsen-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are 
still remarkably high, and it is also the case when compared with some other New Bundesander. This 
does not necessarily indicate a top down discrimination against other regions, since the regional 
distribution o f public support appears to be demand driven and it also depends on the activity o f regional 
authorities. Other regions may instead have referred more strongly to tbg programmes that are not 
covered in the table. DtA and tbg were only recently, at the beginning o f 2003, integrated into KfW. 
However, some national programmes specifically target the New Bundeslander and offer higher 
percentages o f co-investment and guarantees and absolute amounts..
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Table 3.2: Regional Distribution of VC Investment (by Stage) and Location Quotients, UK, (Average for 1998-2001)
A m ount
(P ercen t)
L ocation  Q u otien t
R egion
Total/EarlyStage/Expansions/MBO
(L Q 1/L Q 2/L Q 3)
MBI Total Early Stage Expansions MBO/MBI
London 29.5 31.8 24.0 31.2 2.39 2.02 1.48 2.58 2.07 1.60 1.94 1.56 1.21 2.53 2.03 1.57
South East 19.0 22.8 16.0 20.0 1.40 1.17 1.17 1.67 1.37 1.41 1.18 0.99 0.99 1.47 1.20 1.23
South East & London (Subtotal) 48.5 54.6 40.0 51.2 1.87 1.51 1.34 2.10 1.71 1.51 1.54 1.25 1.11 1.97 1.60 1.42
East of England 6.8 11.5 6.0 6.7 0.74 0.70 0.69 1.26 1.18 1.16 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.73 0.63 0.68
South West 3.8 4.0 3.2 4.5 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.53 0.50 0.54
East Midlands 8.2 3.2 8.3 9.0 1.16 1.09 1.25 0.45 0.46 0.49 1.18 1.21 1.26 1.28 1.31 1.37
West Midlands 8.2 4.0 7.4 9.0 0.92 0.90 1.02 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.83 0.90 0.92 1.01 1.00 1.12
Yorkshire-Humber 4.5 3.3 4.5 4.5 0.53 0.61 0.68 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.64 0.68 0.53 0.64 0.68
North West-Merseyside 10.1 7.3 17.5 7.3 0.88 0.83 1.01 0.64 0.75 0.73 1.52 1.80 1.75 0.64 0.75 0.73
North East 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.5 0.30 0.54 0.56 0.23 0.40 0.43 0.37 0.64 0.69 0.35 0.60 0.65
Wales 1.3 0.7 2.0 1.5 0.26 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.41 0.28 0.58 0.30 0.21 0.44
Scotland 7.8 9.0 9.5 4.0 0.90 1.02 1.19 1.04 1.24 1.37 1.10 1.25 1.45 0.46 0.55 0.61
Northern Ireland 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.18 0.15 0.24 0.48 0.39 0.63 0.18 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.09 0.14
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Martin et al (2003): BVCA (2002); Own Calculations: LQ1 & LQ3, DTI: Start-ups 2001, Resident Population 2000; 
Note:
LQ1 = (Region’s share of national venture capital investment)/(Region’s share of national resident population)
LQ2 = (Region’s share of national venture capital investment)/(Region’s share of national stock of VAT-registered businesses) 
LQ3 = (Region’s share of national venture capital investment)/(Region’s share of newly registered businesses)














Early Stage Expansions M BO/M BI
Baden-Wtirttemberg 13.3 13.8 11.7 15.0 36.3 1.05 1.06 1.10 1.10 0.82 0.93 1.07 1.2 2.59 2.89
Bayern 21.1 24.5 22.6 27.7 0.9 1.21 1.27 1.46 1.47 1.30 1.36 1.59 1.66 0.02 0.05
Southern Germany 34.4 38.3 34.3 42.7 37.2 1.09 1.18 1.26 1.31 1.10 1.17 1.36 1.46 1.18 1.27
Berlin 9.7 13.6 15.2 12.1 8.6 2.55 2.25 3.68 3.15 3.98 3.52 3.17 2.81 2.25 1.99
Brandenburg 2.2 2.6 2.3 3.0 4.0 0.83 0.75 1.01 0.89 0.86 0.78 1.12 1.02 1.50 1.36
Bremen 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.81 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.94 1.86 1.75 0.14 0.00 0.00
Hamburg 5.0 5.9 7.5 4.4 1.5 1.89 2.06 1.87 2.43 2.34 3.09 1.37 1.81 0.46 0.62
Hessen 10.5 4.9 4.8 5.2 0.0 1.34 1.20 0.62 0.56 0.72 0.55 0.79 0.6 0.00 0.00
Mecklenburg-V orpommem 0.7 3.7 4.5 2.9 0.0 0.40 0.36 2.18 1.92 2.58 2.33 1.66 1.5 0.00 0.00
Niedersachsen 4.4 2.8 3.0 2.7 1.9 0.51 0.52 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.22 0.22
N ordrhein-Westfalen 20.3 8.9 10.6 7.5 0.0 0.84 0.98 0.34 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.35 0.36 0.00 0.00
Rheinland-Pfalz 2.7 1.4 1.0 1.5 7.2 0.52 0.53 0.62 0.27 0.27 0.2 0.20 0.29 1.41 1.41
Saarland 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.25 0.77 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.43 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00
Sachsen 3.6 9.1 6.5 11.1 28.4 0.78 0.70 2.18 1.78 1.39 1.27 2.38 2.17 6.08 5.55
Sachsen-Anhalt 1.2 3.2 5.4 0.7 0.0 0.52 0.46 1.46 1.22 2.34 2.05 0.30 0.27 0.00 0.00
Schleswig-Holstein 1.9 2.0 1.6 2.2 11.3 0.55 0.51 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.64 0.59 3.27 3.04
Thiiringen 1.8 2.4 1.7 3.5 0.0 0.71 0.65 0.98 0.87 0.67 0.62 1.38 1.27 0.00 0.00
Total (without subtotal) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Martin et al (2003): BVK, KfW; Own Calculation: LQ2: Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik 2001: Gewerbeanmeldungen, insgesamt. 
Note: Totals for KfW include ‘Other’ category of investment; Location Quotient (LQ) defined as:
LQ2 = (Region’s share of national venture capital investment)/(Region’s share of national stock of VAT-registered businesses)
LQ3 = (Region’s share of national venture capital investment)/(Region’s share of newly registered businesses)
Location quotients can be used to provide some information about what might be an 
expected volume of venture capital investment or a ‘fair’ share. However, they do not 
tell why actual regional shares deviate from ‘expected’ shares, or whether regional 
investment shares are demand or supply constrained. It would certainly be misleading to 
interpret venture capital invested in a region as supply and the stock of companies or the 
formation rates as related to demand, which is either sufficiently served or not. These 
categories are not proper demand or supply categories and even if one had proper 
demand and supply categories a location quotient of less than unity would not 
necessarily indicate a lack of supply since there may also be a lack of demand. One 
should bear in mind that the size of all categories mentioned are market results of 
demand and supply. After Marshall and his pair of scissors these market outcomes are 
the result of factors that determine demand and supply which can be independently 
analysed. The observed market outcome is the quantity of venture capital demanded and 
supplied. Both are, of course, the same. In a graph the market outcome is just a point 
where demand and supply curve intersect. This provides no information about the 
further slopes of demand or supply curves, as long as the determining factors are not 
known or analysed. There can, for example, exist a regional supply gap even when the 
market result of venture capital invested (quantity supplied and demanded) is 
comparatively high, when a very strong demand by entrepreneurs prepared to pay a 
relatively high price for capital has lead to a high investment level although investors 
are very reluctant to supply venture capital in this region because they are aware of 
comparatively high transaction cost or other factors that hamper the supply of capital. 
The figure 3.3 offers an illustration in the style of an economics textbook. Region A 
shall be an average representative region. Region B has a stronger demand of 
entrepreneurs for venture capital finance. Perhaps new oil fields were discovered, which 
offer additional investment opportunities for drilling stations and refineries. The supply 
of venture capital is however lower, be it transaction cost due to the spatial distance 
from national financial centres, or, perhaps, a higher perceived regional risk due to a 
regional economic mono-structure. Location quotients would indicate a relative 
concentration of venture capital investment and not an existing supply gap. Hence, it is 
not very surprising that the location quotients mentioned and presented above are 
normally only used in business studies and geography in order to detect finance gaps,
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often very uncritically, misleading and confusing the involved issues. A proper 
economic analysis of demand und supply is, however, confronted with the difficulties of 
detecting and measuring the determining factors. Furthermore, if demand and supply 
factors are interdependent, as it would be the case when profit expectations and liquidity 
preference for a region effect investors and investee behaviour simultaneously 
(Dow/Rodriguez-Fuentes 1991: 915), an entire independent analysis of demand and 
supply would not be possible and the talk about a supply gap or a demand gap would 
not make much sense. Deficiencies of supply and demand may also reinforce each other 
so that there is a problem of circularity. In the illustration provided another example for 
region B and an interdependence of demand and supply is a situation in which demand 
is relatively high because many entrepreneurs in that region tend to be more 
overoptimistic due to regional cultural differences. National investors know this but find 
it difficult to distinguish between regional entrepreneurs.
Figure 3.3: Demand, Supply, Market Outcome and Equity Gaps
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3.4 CONCLUSION
An article in a recent symposium on equity gaps in the Economic Journal summarises 
empirical approaches used by economist so far in order to detect funding gaps 
empirically (Cressy 2002: 2-3):
1. the labour market switching criterium
2. the net-worth investment criterium
3. the Euler equation approach
4. the self-assessment criteria
The first criteria checks for funding gaps indirectly asking whether individuals who 
have own funds at hand invest more than others. In more precise words, it is asked, 
whether there is a positive correlation between self-employment and individual assets 
(Evans/Jovanovie 1989). The second criterium is similar but related to firms. The last 
approach mentioned is to examine the perception of gaps by market participants 
themselves. Identifying and measuring perceptions is, however, also problematic. 
Entrepreneurs who fail to secure venture capital funding tend to argue that there is an 
equity gap, and that the cause is a deficiency on the supply side. But the fact that 
requests for finance are turned down can hardly be a reliable indicator of a gap, since 
high rejection rates may simply reflect a poor quality of proposals as revealed by initial 
screening and due diligence, rather than constraints on capital supply (Bannock 
Consulting 2001). Also, and again, transaction cost involved can be genuine, so that no 
conclusion about normative gaps can be made. Hence, simply asking firms: “Do 
limitations on the availability of funds influence your decision to start-up/invest/etc?” as 
Cressy (2002: 3) mentions can only lead to biased findings.
In principle, venture capitalists should be a better source for information on gaps, since 
they both assess and evaluate the demand for equity capital and manage its supply. They 
are financial intermediaries and may experience shortages on both sides of supply and 
demand. As they face asymmetric information on both sides they are, for example, 
aware of the cost of obtaining information to reduce the downside risk of equity
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investment. The involved transaction cost may result in proposals being turned down 
which investee companies may incorrectly interpret as supply constraints. With larger 
asymmetries on the investment side of these intermediaries and the time consuming task 
of searching for investment opportunities, one can, however, expect them to tend 
towards detecting insufficiencies on the demand side rather than on the supply side. 
Also, what they may interpret as a lack of demand (flow of viable, investment-ready 
projects seeking funding) may itself be a function of a perception by entrepreneurs that 
accessing funds is difficult and thus not worth attempting. Furthermore, managers of 
venture capital companies may answer strategically, and detect funding gaps and a need 
for public support in the hope of receiving subsidies. In short, soliciting the perceptions 
of market agents, even venture capitalists, is fraught with difficulties. Yet, having 
mentioned the difficulties involved, it is still a very promising way of detecting funding 
gaps, especially when the results are compared with secondary data. When authors 
argue that self-assessment is the easiest approach to detect funding gaps (for example 
Cressy 2002), it is surprising, that so far no survey tried to be precise about the 
differences of a ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ equity gap and addressed the best source for 
a survey, which are the venture capital companies. Whereas all other economic 
approaches and results can only detect a funding gaps according to the positive 
definition and do not take into account that some transaction cost can be genuine, this 
approach is capable to derive conclusions about normative funding gaps.
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CHAPTER 4
PERCEPTIONS OF EQUITY FINANCE GAPS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY COMPANIES IN THE UK AND GERMANY
ABSTRACT
The chapter presents survey results about equity funding gaps in Germany and the UK. 
The survey indicates considerable equity gaps in both countries. The perception of 
‘normative’ funding gaps, those that should be tackled by government policies, is, 
however, more pronounced in Germany. German companies perceive ‘risk mitigation’ 
as the most effective policy instrument. In contrast UK companies are rather critical 
towards government intervention, public co-investment in funds would be their first 
choice. The evaluation of policy instruments indicates the existence of a trade-off 
between potential positive spill-overs in employment and productivity on the one hand 
and negative effects on failure rates and realised returns on the other. A proclaimed 
‘demonstration effect’ for the English Regional Venture Capital Funds is therefore 
unlikely to work. In Germany guarantees have significantly increased investment 
failures and also motivated private equity companies to invest in higher risk areas for 
which they have not developed adequate instruments, notably a hands-on approach with 
strict monitoring and managerial advice.
JEL: G24, G28, P52, R12
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The issue of ‘equity gaps’ has loomed large in recent discussions of enterprise 
formation and development in both the United Kingdom and Germany. In Germany 
where a bank-based financial system of regional and national banks offers relationship 
banking with the so-called Hausbanken a discussion about a lack of risk and equity 
finance only surfaced recently with the emergence and promotion of venture capital 
markets in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, a related debate, why especially SMEs 
receive insufficient finance despite well developed capital markets and how this could 
be overcome, can be traced back for many decades in the UK. The equity gap question 
has been closely bound up with a recurring debate over finance for SMEs that started 
with the Macmillan Report in the 1930s, was followed by the Radcliffe Committee in 
1959, and resurfaced in the 1970s the Wilson Report. A recent addition to the 
discussion, the Cruikshank Report, was published in 2000. Much of this debate has 
focused on the difficulties and high charges that small and medium sized enterprises 
experience in obtaining loan finance and credit from the British banking system, yet 
banks have consistently denied that they restrict finance and argued that the problem is 
not one of under-supply but of a lack of viable projects. Venture capital companies in 
the UK steer much of their funds towards less risky investments. Most of their activity 
is focussed on expansions finance and MBOs in the so called ‘old economy’. However, 
‘New Labour’ started initiatives that target the seed, start-up and low deal size market.
A large public support for the emerging venture capital industry in Germany made it 
recently much easier for riskier seed and new start-up projects in the high-technology 
sector to receive venture capital finance there. On the other hand two new developments 
in banking regulation endanger the traditional relationship banking with SMEs and their 
easier access to bank finance. An EU regulation to scrap the state guarantees to state 
banks in 2005 increases their refinancing cost and reduces their large market share in 
the banking sector. The new risk related capital adequacy requirements of Basle II look 
likely to be ratified and hence introduced in 2006. This tends to increase the cost for all 
banks lending loans to SMEs, especially in the risk prone high technology sector. 
Venture capital and private equity finance is targeted to fill this upcoming gap.
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The research leading aims of this chapter are two-fold. It presents perceptions of equity 
gaps according to a conducted survey and evaluates current policy instruments in both 
countries. A survey of venture capital and private equity companies in Germany and the 
UK was conducted at the University of Cambridge in co-operation with Kreditanstalt 
fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) (see Martin et al 2003). It created a large data pool on the 
basis of the completed questionnaires that were received from September 2002 until the 
end of November 2002. Despite some hints of a pronounced survey fatigue on the side 
of venture capital companies the survey received excellent response rates of 38 percent 
in the UK and 52 percent in Germany1. The participation of KfW and the support of the 
German Venture Capital Association (BVK) contributed to the higher response rate in 
Germany.
The survey aims to get indicators for gaps in several ways. One way is to ask the 
venture capital companies directly, whether there are any market gaps and where they 
perceive them. The survey covers these aspects by asking, whether there are any market 
segments where venture capital and private equity companies perceive there ‘to be an 
under-supply of venture capital relative to demand’ (question Cl and C2; the 
questionnaire is attached as appendix A and appendix B). Another approach to detect 
market gaps is to ask venture capital companies about their perception of the main 
constraints on their own company’s investment activity (question C3). The results can 
then also be related to general characteristics of the company (part A), investment 
behaviour (part B) or public programmes (part D). Furthermore, the wording of the 
question (C3), with a focus on the firm’s experience, allows respondents to provide 
information on investment barriers even when they do not have sufficient information 
about competitors and the whole market.
The indicators mentioned so far do not provide information about gaps according to the 
normative definition, as explained in chapter 3.2. A correct phrasing of a question with 
regard to the perception of positive equity gaps would also have to be based on the
1 Questionnaires were sent out to all 162 ordinary members of the British (BVCA) member list in summer 
2002. It turned out that 4 were not active anymore or simply not known to the post office. The numbers 
for Germany were 209 and 2 respectively. A reminder was sent to those that did not respond in the first 
round. 60 completed questionnaires were received from the UK and 107 from Germany until the end of 
November 2002.
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assumption that the respondents have far reaching analytical skills. Since public 
programmes to support the venture capital industry are in place, it would have to be 
hypothetical and would have to ask whether there would be any gaps if those 
programmes did not exist. Instead, a related question in the policy section of the 
questionnaire (part D) tries to identify gaps according to the normative definition. It 
asked where the venture capital companies ‘see a special need for public finance’ 
(question D8).
Finally, the survey analyses the effectiveness of instruments to close a gap. Simply 
shedding some light on preferred instruments, would relate issues of crowding out and 
complementarity or additionality of public support to potential profits of venture capital 
and private equity companies and not analyse the instruments with regard to the 
envisaged policy target. Instead, a question in the survey asked therefore which aspects 
of public programmes have caused venture capital companies ‘to make investment 
which otherwise would not have occurred’ (question D5).
The research methods used in this chapter are common and examine four types of data:
1. Published and unpublished information obtained from the British and German 
venture capital associations, from the KfW and DtA in Germany, and from a 
number of other national and regional institutions involved in venture capital 
policy in the two countries
2. Information obtained from a purpose-designed postal questionnaire survey of 
UK and German venture capital companies, which was based on elaborated 
conceptions of equity gaps (see Appendix A and B, and Chapter 3)
3. Data from semi-structured interviews with individuals in key national and 
regional institutions and bodies in the two countries (see Personal Interviews)
4. A statistical analysis of the data obtained (see Appendix C ff)
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4.2 SURVEY RESULTS: IS THERE A ‘GAP’?
The survey results indicate considerable equity gaps in the UK and Germany, according 
to both the positive and normative definition. The perception that there are market 
segments or regions where there is an ‘under-supply of venture capital relative to 
demand’ is remarkably similar in both countries. 70.2% in the UK and 68.3% in 
Germany answered that gaps exist1.
4.2.1 The Perception of Existing ‘Gaps’
Participants could subsequently describe the kind of gap they perceived. Gaps could be 
detected in market segments of the following categories: business stage, deal size, 
company size according to sales and region. Multiple answers and combinations were 
possible. The relevance given to these categories differs in both countries (see table 4.1)
Table 4.1: The Relevance of Market Categories in the Perception of Supply Gaps
Categories
Germany (N=104) UK (N=57)
Rank % Number Rank % Number
Business stage 1 61.5 64 2 66.7 38
Deal size 2 55.8 58 1 68.4 39
Sectors 3 50.0 52 3 36.8 21
Company size (sales) 4 43.3 45 4 35.1 20
Region 5 28.8 30 5 15.8 9
Source: Own Survey
1 These are the valid percentages. If respondents, who left this questions blank, that is 3 in Germany and 3 
in the UK, were considered to be relevant for the base, the percentages would hardly change: 66.7% for 
the UK and 66.4% for Germany. The set o f questions in C2 are somehow ambiguous. As there are no 
‘no’ boxes in the questionnaire for the categories and segments o f equity gaps, one cannot distinguish 
between respondents who simply failed to answer it or who actively expressed that no gap exists in this 
category or segment. This is however necessary for a separate ‘valid’ distribution. Yet the questions Cl 
and C2 are linked and one should use the same number of valid responses as a base for the distributions 
presented. Three respondents in each country did neither answer Cl nor C2. For a full explanation o f the 
statistical problems involved and their treatment see Appendix C “Statistical Problems o f the Gap 
Perception in the Survey and Their Treatment”.
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In Germany, the gap perception is predominantly one of business stages. In second 
position follows deal sizes and then sectors, company size and finally regions, which is 
given lowest relevance. The ranking is the same for the UK with the exception that deal 
size is considered to be the most important issue, downgrading business stages into 
second place. Business stage and deal size get higher results whereas sector, region and 
company size are considered less important issues in comparison to Germany.
The leading position of ‘deal sizes’ in the UK may reflect that equity supply gaps are 
slightly different in both countries and indicate the need for policy initiatives with 
different targets. The new ‘Regional Venture Capital Funds’ in the UK target a deal size 
area and the differences between both countries in the area targeted, from £250.000 to 
£500.000 is very marked.1 However, the high results in surrounding deal size areas in 
the UK suggest that equity funding gaps are not constrained to one specific deal size 
area. UK government programmes, that exclusively focussed on a specific deal size 
area, have therefore been criticised (for example Harding 1999) (table 4.2).









< €150 th 37.5 < £100 th 42.1
€150-375 th 42.3 £100-250 th 50.9
€375-750 th 23.1 £250-500 th 47.4
€750-1500 th 11.5 £500-1000 th 35.1
€1.5-5 m 10.6 £1.0-3.33 m 21.1
€5-50 m 3.8 £3.33-33 m 1.8
> €50 m 3.8 > £33 m 1.8
Source: Own Survey
The difference in perceptions between both countries may also simply reflect that the 
public discussion is concentrated on this particular aspect and target area. In a previous
1 To aid comparisons between the two countries an average conversion rate for 2001/02 o f €1 = £0.66 was 
used throughout the survey.
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part of the survey the companies were asked about the approximate percentage share of 
the overall number of investments over the calendar years 1999 to 2001 that were 
allocated to different classes of deal size (question B7). A difference for this particular 
deal size between the UK with a mean of 12.4% and Germany with 15.5% hardly exists. 
The activity in the UK is rather more evenly distributed over all deal sizes (table 4.3).


















< €150 th 7.1 <£100 th 11.4
€150-375 th 12.5 £100-250 th 12.3
€375-750 th 15.5 £250-500 th 12.4
€750-1500 th 17.6 £500-1000 th 11.0
€1.5-5 m 30.5 £1.0-3.33 m 14.4
€5-50 m 11.2 £3.33-33 m 25.0
> € 50 m 5.2 > £ 33 m 12.4
Source: Own Survey
Secondary data shows a significant rise in the average deal size suggesting that equity 
gaps at the lower end of deal sizes became more severe in the UK (figure 4.1).
Assuming that the size of the investee company by sales and deal size is correlated one 
would also expect to get comparable results for the gap perception. Yet, opposed to deal 
sizes, the size of the company is considered less relevant in the UK and only 31.6% 
perceive a gap for companies with annual sales below £10 million (€15 million). The 
figure for Germany is higher with 41.3%. For the range of £ 10-20 million (€ 15-30 
million) this is 3.5 % and 8.7 % respectively. Additionally, 71.6% of the respondents in 
Germany in comparison to 52.6% in the UK do not have a minimum threshold size of a 
potential investee company (question B9, see table 4.4).
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Figure 4.1: The Rise in the Average Size o f Investment, 1994-2001 (in million €)
Assuming that the size of the investee company by sales and deal size is correlated one 
would also expect to get comparable results for the gap perception. Yet, opposed to deal 
sizes, the size of the company is considered less relevant in the UK and only 31.6 % 
perceive a gap for companies with annual sales below £10 million (€15 million). The 
figure for Germany is higher with 41.3%. For the range of £ 10-20 million (€ 15-30 
million) this is 3.5 % and 8.7 % respectively. Additionally, 71.6% of the respondents in 
Germany in comparison to 52.6% in the UK do not have a minimum threshold size of a 
potential investee company (question B9, see table 4.4).
The different business stages of potential investee companies are given a high 
importance in the perception of equity gaps in both countries. Seed and start-up are the 
most important segments whereby start-up plays a smaller role in the perception of 
German companies (table 4.5).
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<€15 m 41.3 < £10 m 31.6
€15-3 0  m 8.7 £10 -  20 m 3.5
€30 -  50 m 1.9 £20 -3 3  m 1.8
€50- 100 m 3.8 £33 -  67 m 0.0
> €100 m 2.9 > £67 m 0.0
Source: Own Survey












Secondary data from the venture capital associations confirm the survey results that 
show a lower perception of equity gaps in the start-up and seed stage in Germany. In 
comparison to the UK and due to public programmes (Adelberger 2000, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000), the venture capital activity in Germany concentrates 
more on early stage and start-ups, although even in Germany a tendency towards later 
stage finance exists which dominates the activity in the UK (table 4.6).
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1998 1999 2000 2001
UK
(Percent) 
1998 1999 2000 2001
Early Stage 25 33 36 26 8 6 11 9
Expansion 50 53 48 37 22 19 33 34
MBO/MBI/LBO 25 14 16 37 70 69 56 57
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: British and German Venture Capital Associations; Note: Expansion
includes Replacement, Turnaround and Bridge Finance
On the other hand 27.9 % believe that there are equity gaps in the turnaround stage 
whereas only 10.5 % in the UK agree with this opinion. This result is related to a rather 
astonishing result in the sector category: with 32.7% and compared to 8.8% in the UK 
‘Manufacturing, low tech, “old economy’” is perceived to be sector that suffers the 
strongest from equity gaps in Germany.




IT, telecommunication, media 15.4 21.1
other business & personal
19.2 7.0
services
manufacturing, high tech 14.4 10.5
manufacturing, low tech, "old 
economy"
32.7 8.8




However, the typical risk of venture capital financing normally does not exist in this 
sector and a history of performances can guide expectations and investment planning. 
Therefore, it is likely that this result partly reflects the new debate about upcoming 
potential problems in the financing of SMEs. Due to Basle II and the loss of public 
guarantees for state banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken) higher refinancing costs for 
banks are likely to restrict their traditional financing to SMEs and the Mittelstand in the 
future. Partly banks already started to adjust their balance sheets. That this perception in 
Germany is a result of the public debate is confirmed by the actual investment 
behaviour of the venture capital and private equity companies. The mean of the share of 
gross investment allocated to this specific sector of the economy over the calendar years 
1999 to 2001 was in Germany with 17.8% even higher than in the UK with 13.2% 
(question B19). Secondary data on sector investment from BVCA and BVK are 
unfortunately not comparable due to the different classification systems used.
The lower perception of gaps in the sectors ‘life science’ and ‘IT, telecommunication, 
media’ in Germany may indicate that public initiatives were successful insofar as they 
provided sufficient finance for these sectors. On the other hand and despite public 
programmes a higher percentage in Germany than in the UK perceived gaps in the 
sector ‘manufacturing, high tech’.
From a regional perspective it is remarkable that equity funding gaps are neither in the 
UK nor in Germany perceived as a regional problem. Venture capitalists tend to think 
much more in terms of deal size, business stage or sector opportunities rather than 
recognising or admitting to regional biases or discrimination in investment behaviour. 
Regions are ranked least relevant, only 28.8 % of the respondents in Germany and only 
15.8 % in the UK detected a regional equity gap. Thus, a very low share of the 
respondents selected particular regions in both countries. The highest perception of 
regional gaps in Germany exist for the New Bundeslander, whereas the lowest 
proportion of German companies perceives a gap for Hamburg, which represents a 
cluster of venture capital firms. Due to the lower sample size for the UK and the low 
number of regional selections any interpretation for the UK must be made very 
carefully. There were only 9 venture capital and private equity companies in the UK (30
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in Germany) that selected this category, so that the danger of jumping to conclusions 
looms large. However, the perception of a regional equity gap is the lowest for Scotland 
and highest for the North West and South West. It is also, surprisingly, quite high for 
London. Since the survey hardly provides sufficient findings for a detailed discussion of 
the regional aspects in the perception of venture capital gaps, secondary data and 
questions about proximity effects and about clusters of activity in the survey have to fill 
this gap. For a detailed discussion of these regional aspects of venture capital finance in 
both countries see Martin et al (2003).
4.2.2 Constraints on Investment Activity
Another approach to detecting market gaps is to ask venture capital companies about 
their perception of the main constraints on their own company’s investment activity 
(question C3). The wording of the question with a focus on the firm’s experience allows 
respondents to provide information on investment barriers even when they do not have 
sufficient information about their competitors and the whole market. The survey results 
show that German respondents attach a stronger importance to all listed constraints, 
with the exception of the constraint ‘Problems in fundraising’.1 Since venture capital 
and private equity companies are financial intermediaries and best placed to distinguish 
between demand and supply constraints the exception of the investment constraint 
‘Problems in fundraising’ is significant. German intermediaries perceive potential 
equity gaps less as a supply problem based on funding difficulties. This may not simply 
be a result of subsidies to the industry, especially in the form of guarantees and an
1 To complete the results: In Germany the mean for ‘tax problems’ was 2.00 (N=13) and for ‘others’ 2.50 
(N=6). In the UK the related numbers are 3.00 (N=6) for ‘tax problems’ and for ‘others’ 1.6 (N=10). 
Respondents could additionally specify their answer in an open question for these two constraints, hence 
some o f  them might have been reluctant to fill this question out, however, the low number of 
respondents rather suggest that these issues were considered as hardly relevant and that the other options 
given were appropriate. Cultural differences between both countries, for example a tendency to avoid 
complains on behalf o f British respondents, may have led to a partly biased result. A correction factor 
could be introduced and results for each constraint could be presented as a deviation from an overall 
average for each country. Furthermore, answers to set o f questions like these are often ranked for each 
respondent and recoded as an ordinal variable (Hartung 1999). Since this would hide the comparative 
information given by a respondent who found for example many aspects o f public programmes 
important, this procedure was omitted.
71
overlapping of a positive and normative gap perception, the sources of funds for 
investment also differ in both countries.
Table 4.8: Main Constraints on Investment Activity
Barriers to Investm ent
Germany UK
Rank 0 N Rank 0 N
Perceived risk involved is prohibitively high 1 2.43 103 3 3.65 54
Lack o f  proposals with promising returns 2 2.59 105 1 2.79 56
Exit problem s 3 2.81 106 2 3.38 56
D ifficulties in m onitoring investee com panies 4 3.61 105 9 4.81 54
Lack o f  information on potential investee  
com panies
5 3.93 104 7 4.54 54
Low dealflow 6 4.08 104 5 4.27 55
High (fix ) due d iligence cost 7 4.08 103 6 4.50 56
Problems in fundraising 8 4.19 102 4 4.16 56
Geographical rem oteness o f  investee company 9 4.25 105 8 4.80 56
Shortage o f  sta ff w ith V C  experience 10 4.29 105 10 5.00 56
Source: Own Survey, Note: Valid Average 0 ; Scale from 1 to 6, 1= very
important, 6= not important
In the market based system of the UK, pension funds have tended to be the major source 
of funds, making up over 40 percent of the total in 2001, followed by funds of funds, 
banks, and insurance companies. Some 70 percent or more of the funds raised for the 
UK venture capital industry originate overseas, and much making up much of the 
balance of the pension fund finance comes from North America. Domestic pension 
funds have been criticized for not fully exploiting venture capital investment 
opportunities, (European Commission 1999; Bank of England, 2001), but the volume 
and share of funds raised by UK pension funds has grown substantially over the past 
few years to 13 percent in 2001. The Myners review (HM Treasury 2001), lobbying by 
the BVCA and the government, and the historic superior returns demonstrated by the 
industry have all encouraged the UK pension funds to recognize the opportunity that 
venture and private equity present. However, overseas pension funds far outweigh their
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UK counterparts as the sources of capital for investment, by more than factor two. UK 
banks and UK insurance companies raised only 4 percent each of the overall amount.
Table 4.9: Sources of Private Equity Funds in the UK and Germany in 2001
Sources of Funds (in Percent) Germany
Pension Funds ..... 28'..... ~ ~  42
Banks 18 14
Insurance Companies 17 12
Private Individuals 12 4
Funds of Funds 11 15
Corporate Investors (“Industrie”) 9 2
Public Agencies 6 8
Other 0 3
Total 100 100
Total in € m (€1=£0.66) 10.3 18.4
From Overseas Sources 66 71
From Inland Sources 34 29
Sources: BVCA & BVK 2002; Note: Public Agencies Include Government
Agencies and Academic Institutions; BVCA Does Not Include Funds of 
Their International Members with Headquarters in London, which are 
Raised “Mainly for Large Buy-Outs, of which the Vast Majority Will Be 
for Investment Outside of the UK.”
In contrast, in the bank based financial system in Germany banks have traditionally 
been the most prominent investors. They provided over 29 percent of the total new 
funds for investment in 1999 but their share fell dramatically to about 18 percent in 
2001. Similar to the UK, pension funds have become the dominant source for new funds 
raised, in 2002 their share further increased to over 39 percent. In the UK, however, this 
source mainly originated from abroad and the relation of national to international 
sources was turned upside down in 2001. In 2002 the international share fell slightly to
59.5 percent. For Germany, it is not clear how much from this source is invested in 
Germany. BVK does neither provide a break down with regard to the locations of 
investments nor does it exclude foreign companies. The share of total investment made
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in Germany reached with just over 69 percent its lowest level in 2001 and did hardly 
increase in 2002. The survey also indicates that investment abroad increased in the three 
calendar years up to 2001 (question B17). 35 percent of German companies with 
investments abroad reported an increase, 22 percent reported a decrease. The data 
provided by BVCA and BVK is therefore not comparable and draws an incorrect 
picture of national sources and national investments.
The following table illustrates the survey results with regard to the sources on invested 
capital in the year 2001 (question A9).
Table 4.10: Sources of Funds in 2001
Sources of Funds 'Vv Germany , UK ;
(N=103) (N=54) "
Internal Finance 27 16
Banks 24 15
Public Sector 17 14
Individuals 12 20
Insurance Company 6 8
Fund in Fund 6 9
Industry 4 6
Pension Fund 3 12
Source: Own Survey; Note: Mean of Percentages
It is important to notice that public guarantees can have a large leverage effect on 
mobilizing private investment. The net cost may be kept down and fees to pay may be 
below market rates, so that they are attractive for the purchaser (Bannock Consulting 
2001: 35). In comparison to public co-investment their contribution will be 
underestimated in this table. The public sector played a larger role in Germany than it 
appears in this table.
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A dominant role of banks in Germany is also confirmed in the survey. 26 percent 
answered that a bank is the largest owner of the venture capital or private equity 
company. A mere 6.9 percent answered likewise in the UK, where instead individuals, 
with 46.6 percent form the largest ownership group (table 4.11; question A ll). Whereas 
in the UK financial system the capital markets function as a market for corporate 
control, the German system is known to have large cross-ownerships of banks and 
companies. These numbers are therefore likely to disguise an even more dominant role 
of German banks in the venture capital and private equity market.
Table 4.11: Largest Owner of Venture Capital Company
Largest Owner of Company „ „ Germany UK




(Semi) Public Body 16.3 12.1
Industrial Company 13.5 8.6




The difference in the perception of investment barriers between both countries is small 
for ‘Low deal flow’ and ‘Lack of proposals with promising returns’. In both countries 
three constraints are regarded the most important, although not in the same order. These 
are ‘Lack of proposals with promising returns’, ‘Perceived risk involved is prohibitively 
high’ and ‘Difficulties of exit’. In Britain missing investment opportunities in form of 
proposals is the single most named factor hinting at constraints on the demand side. In 
contrast, for German respondents risk is the dominant constraining factor. Interestingly 
the difference between both countries are most marked for ‘Perceived risk involved is 
prohibitively high’ and ‘Difficulties in monitoring investee companies’. The first
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difference may simply reflect different notions about risky market environments in both 
countries and as such reflect different ways of how “markets” are organized and 
constructed in Germany. Part B of the questionnaire analyses the investment behaviour 
of venture capital and private equity companies. There are marked differences in both 
countries with regard to the expected rate of return (question B12) and the realised 
return on investment in 2001 (question B13, see figure 4.2). A clear statement can be 
made: In comparison to Germany, UK companies target and realise higher return rates. 
These differences may partly reflect the impact of policy initiatives in both countries 
(see section 4.3).
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Figure 4.2: Expected Minimum and Realised Rate of Return in 2001
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4.2.3 The Perceptions of a ‘Normative’ Equity Gap
Since policies to promote the venture capital industry are in place, a correct perception 
of a ‘positive’ equity gap is difficult to measure and the wording of the question would 
have to assume far-reaching analytical skills of the respondents. However, a question in 
the policy section of the questionnaire refers to the perception of ‘normative’ equity 
gaps and asks, in which regions, phases, segments, the respondents see a special need 
for public finance (see table 4.12; question D8).
Table 4.12: Market Categories and the Perception of a Need for Public Finance
Categories
Germany (N=104) UK (N=57)
rank percentage number rank percentage number
Business stage 1 72.1 (61.5) 64 1 45.6 (66.7) 38
Sectors 4 37.5 (50.0) 52 4 28.1 (36.8) 21
Company size (sales) 2 64.4 (43.3) 45 2 31.6 (35.1) 20
Region 3 54.8 (28.8) 30 2 31.6(15.8) 9
Source: Own Survey; Note: The Numbers in Brackets Represent the Previous
Findings about the Gap Perceptions; Deal Size Segments Were not 
Offered for a Potential Answer in this Question
Interestingly, in the UK this perception of a gap is smaller in comparison to the previous 
positive one for all categories except for regions. In contrast only the perception of a 
sector gap is smaller in Germany. The increase for regions is also the largest. At least 
with regard to ‘normative’ equity gaps respondents are much more aware of regional 
issues. The other differences for the UK suggest that many respondents perceive that 
there are, or would be ‘positive’ equity gaps without the rather small and few public 
programmes. Nevertheless they do not perceive a need for policy intervention in the 
sense of ‘normative’ gaps, since they believe that transaction cost are genuine, 
government programmes are inefficient or lead to overinvestment despite potential 
positive spill-over effects to the economy. Although the view that public venture capital 
programmes should be stopped, because they “are inefficient and/or support inefficient 
venture capital companies”, had the lowest importance to ‘improving’ policies in both
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countries (Germany: 0  4.95, N=76). UK: 0  4.19, N=27), a different picture appears for 
Germany. Most pronounced is the view of the Mittelstandische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften (MBGs, public regional institutions). They clearly see a 
special need for public finance, since all of these respondents ticked at least one 
segment of question D8, but they may perceive this need to be covered by their activity 
or other existing initiatives.1 Only 50 percents of them answered in Cl that gaps exist 
(N=10). Other public or semi public institutions and independent venture capital also 
perceive a higher need, the exception is corporate venture capital companies, mirroring 
an attitude similar to the UK.
The following figures provide a detailed overview of the market segments with regard 
to the special need for public finance, the strong reference to public finance and the 
perception of a gap (Germany: N=104, UK: N=57). In Germany the normative gap 
perception in general scores higher results than the positive gap perception which 
indicates a sufficient coverage of public programmes. This argument is supported by the 
opposite relation between need and gap perception for the business stage ‘replacement’, 
where no respondent referred to public finance and for ‘turnaround’, where hardly any 
respondent referred to public finance. Furthermore, this opposite relation also shows in 
the sector ‘manufacturing, low tech (‘old economy’)’, where initiatives are currently 
designed. Similar to many market segments in the UK (with the exception of the ‘life 
science’ sector) these are segments for which no government programmes are in place. 
Hence, any gap perception in C2 must here at least be according to the definition of a 
‘positive’ equity gap, which is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a 
‘normative’ gap and the need for public finance. However, since subsidies supporting 
the economy are at least always welcome for those who benefit, German companies 
may simply acknowledge and seek the supportive function of government programmes 
or public private partnerships, and may not base their view on a rational analysis as to, 
whether funding gaps exist and whether and how they should be tackled, with the result 
that the need for public finance becomes exaggerated. In contrast a funding gap debate 
has been going on for decades in the UK and has been based on arguments of economic
1 For the German gap perception in Cl and the need for public finance according to the type or size o f the 
company and stage specialization see KfW 2003.
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theory. Yet, even in the UK, peripheral regions mirror the general German relationship 
between the gap and need perception. This indicates that at least some of the 
respondents in the UK favour regional re-distributional aims over the overall efficiency 
of the national economy, which many of the German respondents also do.
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Figure 4.3: Special Need for Public Finance, Strong Reference to Public Finance and
the Perception o f a Gap with Regard to Business Stages in Germany
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Figure 4.4: Special Need for Public Finance, Strong Reference to Public Finance and
the Perception of a Gap with Regard to Business Stages in the UK
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Figure 4.5: Special Need for Public Finance and the Perception of a Gap with
Regard to Sectors in Germany
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Figure 4.6: Special Need for Public Finance and the Perception of a Gap with
Regard to Sectors in the UK
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82
Figure 4.7: Special Need for Public Finance and the Perception of a Gap with 
Regard to the Size of the Investee Company (Sales) in Germany
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Figure 4.8: Special Need for Public Finance and the Perception of a Gap with 
Regard to the Size of the Investee Company (Sales) in the UK
Source: Own Survey
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Figure 4.9: Special Need for Public Finance, Strong Reference to Public Finance and
the Perception o f a Gap with Regard to Regions in Germany
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Figure 4.10: Special Need for Public Finance, Strong Reference to Public Finance and 
the Perception of a Gap with Regard to Regions in the UK
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4.3 POLICIES TO CLOSE A ‘GAP’
Over the past twenty-five years, the USA has pioneered a new technological revolution 
based on large numbers of new small enterprises. The new industries require significant 
external finance, and the majority of these businesses in the US raise their initial finance 
from venture capitalists and other similar providers of ‘risk money’ (such as business 
angels and corporate venturing), rather than from banks. The European Union, 
meanwhile, has lagged behind in the growth of ‘new economy’ high-tech activity, and, 
compared to the US, innovative small and medium enterprises appear to find it more 
difficult to get started and grow (Gill et al 2000). Although there has been some debate 
over whether this is because Europe lacks an individualistic entrepreneurial culture of 
the sort that seems to characterise the US, the dominant view is that it is due to the 
nature of capital markets and the problems of raising finance for small risky businesses. 
Across much of Europe, regional and local banks have traditionally been important 
sources of capital for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but it has been 
increasingly argued that this source of external funding has deprived European 
entrepreneurs of sufficient risk capital.
Accordingly, the European Commission has become increasingly exercised over what it 
sees as the need to develop large and pro-active venture capital and risk capital markets 
across the EU. “Developing risk capital in the European Union, leading towards the 
development of pan-European risk capital markets is essential for job creation in the 
EU... In essence what is at stake is the creation of a new entrepreneurial culture in 
Europe. The real political challenge is to provide the tools for enabling technologies and 
financial instruments for a new generation of European entrepreneurs to start up and 
succeed...The Commission considers the provision of substantial pan-European risk 
capital markets a necessary condition for this to happen” (European Commission 1998: 
1). The task is to remove and dismantle the institutional and market barriers that exist in 
European financial systems so as to promote the growth of large and vibrant venture 
capital funds as well as suitable stock market exit routes by which successful businesses 
can be floated and additional liquidity raised (Wright et al 1999; Mason/Harrison 1999; 
Leadbeater 2000).
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By comparison with the USA, venture capitalism in Europe is indeed underdeveloped. 
Throughout the 1980s and into the first half of the 1990s, the annual volume of venture 
capital investment averaged less than ESbn.1 It has only been since 1996 that the size of 
the market has grown, to €35bn in 2000, though with the sharp collapse of ‘new 
economy’ stocks and resultant economic slowdown from late 2000 onwards, the volume 
of new investment fell back in 2001 to €24bn. This compares with some $23bn of 
venture capital investment in the US in 1998, and over $100bn in 2000.1 2 It is widely 
argued that the slower development of venture capital across the EU, compared to the 
USA, reflects a variety of institutional and market factors that, in combination, tend to 
militate against a vibrant supply of risk capital (Wright et al 1999; Cowie 1999).
One of the main factors explaining the immaturity of many European venture markets is 
the influence of traditional attitudes to firm ownership and related systems of firm 
finance. Historically, many firms across Europe have been family owned and financially 
independent, and most have preferred bank loans to equity finance. Searching for equity 
capital has been seen potentially damaging to a firm’s reputation. More generally, it has 
also been argued that European entrepreneurs themselves suffer from a relatively low 
social status. Although this image does appear to be changing, bankruptcy in many 
European states remains tainted with stigma and failure, whereas in the USA it is much 
less disparaged (De Witte 1999).
Some researchers have argued that globalization and integration are at last undermining 
such traditional financial patterns and preferences in the EU (Turner 2001; 
Harding/Paterson 2000). In the context of intensified competition, many SMEs are 
recognizing the benefits of outside expert help and advice from experienced partners, as 
well as the potential of equity finance in meeting expensive innovation and investment 
needs. Consequently, owner-managers are shedding their reluctance to accept equity 
and institutional partners.
1 Europe here refers to the 15 member states o f  the European Union plus Switzerland.
2 Funding for MBOs, MBIs and LBOs is included in the figures for Europe, but excluded from those for 
the USA.
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A second problem is the lack of active stock markets in many European countries. Well- 
developed stock markets are considered important to the existence of a vibrant venture 
capital market, as many venture capitalists seek an exit route via an initial public 
offering or IPO (Black/Gibson 1998). Typically, venture capitalists look to dispose of at 
least half of their investments in a five to ten year period. The existence of readily 
accessible stock markets and high stock market values should therefore encourage more 
venture capital investment. In the past, European stock markets have been too small and 
fragmented to provide the necessary liquidity. Between 1992 and 1997 there were 1,200 
venture backed IPOs in the US, compared to 244 in the UK and only 156 in the rest of 
Europe. Before the 1980s, SMEs in particular had difficulty obtaining equity finance 
because there were few ‘second tier’ equity markets, and the ‘first tier’ markets had 
over-demanding listing requirements. The situation has been improved in recent years 
by the creation of ‘second tier’ stock markets for high-growth small firms, such as the 
UK’s AIM in 1995, the French Nouveau Marche in 1996, Frankfurt’s Neuer Markt in 
1997, and Milan’s Nuovo Mercato in 1999.
Nevertheless, compared to the USA, the European market appears fragmented, 
institutionally and geographically. For example, as of early-2000 there were still 33 
regulated stock markets and 18 associated regulatory bodies in the EU. Attempts to 
reduce this fragmentation have yet to make a major impact. The creation of EASDAQ 
in 1996 was intended to remedy the lack of a pan-European market for raising liquidity 
for small, high-technology enterprises, in the same way that NASDAQ in the US has 
played a key role in financing the wave of fast-growing American high-tech companies 
in the 1990s (OECD 1996; Cowie 1999). The creation of EASDAQ was designed to 
imitate this success, but it has thus far failed to attract large numbers of European 
entrepreneurs (Bank of England 2001). Similarly, the creation of Euro NM by an 
agreement between the Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Milan Stock 
Exchanges was intended to promote the cross-listing and trading of their members. Its 
capitalization has grown quite rapidly in recent years. However, the bursting of the 
dotcom bubble in 2000-2001 has both reduced stock market values and the level of IPO 
activity. Trade sales continue to be the main exit route in the European venture capital 
market.
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Thirdly, it is also beyond doubt that the complex fiscal and regulatory contexts of many 
European states have stifled the demand for and the supply of venture capital (European 
Commission 1998; Bannock Consulting 2001). In several states, high capital gains and 
equity taxes, as well as complex company laws, act as obstacles to equity trading and 
buy-out activity. At the same time, fragmented patent laws, bankruptcy laws and 
demanding company registration procedures have all limited the demand for venture 
capital. Over the course of the 1990s, many of these regimes began to be reformed and 
some of the major impediments to venture capital have been lowered, though scope for 
further reforms undoubtedly exists.
There are, however, also strong grounds for arguing that the supply of venture capital, 
of itself, does not necessarily create a corresponding demand. What may also be needed 
are policies to stimulate the demand side -  that is the numbers of potential new ventures 
and start-ups that might benefit from access to venture finance. This is not only a 
national-level issue (McGlue 2002), but one that has particular relevance at the regional 
and local level. Venture capital activity in lagging regions may well be primarily 
constrained by the restricted supply of viable, high-potential businesses. It may be 
difficult, therefore, for such regions to demonstrate that they have a real existing equity 
gap. As US experience has shown, simply making venture capital available will not 
magically generate the conditions under which entrepreneurship can flourish 
(Florida/Kenney 1988: 316-317).
Another question concerns what specific forms policies should take -  and whether such 
policies should be linked to other policies directed at encouraging and facilitating high- 
technology enterprise. For example, some authors argue that direct supply of capital by 
public authorities -  especially in economically lagging regions - may send perverse 
signals about commercial returns to private firms, and may also confuse development 
and commercial criteria in the selection of projects. They argue, therefore, that public 
agencies are better advised to sponsor and attract privately managed funds through 
fiscal incentives and investment in these funds (Doran/Bannock, 2000). Following from 
this, another fundamental issue is whether public policies in fact can have any 
significant impact on venture capital activity. For example, according to Mason and
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Harrison (1999), drawing on UK and US experience, previous attempts by national and 
local governments to fill regional venture equity gaps have not on the whole proved 
very impressive. The effect, they suggest, has often been to reinforce existing spatial 
biases in the venture capital industry. On the other hand, Laughlin and Digirolamo 
(1994) and Lemer (1999, 2002), have argued that in the US public programs at the 
Federal, state and city levels have played an important role in the US venture industry, 
not only providing funds but also filling information gaps and acting in a guarantee and 
certification capacity.
In response to the conviction that there are significant funding gaps, particularly for 
small high-technology-based firms, most OECD governments have introduced remedial 
policies. The OECD (1997) distinguishes between indirect measures, such as stock- 
market reform, and direct measures that attempt to stimulate and improve venture 
capital markets. These direct measures can be classified into three types of programmes. 
The first is the direct supply of capital to venture capital firms (e.g. through refinancing 
loans) or to small investee firms (via public venture capital firms, often in co­
investments schemes). Capital may be supplied either as equity or loans. Second, 
governments may provide financial incentives for investing in venture capital funds or 
small firms (for example, through equity and loan guarantees, tax incentives, or by 
engineering an upside return boost for private investors in public-private funds) which 
are intended to stimulate private investment. Third, states also directly shape venture 
capital markets by means of the regulations controlling types of venture capital 
investors, and may introduce regulatory measures designed to mobilise certain 
politically desired types of investor, such as pension funds. Given the regional focus of 
this report, we examine the first two types of intervention as it is these that can be given 
a strong regional dimension, and that have in fact been widely used in regional 
initiatives.
These direct measures can be further broken down into seven main types of scheme 
(Bannock Consulting 2001). First, states may create investment funds or funds of funds 
in which they are partners, investors or participants. Public investment in such funds 
often takes a minority share and is on subordinated terms, which means that the state
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receives lower returns than other investors and may absorb the initial costs of any 
losses. Second, wholly or majority publicly-funded agencies may act as direct single 
investors in small firms. Third, such agencies may instead act as co-investors with 
private investors that may take the lead in particular projects. Fourth, government 
agencies may provide refinancing loans to venture capital firms on commercial or softer 
terms, typically for investments in specific types of enterprise. Fifth, such measures may 
also be combined with different forms of guarantees against a proportion of investment 
losses, as well as loan repayment forgiveness. Such guarantees are usually given to 
venture capital firms, although they may also be given to those financial institutions 
investing in venture capital funds. Guarantees and loan forgiveness may also be 
accompanied by upside return boosts, which increase the incentives for investments in 
risk capital. Sixth, overhead subsidies can be used to cover part of the costs of venture 
capital firms. And, finally, tax regulations and fiscal incentives can be used to 
encourage investors to undertake risk capital investments. In summary then, there are a 
wide range of possible ways in which states can act to modify the operations of venture 
capital markets, and different tools can be applied to different parts of the investment 
process. Furthermore these instruments are frequently combined to produce quite 
complex policy measures.
There are several reasons for a comparison between the UK and Germany. First, 
although the UK venture capital market is more mature and considerably larger than 
that in Germany -  in 2001 the funds raised for investment in the UK amounted to 
€17.66bn, compared to €6.11 bn in Germany (European Venture Capital Association 
2002) -  funds in Germany have been much more directed at start-up and early-stage 
investment than has been the case in the UK, where the focus has been overwhelmingly 
on MBOs, MBIs and LBOs (Martin/Sunley/Tumer 2001). Perhaps because of the latter 
that there has been a recurring debate in the UK over what is perceived as an ‘equity 
gap’ at the small deal size, start-up and high technology (or so-called ‘classic’) sectors 
of the venture capital market. In Germany, in contrast, although the initial motivation 
for state intervention in the venture capital market was for foundation, high-technology 
ventures, the complaint is now more one of a lack of equity capital for ‘old economy’ 
activities. Second, the nature of the industry in the two countries differs in significant
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and interesting ways. For one thing, the financial, institutional and regulatory 
framework impinging upon the venture capital industry differs. Perhaps most 
importantly, in the bank based financial system in Germany two quasi-public credit 
institutions employed historically to provide long-term financing to industry -  the 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) and Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA) - have 
become active players in channelling public funds for venture capital investment. Until 
recently, the only institution of a public nature that operated in the venture capital 
market in the UK was 3i (previously Investors in Industry), a body owned jointly by the 
Bank of England and the major clearing banks and which invested directly in venture 
equity. This institution was privatised and floated during the 1990s. Then in 2000, the 
UK government launched a major new policy initiative -  the Regional Venture Capital 
Funds (RVCFs) -  aimed at creating specific funds in the English Regional Development 
Agency areas directed explicitly at the lower deal-size end of the market. The aim 
behind these RVCFs is to commit state monies to leverage additional private funds to 
establish one-off regional ‘funds of funds’ under the control of a single fund manager. 
This approach thus differs from that found in Germany as embodied in the KfW and 
DtA, which is essentially a continuous ‘open-ended’ system of support. Third, the 
nature of venture capital investments differs markedly between the two countries, in 
that, at least until very recently, the UK market has been overwhelmingly orientated to 
management buy-outs (MBOs), to the neglect of start-up financing. This focus on 
MBO/MBI investment and the neglect of ‘classic’ venture capital activity (that is seed, 
start-up and early stage ventures, especially in high-tech companies) has in fact been a 
recurrent criticism of the UK market. And the relative lack of funds directed into the 
start-up and early-stage stages was a key factor in the UK government’s decision to set 
up the new Regional Venture Capital Funds. In Germany, by contrast, since the mid- 
1990s, foundation and early-stage venture capital - especially in high-tech sectors - has 
been much stronger, and investment in MBOs and MBIs much less significant, than in 
the UK. Fourth, there are important differences between the two countries in the 
geographical organisation of the industry. In the UK, the venture capital industry is 
much more spatially concentrated -  primarily in London - than is the case in Germany, 
where there is a higher degree of regional balance, with no one single centre or region
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dominating the market in the same way that London and the South East region do in the 
UK.
Both countries differ from one another not only in the size and maturity of their venture 
capital markets, but also in the extent and nature of their institutional set-ups and policy 
interventions. Distinctive institutional environments and different aims have shaped the 
instruments and mechanisms used. In Germany, the prevalence of public and semi­
public actors and the dominance of public financial support, (especially via the 
programmes of the KfW and tbg), virtually created a venture capital industry from 
scratch during the 1990s. The reliance on guarantees and on the supply of capital via 
refinancing loans and silent capital co-investment stems from the traditional means of 
providing SME support through loans and guarantees. Guarantees appear to have had a 
particularly strong impact in encouraging investments and their extensive use helped to 
leverage in a large amount of private investment (see table 4.13). However, the recent 
'technology crash' resulted in large guarantee pay-outs and the costs have increased to 
an extent that the programmes are unlikely to continue in their present form. Yet, risk 
mitigation schemes form an in-build stabilizer for venture capital companies. Since 
especially the venture capital industry is prone to the business cycle and the valuation of 
the stock market, guarantees may help to keep talent and competence on board during a 
severe downswing phase of the market. A restricted, reasonable use of this instrument 
should also not hinder a necessary cleaning-up of the market.
Both countries had to pass EU regulations with regard to state aid, which were 
negotiated at the same time. Since the market values of the public guarantees are 
difficult to quantify and the private capital markets hardly offer any guarantees of this 
form, the large take-up by investors and low fees suggest that they represented an 
enormous amount of state aid. The EU, however, acknowledged the important role of 
start-up finance for the economic development of the union, recognised a role for public 
funding limited to “addressing identifiable market failures” and supported the industry 
with EIF fund of funds (European Commission 2001b). With regard to a departure from 
common state aid rules and rapid developments in this area, the European Commission 
reserved the right to change these rules, that were envisaged to be applied for five years,
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at any time (European Commission 2001a). An agreement, which permitted the German 
governments to retain support programmes in their present form with the exceptions 
that public guarantees for state banks had to be abolished in 2005 and that export 
finance subsidies had to be diverted from KfW to a different organisation, was hence 
fragile.1 Yet, due to the high cost of the guarantee programmes in recent years and the 
opportunity to tap into European funds available, a policy switch towards fund of fund 
constructions had already begun.
Based on the survey results the following table measures the effectiveness of applied 
policy instruments in both countries. It is directly related to the policy target of closing a 
gap since it refers to investment that otherwise would not have occurred. 12
Table 4.13: Aspects of Public Programmes that Caused Additional Investments
Aspect
Germany UK
rank 0 N rank 0 N
risk mitigation (guarantees) 1 2.32 96 3 5.19 21
cheaper refinancing loans 2 3.77 94 4 5.55 22
public co-investm ent in investee com panies 3 3.80 94 2 4.91 22
public co-investm ent in fund 4 4.30 93 1 4.13 23
access to  (not price reduced) refinancing loans 5 4.33 90 5 5.62 21
Source: Own Survey; Note: Valid Average
0 , Scale from 1 to 6, 1= very important, 6= not important
1 “Die inlandische Fordertatigkeit bleibt also uneingeschrankt bestehen. Sie wurde von der EU- 
Kommission als Ausgleich fur die Staatsgarantie anerkannt“ (Suddeutsche Zeitung 2002, Schlusspunkt 
im Bankenstreit, KfW trifft Vereinbarung mit Brussel, Inlandische Forderprogramme bleiben 
unangetastet/Exportfinanzierung wird ausgelagert)
2 To complete the results: In Germany ‘others’ mean is 1.00 (N=4), in the UK ‘others’ mean is 2.00 
(N=3), however, the specified answers were in both countries not coherent at all. Interestingly the UK 
standard deviation for ‘public co-investment in fund’ is with 2.262 by far the highest, expressing a split 
opinion on the use and the effectiveness o f  this instrument.
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4.3.1 The Evolution of Venture Capital Policy in Germany
Venture capital and private equity policies in Germany have developed as part of both 
technology-and-innovation (T&I), and small-and-medium-sized-enterprise (SME) 
policies. The provision of equity capital emerged as a major focus during the 1990s and 
has since become a regular feature of German T&I programmes, and increasingly of 
SME policy.1 The key instruments are guarantees, refinancing loans and direct 
investment by wholly or majority publicly-funded agencies, especially as co-investment 
and in the form of ‘silent capital’.
Venture capital programmes complement and are combined with a wide array of other 
instruments, such as grant and loan schemes as well as non-financial instruments such 
as consultancy and network support services, small firm incubators, and technology 
transfer. The rationale behind venture capital policies and its specific forms are best 
understood in the context of the development of SME and T&I policy.
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), often referred to as ‘Mittelstand’ in 
Germany, have long been considered the backbone of the German economy, and since 
World War II a complex and complicated system of SME and especially start-up 
support policies has developed. Traditional SME policies including early support 
schemes for technology based and innovative SMEs were largely based on grants and 
loans at preferential rates. In the 1960s and 1970s the T&I policy focus was on 
financing large research institutions and research in large industrial companies, and 
SMEs as potential carriers of innovation processes have only been targeted since the 
1980s. Since the 1980s and especially the 1990s, these have been complemented by 
consultancy services and network initiatives, mainly provided to start-ups and SMEs in 
specific situations. Although the first equity programme was introduced in the 1970s, it 
was only in the late-1990s that the provision of equity to SMEs became a major policy 
aim. In reaction to a debate about a possible equity gap for SMEs in the late-1960s, the 
ERP venture capital programme (ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm) was launched by the 
KfW in 1971. This programme aimed to refinance those venture capital firms providing
1 For an overview on the development of T&I policies in Germany, see Fier and Harhoff (2001).
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quasi-equity to SMEs unsuited for the stock market (now described as ‘old-economy’ 
SMEs). It led to the establishment of the Mittelstandische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
(MBGs) in the German Lander. This is mainly due a growing awareness of the 
advantages and potentials of venture capital finance for technology-based and 
innovative firms, the restrictions placed on bank debt financing by Basel II, and the 
increasing significance of succession problems for SMEs. Following a draft version in 
July 1999, the Basler Ausschuss fur Bankenaufsicht has laid down new regulations 
regarding the adequate equity capitalisation of banks. These regulations revise 
stipulations made in 1988 (Basel I). It is widely argued that following Basel II, banks 
will charge higher costs to more risky investments, as they will be required to provide 
more security for risky credits, and rating will play a more prominent role. Although 
Basel II will only come into effect in 2006, banks have already started to change their 
strategies accordingly.
The national pilot scheme ‘Equity for young technology-based firms’ (BJTU), launched 
in 1989, was the first equity programme in Germany T&I policy and marked the 
beginning of the recent upsurge of venture capital policies in Germany. One earlier 
endeavour in the 1970s, however, should not be ignored. As a response to public 
debates about an equity and a technology-market gap the Deutsche 
Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft mbH (WFG) was established as the first German 
private equity firm by the national government and 29 banks in 1975. This venture 
proved to be an outright failure -  among the reasons cited are the contradictory goals of 
the shareholders - and the government withdrew in 1984 (Mayer/Muller 1991; 
Becker/Hellmann 2000). The new programme, however, was inspired by a desire to 
imitate the success of the US in developing venture capital-supported technology-based 
companies and was referred to as a “technology policy learning and stimulation 
programme” (Kulicke 1997a: 116). It provided (non-fiscal) incentives to encourage 
investors to invest in young technology-based firms. By aiming to stimulate private 
capital providers and activate market forces, it marked a clear shift from loan- and 
grant-based schemes, such as the preceding pilot programme, ‘Support for technology- 
oriented business startups’ (TOU, 1983-1988), to a more market based approach in T&I 
policy.
95
The BJTU programme (1989-1994), and its successor programme ‘Equity for small 
technology-based firms’ (BTU, which started in 1995), in combination with other more 
recent equity programmes, have had a substantial impact on the German venture capital 
market. They have led to the establishment of new venture capital firms concentrating 
on early-stage (technology) finance and a reorientation of pre-existing venture capital 
firms (Wupperfeld, 1997). These policies are one reason why Germany, in international 
comparative terms, has large absolute amounts and high shares of venture capital in 
early-stage investments. It is estimated that the majority of all early-stage investments in 
young or small technology-based firms in Germany in the 1990s were publicly 
supported in some way.
The take-off in the German venture capital/private equity market in the second half of 
the 1990s was supported by new venture capital and private equity policies at both 
national and regional levels (Fiedler/Hellmann 2001). Some of the more recent 
programmes support investment in later stages and apply a broader definition of target 
companies including medium sized and more established companies as well as firms 
without a specific technology or innovation focus.
In addition to the proliferation of straightforward venture capital policies targeting 
individual firms, more complex T&I policies have been launched since the mid-1990s. 
These policies combine various instruments and address specific groups of actors (such 
as support for the creation of innovation networks). Equity capital and equity providers, 
especially venture capital firms, constitute one element of these policies. In the belief 
that localised clusters are essential for the generation of innovation, relevant national 
policies were designed as ‘contests between regions’ (for example, the BioRegio 
contest, launched in 1995). By tying technology policy initiatives to the regional level 
and moving away from the traditional policy focus on individual firms and sectors, they 
represented “a new path in technology funding” (Dohse 2001: 446). As T&I policies 
have become ‘regionalized’, they have at the same time introduced a (regional) 
competitive element into the system (Koschatzky et al. 2000: 415). However, the 
regionalization of T&I policies has only partly been accompanied by the establishment 
of genuinely regional venture capital policies.
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In Germany, long-standing national public institutions, in particular the Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA), or rather its subsidiaries 
Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft mbH (tbg) and gbb Beteiligungs-AG, of which 
the latter solely provides equity to low- and no-tech, 'old economy' firms with limited 
growth prospects, play a crucial role within public venture capital. They have operated 
loan- and grant-oriented policies for a long time and have, in the last decade, also 
become engaged in venture capital policies. The KfW and DtA, as well as similar 
institutions at the Lander level, form a tiered system of quasi-public banks acting as 
economic development agencies in charge of SME and T&I programmes. The 
complexity of German SME and T&I policies targeting start-ups in Germany partly 
results from the incremental development of programmes within and in co-operation 
with these public institutions. Hannemann and Schmeisser (2001) for example counted 
no fewer than 186 national and 822 regional public programmes Against the 
background of this very distinct institutional environment, which reflects the bank- 
dominated financial system in Germany, it is not surprising that venture capital policy 
measures show an affinity with, and some similarities to, loan-oriented programmes.
At the national level loan- and equity-oriented programmes within SME and T&I 
policies were mainly administered by two large quasi-public banks, the Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau in Frankfurt (KfW), on the one hand, and the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank 
in Bonn (DtA), on the other. The KfW and DtA acted as “Wirtschaftsforderinstitute”, 
that is, economic development institutions. Founded in the wake of World War II and 
capitalised under the post-war European Recovery Program (ERP), both institutions 
were originally assigned to tasks related to the reconstruction of the German economy 
and to payment transfers after the war. Subsequently they have evolved into national 
economic development institutions with a variety of tasks including the management of 
SME and T&I programmes. Recently DtA was merged with KfW. At the regional level 
the (semi-)public Landesbanken and -  as integrated or separate institutions -  public 
Investitionsbanken play a similar role. They act as regional economic development 
banks and manage regional SME and T&I policies. While these institutions are vehicles 
administering Federal Government-initiated programmes in a top-down manner, they
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also have developed their own initiatives and actively participate in the design and 
introduction of new policies.
The two models applied in the first national venture capital programme, the BJTU pilot 
scheme and continued in the current BTU programme, are representative of the types of 
programmes managed by KfW and tbg. The KfW model combines refinancing loans 
with public guarantees, while the tbg model combines a public-sector co-investment 
scheme with guarantees. KfW and tbg programmes played an important role in the 
boom of the German venture capital market in the late-1990s, when they accounted for 
a significant share of venture capital invested. In the second half of the 1990s a large 
part of total investment and the majority of all seed, start-up and expansion investment 
(which is the main focus of KfW and tbg programmes) were either refinanced or co- 
financed by the KfW and the tbg respectively.
The KfW provides various refinancing facilities (long-term loans of up to 85 % of an 
investment), investment guarantee schemes and combinations thereof to venture capital 
firms and other investors that provide equity capital to eligible firms. The loans cany 
interest rates which are set at the lower end of market rates and are fixed over the 
duration of the loan. The tbg was founded as a venture capital subsidiary of the DtA in 
1989 and directly provides quasi-equity to firms under closely specified conditions. The 
most important condition is the commitment of a lead investor whose investment is 
matched by the tbg. Depending on the specific programme, the tbg can guarantee part of 
the lead investor’s investment, and offer rather favourable regulations for the lead 
investor with regard to the conditions under which he or she can buy out the tbg’s share 
or sell his or her share to the tbg. Both the KfW and tbg mainly act on a case-by-case 
basis. Recently, however, they have also started sponsoring venture capital/private 
equity funds using their respective models; these include several regional funds. 10 Both 
models (refinancing and co-investment) increase the amount of investment capital in the 
venture capital market and at the same time guarantee (part of) the investment of their 
counterpart (venture capital firm or investor). Venture capital firms and investors using 
KfW or tbg programmes need to be accredited with the respective institution. The 
affiliation of the two models with different institutions has led to some competition and
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overlap. The most recent decision to merge KfW and tbg’s parent company DtA and 
then concentrate SME support policies in a so-called "SME Bank“ (Mittelstandsbank) 
under the roof of the KfW Group aims at enhancing efficiency and transparency of 
public policies administered by the two institutions.
The partly pro-cyclical tendency of venture capital support by the KfW and tbg is 
eminent (Martin et al 2003: 23). Not only have both institutions decreased their 
commitments in absolute terms, but they have done so at a faster rate than the overall 
decline in total venture capital investment. While in 1998 almost half of all venture 
capital investment was sponsored by either KfW or tbg this figure dropped to less than 
20 percent in 2001. According to information gathered in interviews, both institutions 
have become reluctant to sponsor new deals and are concentrating on providing second 
round finance for existing companies.
The programmes of the KfW and tbg account for the vast majority of financial 
expenditure and organisational capacity of German venture capital policies at the 
national level. Nevertheless, there are some further activities including: The close 
interplay between new T&I policies such as BioRegio and venture capital markets. One 
dimension of BioRegio was the supply of matching funds to those venture capital firms 
investing in target companies. Koschatzky et al. (2000b, 429) argue that the availability 
of venture capital appears to have improved with BioRegio, as innovative biotech SMEs 
do not identify access to venture capital as a major problem. Several of our interviewees 
emphasised that policies such as BioRegio and the take-off of the venture capital market 
are closely intertwined (compare, for instance, the role of BioM AG in Bavaria’s 
biotech cluster). This contrasts markedly with an earlier study of biotechnology SMEs 
in 1995. The downside of this close interplay is of course the current crisis within high- 
tech sectors, a crisis which also affects biotechnology and is related to a “dramatic 
collapse” of venture capital.
The foundation of the Business Angels Netzwerk Deutschland (BAND) by the Federal 
Government together with business sponsors in 1998, as an initiative to develop an 
informal venture capital market for early-stage companies. The BAND produces
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specimen contracts, a ‘How-to-do-book’ for business angels and would-be 
entrepreneurs and runs an internet matching platform. In addition, the activities 
explicitly support regional business angles initiatives. It is important to note that most 
KfW and tbg venture capital programmes (with the exception of policies targeting the 
Eastern Lander, such as FUTOUR) do not have explicit regional objectives; that is, the 
distribution of the funding is not based on explicit regional criteria. The regional 
outcomes of KfW and tbg policies, which will be analysed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, thus mainly depend on factors contextual to the policies themselves. Prominent 
among these factors are the activities of regional public actors and the way in which 
they design regional venture capital policies to integrate KfW and tbg funding 
opportunities.
Venture capital policies at the regional level -  with the notable exception of MBGs -  
are fairly recent and vary significantly in their scale and scope. While some Lander 
actively intervene in their regional venture capital markets, others are less engaged. 
There is an apparent variation of policies with regard to aims, actors involved, and the 
mixture of instruments employed. In addition to initiatives that mainly perform 
consultancy and networking functions (e.g. business angel networks, WIN in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen), each Land has developed policies aimed at the financial support 
of venture capital investment. These can be classified into four general types:
First, all Lander states, except Bremen, have established Mittelstandische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften (MBGs, or Equity Stock Companies). MBGs were founded 
as regional development agencies by private regional actors as well as local and 
regional public banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken) to provide equity to SMEs in the 
regions. The larger part of their investments is guaranteed by regional guarantee banks 
(Btirgschaftsbanken) which exist in all Lander and which in turn receive guarantees 
from the Lander governments and partly the KfW; the latter two also provide 
refinancing in some cases. While the original focus of the MBGs was firmly on 
traditional SMEs, some have recently expanded their scope to support T&I. The level of 
MBG activity differs substantially between the various Lander. The Baden- 
Wiirttemberg MBG has always enjoyed a great amount of regional government support
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and traditionally is the most active MBG in Germany. Other large and active MBGs 
include those from Bayern, Hessen, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thtiringen (Kulicke 
1997b; Wupperfeld 1997). In 2001 about one third of MBG investment was in Baden- 
Wiirttemberg, more than 20 percent in Bavaria while the other Lander account for less 
than 10 percent each. Nordrhein-Westfalen represents the lowest end of the activity 
range. Before 2001 Nordrhein- Westfalen’s MBG stopped any engagement in new 
investment projects and is now merely administrating the remains of its portfolio.
In addition to, or as a substitute for, their participation in MBGs, some Sparkassen -  
local savings banks -  established their own venture capital firms. These venture capital 
firms established by one or more Sparkassen serve a clientele very similar to that of the 
MBGs. Although they are not Lander initiatives per se, they are indirectly linked to the 
Lander level via their association with the (public) Landesbanken which serve as their 
central banks. The vast majority of the more than 500 Sparkassen in Germany are public 
institutions at the local level and their activities have traditionally been backed by local 
and regional public authorities enabling them to get preferential credit rating and thus to 
provide credit at very competitive rates. They are very important providers of credit to 
old-economy SMEs and have a local or regional focus. The latter is also the case for 
most of their venture capital subsidiaries, which focus on the traditional clientele of the 
respective parent companies -  thus complementing their product range with an equity 
facility. Although overall investment sums as well as most of the individual investments 
are generally rather small, the importance of venture capital firms established by 
Sparkassen should not be underestimated. Some studies found that about one fifth of 
German venture capital firms were established with Sparkassen as major owners 
(Nolte/Stummer 2000 and 2001), and that most of them are located outside the major 
agglomeration centres. Nordrhein-Westfalen, where the regional MBG ceased its 
investment activity, is the Land featuring the by far largest number of venture capital 
firms established by Sparkassen. Second, in most Lander, in addition to the MBGs new 
Lander institutions have been established in the 1990s to act as regional venture capital 
firms with a public majority share. In most cases these take the legal form of a 100 
percent subsidiary of the respective Landesbank or its investment branch 
(‘Investitionsbank’), or other regional development agencies (such as in Bavaria). Their
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sizes and foci vary between the Lander, but generally these institutions concentrate 
much more on classic venture capital per se, that is on high technology and innovative 
enterprises, than the MBGs. The most prominent example is Bayern Kapital 
Risikokapitalbeteiligungs GmbH, founded in 1995. Other examples include IBB 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, founded 1997 in Berlin, and BC Brandenburg Capital 
GmbH, founded in 2000. In Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen such institutions do not 
exist.
Third, in addition to public-majority institutions, there are also venture capital firms 
which were founded by a Land together with private investors and in which the Land 
only holds a minority share. Examples are Maz Level One and Imtc established in 2000 
in Hamburg, a Land where there is no public majority venture capital firms as described 
above and not even a regional investment bank. Apart from the public minority equity 
funding, Imtc also receives additional funding for overhead subsidies. The two 
institutions are very small with regard to their fund volume and act as specialist venture 
capital firms. They concentrate on seed finance in specific sectors, namely 
microelectronics, telecommunications and medical technology. The private investors are 
financial and/or technology based companies and individuals, and they are supposed to 
function as network partners for the portfolio companies. The newly established 
institutions can be described as ‘cluster breeding facilities’ as they are providers of seed 
finance (including a hands-on monitoring approach) and a network facility at the same 
time, and target areas where Hamburg is perceived to have specific strengths.
Fourth, some states pursue venture capital policies by providing capital to new funds 
which target particular types of companies (e.g. innovation, technology, early stage) 
without establishing new institutions. The provision of capital is often conditional on 
the investment of additional matching capital by the fund manager, so that there is a 
leverage effect. The fund managers can be public, private or combinations of the two. 
They are either assigned the task of fund management directly or are chosen by 
competitive tendering. Examples include the Innovationsfonds Hamburg/Schleswig- 
Holstein (1998; DM 100m) and the Innovationsfonds Nordrhein-Westfalen (2000; 
DM200m). Both were established in co-operative efforts by the respective Lander, the
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KfW and private venture capital firms. The private venture capital firm(s) match the 
capital provided by public actors and manage the fund. The Innovationsfonds Berlin 
(founded in the early 1980s) provides an example of a publicly administered fund where 
matching private or public capital is sought for on a case-by-case basis. This fourfold 
categorisation of different forms of intervention provides a foundation for 
understanding how venture capital policies vary between different Lander.
In Germany regional venture capital policies in typically exhibit diverse and varying 
levels of institutional thickness or density, together with complex actor constellations 
and complicated instrument constructions, all of which rule out easy generalizations and 
comparisons. There are three main aspects connected to the regional variation of 
German venture capital policies. First, regional venture capital policy development is 
strongly influenced by the relational networks and knowledge of regional actors, as well 
as by their past experiences and current interests. Indeed, it is often a direct result of the 
personal interactions and mutual obligations of actors in various public, semi-public and 
private institutions. Second, and partly related to this point, the amount of financial 
resources committed to venture capital policies and programmes at the Lander level 
vary significantly. One important factor here is the economic and fiscal disparities 
between the Lander. Third, given the constraints on the availability of financial 
resources, Lander governments and other regional actors generally try to draw on the 
resources made available by ‘external actors, especially the KfW, the tbg and the EU. 
The specific requirements associated with these funding opportunities, in combination 
with the regional actors’ networks, create a profound complexity in regional venture 
capital policies across Germany. In particular, the willingness and capability of public 
actors to successfully start or support initiatives that integrate other actors and funding 
opportunities (national, EU, private) is crucial and can make a significant difference. A 
similar process, although operating on a much smaller scale, has also been apparent in 
the development of venture capital policy in the UK.
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4.3.2 The Evolution of Venture Capital Policy in the United Kingdom
Both the economic and ideological contexts in which policy towards venture capital has 
developed in the UK, are quite different from those in Germany. In Britain, the problem 
of capital market failure in the supply of capital to small firms was first identified in the 
Macmillan Report of 1930. But, given the tendency over the past two decades for UK 
policy to be strongly influenced by neo-liberal free market economics, and given the 
maturity and size of the British venture capital market, it is perhaps not surprising that 
central government policy towards the market has, until very recently, been dominated 
by an approach that seeks to encourage a healthy supply of equity capital through 
national fiscal incentives rather than regional or local initiatives and programmes. The 
Loan Guarantee Scheme introduced in 1981 was a further example of an indirect 
approach that guaranteed a proportion (70-85%) of bank loans to smaller companies. 
This did not involve equity. The Business Expansion Scheme, for instance, permitted 
individuals investing directly in small unquoted companies to claim tax relief at their 
marginal rate on the amount invested. But while it attracted billions of pounds of 
investment, much of the money went into property and asset-backed deals rather than 
small high-risk companies (OECD 1997). The Enterprise Investment Scheme 
introduced in 1994, continued the same approach and provided a range of tax reliefs to 
encourage individuals and trustees to acquire shares in small higher risk companies. 
Furthermore, Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs), established in 1995, are investment trusts 
specialising in investment in small higher-risk trading companies; VCTs can invest up 
to £1 million in any one business, and are exempt from corporations tax while their 
investors are also entitled to significant income tax and capital gains relief. The trusts’ 
average investment per company was £882,000 as at end-1999, and most of their 
investments were focused at £500,000 upwards (DTI 1999). Their original aim 
however, has been subverted to a large degree as they have tended to invest as much as 
legally possible in lower risk asset backed shares (OECD 1997).
Despite central government’s traditional preference for fiscal incentives, it would be 
wrong to believe that the UK has seen no examples of attempts to directly supply equity 
to small firms. Most notably, in response to perceived shortages in the supply of
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investment capital to small firms, in 1945 the Bank of England together with the major 
national clearing banks established the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation 
or ICFC (Coopey/Clarke 1995). The ICFC created a large and passive portfolio of long­
term equity investments in unproven companies and did not rely on public sector 
assistance nor subsidised credit. After a merger in 1973, ICFC became Finance for 
Industry which subsequently changed its name to Investors in Industry and then to 3i. 
The organisation specialised in investing relatively small amounts of capital and became 
the main equity provider in most of the regions of the UK, moving into venture capital 
from the late- 1970s onwards. In 1994, however, 3i went public (that is, floated on the 
Stock Market) and it has subsequently been driven by the need to make returns for its 
shareholders. It has closed several of its UK regional offices (including those in Leeds, 
Newcastle, and Edinburgh) and in 1998-99 announced that it was adopting ‘loose’ 
minimum deal sizes of £lm  for technology deals and £3m for general investments. This 
regional withdrawal and upward shift in deal size have certainly reinforced the 
perception among many actors in the industry that there is an equity capital gap for 
small high-risk companies, although, as we have seen, this remains a controversial 
issue.
In addition, direct policy measures to increase the supply of venture capital to small 
high-risk companies have, for some time, been employed at a local and regional level by 
sub-national and specialist sectoral institutions (Harding 1999). The nationalised steel 
and coal industries, for example, created Enterprise Groups to encourage new firm 
formation in order to regenerate those local economies and communities damaged by 
the decline of these heavy industries (British Steel Enterprise was established in 19751, 
British Coal Enterprise in 1984).
In 1982, in an effort to respond to urban recession and widespread private sector 
bankruptcies, five of the large Metropolitan County Councils also created Enterprise 
Agencies or Enterprise Boards in order to supply long term capital to small local 
businesses. These included Greater London Enterprise, West Midlands Enterprise,
1 British Steel Enterprise is now UK Steel Enterprise and supplies loan and risk capital to businesses in 
former and present steel areas. Equity investments vary between £25,000 and £250,000. It is also a co­
manager o f unsecured equity capital ftmds in South Yorkshire and Wales.
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Lancashire Enterprises, Yorkshire Enterprise and Merseyside Enterprise, and by the 
mid-1980s there were some 20 local-authority based institutions of this kind, the 
majority associated with Labour-controlled councils. These enterprise units typically 
raised monies for investment by appropriating a fraction of the local property tax 
(known as the local rate, and later to be renamed the Community Charge). During the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s the funding of such boards was seen as an 
inappropriate use of public money and was outlawed by legislation. However, several of 
these agencies managed to survive by privatising themselves, rolling over their capital, 
and seeking new sources of investment from the private sector (examples include 
Yorkshire Fund Managers, Enterprise Pic, West Midlands Enterprise and Greater 
London Enterprise). These enterprise fund managers usually have retained close links 
with their local governments and economic regeneration agencies, so that they have 
continued, to some degree at least, to have a specialist focus on small-firm high-risk 
investments in order to support their local economies. Yorkshire Fund Managers, for 
instance, continues to have local authority representatives on its Board and believes that 
its ethos reflects the legacy of its public sector, economic development origins.
Other fund managers have also been more recently created by local development 
agencies and TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils). For instance, the Merseyside 
Special Investment Fund was established in 1996 by a coalition of local development 
institutions in order to use EU Objective 1 funding for Merseyside to fill a perceived 
local equity gap. MSIF began as a £25 million fund, consisting of a fifty-fifty mix of 
private and public cash from Barclays bank, the Merseyside public sector pension fund 
and an ERDF grant. It now has three funds totalling £80 million and in 2000 created its 
own fund manager, Alliance Fund Managers. The MSIF model is being copied in other 
Objective 1 areas. In the North East, for example, Northern Enterprise Limited was 
created by a similar coalition of agencies. Such specialist fund managers have often 
drawn on European Union monies or the European Investment Fund (EIF), a recent 
equity investment arm of the European Investment Bank, and also became key players 
in the Midland (now HSBC) Enterprise Funds. The Midland programme was introduced 
1993, following a Business in the Community Taskforce report that highlighted the 
problem of the equity gap for SMEs. The then Midland Bank became the lead investor
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in nine regional funds, established as limited partnerships with ten year life-spans, 
managed by independent private fund managers who could invest between £10k and 
£150k in small companies. TECs and Business Links provided support for the running 
costs of these funds and in 1998 the European Investment Bank invested a further £20 
million. They are now known as HSBC regional enterprise funds and the bank has 
invested a total of £37 million.
Finally, the Scottish, Northern Ireland and Welsh Development Agencies also created 
venture capital arms in the early 1980s. In fact the Scottish Development Agency 
(subsequently renamed Scottish Enterprise) has had an investment arm since 1975 and, 
in 1982, this became Scottish Development Finance (SDF). As Hood (2000) explains, 
initially SDF subordinated the aim of making investment returns to economic 
development objectives and was criticised for providing bailouts to ‘lame ducks’ in 
declining industries. After surviving a period of political uncertainty and opposition 
between 1989 and 1991, SDF gained more commercial credibility as it became a 
specialist investor in high-technology start-ups. A key innovation here was the 
provision of a guarantee by the newly established EIF in 1994. This allowed the 
establishment in 1996 of the Scottish Equity Partnership as a £25 million limited 
partnership with an equal public-private investment contribution. The EIF’s 
involvement guaranteed the repayment of the private sector’s contribution to the Fund. 
In 1997 SDF also set up the Scottish Technology Fund in a joint venture with 3i and has 
also become the manager for a University Challenge Fund. In 1999 SDF became an 
independent venture manager company (Scottish Equity Partners Limited), although 
Scottish Enterprise retains a 25 percent stake. According to many observers, the 
consequent primary emphasis on investment returns has been associated with upward 
move in deal size and a move away from investing in small high risk companies within 
Scotland. In the Scottish Executive's view, therefore, there is once again a need for a 
new programme of direct intervention in the high-risk, small end of the venture capital 
market. Moreover, the appearance of a new direct interventionism designed to remedy 
market failure has been shared with the Westminster government.
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The arrival of New Labour in government in 1997 signalled a significant break in 
venture capital policy in the UK. The Labour Government has continued and enhanced 
several established SME loan-based programmes, but it also expressed the opinion that 
loans programmes encourage a grant dependency, discourage risk taking and attract 
lower growth companies. It noted that debt is often inappropriate for high-growth 
companies as they lack the appropriate security, and cash-flow constraints can make 
servicing difficult and restrict the company's growth. While the Labour government has 
therefore reinforced fiscal incentives for equity investment, it has also supplemented 
these with a new series of policy interventions designed to stimulate a new ‘knowledge 
driven economy’ and emulate the genesis of the New Economy in the United States. 
The Government has adopted a series of measures designed to promote the supply of 
seed and risk capital.1
In March 1998 the Government announced the University Challenge Fund as a 
collaboration between itself (£25m), the Wellcome Trust (£18m) and the Gatsby 
Charitable Foundation (£2m). This is designed to assist Universities in commercialising 
their scientific research by supplying seed finance for market research and proto-type 
development. The aim is to fund businesses to allow them to produce a sound business 
plan and make credible approaches to commercial investors (Office of Science and 
Technology 2002). The first round funding was £45m plus £15m from university 
matched funding. It created 15 seed funds of up to £5m with a cap of £250,000 for a 
single project involving 37 institutions (28 institutes and 9 institutes. A second round 
involving £15m from the DTI was announced in 2000. The Government has described 
this initiative as a regional policy in that it illustrates how “national policy priorities can 
be treated flexibly, to deliver regional centres of excellence” (HM Treasury/DTI 2001: 
para 4.46). In 2001, however, the DTI stated that it was reducing its annual funding of 
this fund from £9.4m to only £586,000
1 In November 1999 a Phoenix Fund was established to provide better access to finance and business 
support for firms in deprived areas. This was originally £30m which was trebled in July 2000 to £100m 
and it includes a loan guarantee scheme, a CFI fund, a mentor network, and a development fund. The 
Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions had also created a Coalfields Enterprise 
Fund to supply venture capital to firms in former mining and coalfield areas. It has invested £10m and 
Barclays Bank a further £10m. The Fund was to be run by Coalfield Partners, an independent manager 
consisting o f Enterprise Ventures Limited and GLE Development Capital.
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Some of the seed funds have been slow and cautious at investing their money, the large 
consortia surrounding the funds have often been slow to establish and organise, and the 
funds have found it hard to appoint experienced fund managers. The DTI comments that 
“it would clearly be inappropriate to provide public funding in advance of need” (Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry 2001: para. 58). Moreover, these difficulties may 
reflect a broader wariness of University commercialisation projects among the UK 
venture capital community. Several of our interviewees stated that such projects were 
often too far removed from getting products to the market to be worth risking 
investment.
A similar reliance on regional actors to deliver national policies has been apparent in the 
public promotion of venture capital. Some of the local and regional examples discussed 
earlier were identified as useful policy models, particularly those that had successfully 
managed the Midland (HSBC) Enterprise Funds. At the same time, the Government 
argued that without public sector support the existing ‘equity gap’ funders would tend to 
move up to larger deals (DTI 1999: 30). It estimated that only five of the existing 15 
BVCA members investing under £250,000 managed funds of a viable size, that is, over 
£10m. Moreover, relying on an uneven and small set of local actors was an inadequate 
response to the equity gap for SMEs. This was described as a national problem, but one 
that was amenable to a regional solution.
The ‘equity gap’ has been identified as a national problem with regional solutions. 
Those funds which have historically demonstrated success in the ‘equity gap’ tend to be 
those which are situated physically close to where investments are made and which 
have an understanding of local business networks. Funds which are embedded in a 
business community can control their due diligence costs by drawing on local 
knowledge and experience. But not only was the equity gap presented as a national 
problem. At times the Government also suggested that there might be specific regional 
market failures. It was frequently noted that there are substantial regional variations in 
small firms creation rates, with the rate of VAT registrations per 10,000 people being 
three times as high in London as in the North East. In the government's words, “There is 
a strong role for a regional investment policy where it can tackle particular regional
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market failures” (HM Treasury/DTI 2001: para 4.38). The Treasury describes how 
public support for risk capital constitutes an umbrella fund to be operated by a new 
Small Business Investment Taskforce in co-operation with the RDAs. In accordance 
with the Chancellor's expressed aim of ensuring “balanced economic development 
across the regions and nations of the UK”, the policy was to ensure that all enterprises 
wherever they are located can access the finance they need. As part of this strategy, the 
SBS and RDAs will co-decide on regional priorities - the criteria for the funds and the 
allocation of government support - to narrow the equity gaps for small scale venture 
capital across the UK. For example, relative to their SME sectors, the North of England, 
South West and Wales have 50 percent or less early stage venture capital compared to 
the UK as a whole. The £1 billion target umbrella fund should go a substantial way 
towards narrowing regional disparities and moving the market forward over the next 3-5 
years.
In line with these aims, the Government's 1998 Competitiveness White Paper 
announced a new Enterprise Fund totalling £180m which would draw on local expertise 
and a new support network for business proposals (DTI: 1998). This included a High 
Technology Fund (which is a ‘fund of funds’) that invests in venture capital funds 
which target early stage high technology companies. The DTI acts as the cornerstone 
investor providing £20m (€30m) on subordinated terms and this has attracted a further 
£106m (€160m) from private investors and the EIB. The Enterprise Fund also included 
the creation of a minimum of nine Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCFs). The 
largest component of the Enterprise Fund is a revised Small Firms Loan Guarantee 
Fund. The RVCFs involve £50m (€75m) of government funding expected to lever in 
around £250m (€375m) of private backing. The structure of these funds imitates the 
Midland Enterprise Funds, as they sought to create a viable fund in each of the English 
regions, managed by commercial and experienced fund managers. While the other 
Enterprise Funds operate throughout the UK, the RVCFs are limited to England so as 
not to duplicate the venture capital schemes already operational in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
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The programme’s main aims are first, to increase the amount of ‘equity gap’ venture 
capital available to SMEs (in amounts up to £500,000, approximately €750,000) 
without displacing existing fund activity in this market segment. Second, the objective 
is to ensure that each region has access to a viable regionally based venture capital fund 
making small equity investments. The third aim is to demonstrate to potential investors 
that commercial returns can be made by funds investing at the smaller end of the market 
and thereby attract other actors into this market segment, increasing the supply of 
highquality fund mangers operating in the ‘equity gap’ segment. Private sector fund 
managers were invited to tender for the management roles in each region, and the 
managers approved and appointed by the Small Business
As critics of the RVCF programme predicted (Mason/Harrison: 2001), in some regions 
it was clearly difficult to find appropriately experienced managers, with the result that 
some managers are handling several regions. The issues raised by this are discussed in 
Chapter 4. However, each fund is to operate within its regional boundary and will be 
governed by a 10-year limited partnership (with the possibility of a two-year extension). 
The fund managers are to make decisions about their investments on the basis of 
commercial criteria, although the businesses must not be owned (above 25 percent) by 
another company or companies and comply with the EU’s definition of an SME, which 
means less than 250 employees and either a turnover of less than £24m (€36m) or a 
balance sheet total of less that £16m (€24m).
While these are generalist funds with no explicit sectoral foci, as a condition of EU 
State Aid approval there are also some sectoral exclusions, which include land and 
property, financial services, accountants and legal services, hotels, nursing and care 
homes, international motor transport, agriculture, forestry and timber production and 
horticulture. Managers can invest up to £250,000 into qualifying business in start-up, 
early stage and development and acquisition and buy-out stages. If another venture 
capitalist is already invested or co-invests with the fund then total investment of both 
funds cannot exceed £250,000. Follow-on investments of another £250,000 can be 
made after a six-month time period. These rules are clearly designed to keep the funds 
firmly in the smaller, high-risk segment of the venture capital market. The managers
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will report on activity and performance to an investment Advisory Committee and 
presumably to the partnership’s General manager as well. The Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) are charged with supporting the operation of the funds in their region 
primarily by using their networks of business contacts. In order to address possible 
regional market failures, the consultation document on the RVCFs issued by the DTI, 
emphasised that the fund managers would be embedded in their local business 
communities. It also noted that regional delivery offered the opportunity to vary the 
levels of support according to differing regional conditions and thereby to make the 
funds equally attractive to private investors in all areas. “There might, for example, be a 
case for a lower level of support in more prosperous areas such as the South-East, in the 
expectation of that region having access to many more investment opportunities”. “It is 
conceivable that additional incentives could be given to funds to make a proportion of 
their investments in sub-regions, such as the Assisted Areas or areas which face a 
particular short-term difficulty, such as a major closure”. (DTI 1999: 10) However, the 
feedback received during consultation was apparently divided on the merit of offering 
additional incentives, and a number of respondents expressed the opinion that this could 
lead to poor investment decisions. The possibility of such incentives was dropped and 
any aim of remedying regional disparities in venture capital markets was downplayed. 
Indeed the Small Business Service (SBS) informed that the funds do not represent any 
form of regional policy (Interview). In terms of investment, the SBS, on behalf of the 
DTI, is investing a varying amount into each fund, depending on the size of fund 
specified by the prospective managers during the contracting process. The DTI is 
responsible for between 25 and 40 percent of investment and there is no immediately 
obvious regional logic behind this share. For instance, it is the same in London as it is in 
the North East. In addition, the SBS has secured funding from the European Investment 
Fund (EIF) and in most cases funding from these two sources will provide 50 percent of 
the total investment. In order to enable the Fund Managers to attract the requisite fifty 
percent private investment, the DTI is to subordinate its investments by putting a cap on 
its return (thus raising the return to other investors) and by agreeing to accept the ‘first 
loss’, meaning that in the event of an erosion of a fund’s capital base, its investment 
suffers the loss first. Barclays Bank has become one of the key investors in the regional
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funds, as has the Royal Bank of Scotland, and local authority pension funds have also 
become a vitally important private source of capital.
The East Midlands Fund, which was one of the first to be put in place, does not have 
Barclays funding and is heavily dependent on the County Council pension funds. It 
closed at £30m in January 2002 (well over its target of £20m). In contrast, the RVCF in 
the South East had difficulty in attracting corporate and local authority pension fund 
investors to the same degree as in other regions. SEEDA (South East England 
Development Agency) considered making its own equity investment into the fund but 
eventually West Midlands Enterprise invested £300,000 and the fund closed at £22.5m, 
below its indicative target of £30 million.
Partly as a response to the English RVCFs, Scottish Enterprise has also agreed to a new 
set of venture capital policies to support SMEs. It is to divert part of its Regional 
Selective Assistance grant to establish a new £20m Scottish Co-Investment Fund. The 
Scottish Co-Investment Scheme (SCS) will invest in private funds targeted at the equity 
gap of up to around £500,000. It will invite bids for private funds focusing on start-up, 
early stage, and building of technology companies. In addition, the Business Growth 
Fund is to be redesigned as a debt and equity vehicle able to provide funds in the 
£20,000-£l00,000 range (absorbing £5m per annum over the next three years). Finally 
an Investment Readiness Programme will operate more on the demand-side. It will 
provide financial support to growth businesses to assist with the costs of making their 
propositions investment ready - up to a maximum of £10,000. Officials from an 
Enterprise Network will also work with client companies to improve their search for 
funds and proposals. £4.5m over three years will support the grant element of this 
scheme. The SCS has similar, if slightly more cautious, aims than the English RVCFs, 
but it is noticeable that the structure and parameters of the fund are significantly 
different. The primary objective of SCS is to stimulate the provision of certain levels of 
equity funding currently not adequately provided by the market in Scotland. It is hoped 
that this will provide sufficient flexibility to stimulate additional private sector activity 
and as a consequence help to alleviate financing difficulties typically encountered by 
early stage investment propositions (Scottish Enterprise 2002).
113
The SCS will invite bids from experienced funds and other informal ‘gap actors’ and 
successful applicants will enter into a management agreement with Scottish Enterprise 
involving co-investments on equal and commercial terms. These actors will draw down 
matching funds as they make qualifying investments and will receive commercial 
management fees. The guidelines suggest that SCS commitments to funds will be in the 
range of 25-50 percent up to a maximum of £4m. Co-investments will be made up to a 
maximum SCS investment of £500,000, within a deal size ceiling of £lm. In general, 
individual investments are again to be at the discretion of the fund manager.
It is clear that the development of regional venture capital policies in the UK and 
Germany has been strongly conditioned by the different characterof financial industries 
and financial regimes in the two countries (Bascha/Walz 2001; Becker/Hellmann 2000). 
The traditional reliance on bank based loan capital in Germany explains why it was 
necessary to use anextensive range of public policy measures to construct a venture 
capitalindustry, virtually from scratch, during the 1990s. The bank-dominated financial 
system meant that innovative high-technology start-ups were unlikely to be funded in 
the absence of a significant policy strategy to create and support new equity funds and 
markets. “Given the lack of fit between the native institutional environment and the 
needs of high-tech entrepreneurship German policy makers have resorted to extensive 
‘compensatory’ measures to encourage the founding of high-tech start-ups.” (Lehrer 
2000: 92). The prevalence of public and semi-public actors and the dominance of public 
financial support in the German venture capital market is unusual (Bascha/Walz 2001). 
In the UK by contrast, despite long standing concerns about the funding of small firms, 
the fact that a very large venture capital industry already existed meant that the case for 
policy intervention and evidence of market failure has been more controversial. Thus it 
was not until the late-1990s that central government decided to try to directly increase 
the supply of venture capital to these firms. Its intervention has so far been on a much 
smaller scale and aimed at demonstrating to the private sector the potential profitability 
of investment in the (small firm and start-up) ‘equity gap’.
Furthermore, the distinctive institutional environments as well as the different aims 
have also shaped the instruments and mechanisms used to deliver public support to the
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venture capital industry. The reliance on guarantees and on the supply of capital via 
refinancing loans and silent capital co-investment in Germany seems to stem from, and 
conform with, the traditional means of providing SME support through loans and 
guarantees. In the UK, in contrast, the traditional orientation towards fiscal incentives 
and, in the case of the RVCFs, the adoption of a fund-of-funds approach run as limited 
partnerships with a 10-year limit and the delegation of investment decisions to private 
managers, demonstrate the stronger market orientation of venture capital policy there.
However, the development of regional venture capital policies in the two countries is 
not just a matter of national institutional and financial contexts and central government 
decisions. It has also involved significant interactions between central governments and 
local and regional authorities. In Germany several Lander governments initiated their 
own venture capital policies during the 1990s and in most cases these regional 
initiatives have been designed to draw down and make use of the increasing amounts of 
KfW and DtA finance available. The precise form of these regional policies has varied 
significantly between different Lander, reflecting their institutional relations of 
decision-makers, the nature of their economies and their commitment to other 
technology initiatives. The discovery of such decentralised reactions to and 
incorporation of central initiatives is perhaps not surprising in a federal system. It has 
also become very obvious that intermingling of national and regional monies is such 
that there is no clear demarcation between policies at different spatial scales. It is 
perhaps more surprising to find that in the UK local and regional policies and actors 
have also played an important role in the recent development of venture capital policy. 
In most regions specialist ‘gap’ regional fund managers often created by local and 
regional development agencies have existed since the 1980s. Their ability to capture and 
manage private enterprise and European public funds, suggested a possible means of 
public intervention that could possibly reconcile economic development goals with a 
market-conforming style of operation and decision-making. Such schemes thereby 
demonstrated the potential value of public-private partnerships in the regions. Recent 
central government policy has been designed with these models in mind and, indeed, is 
partly aimed at ensuring that such local partnerships prosper and are not pressured by
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market imperatives to move their deal sizes upwards into conventional venture capital 
territory.
4.3.3 Guarantees: An Evaluation of Germany’s Predominant Policy Instrument
Risk mitigation schemes in form of guarantees were introduced in Germany because 
venture companies and private equity companies had expressed a preference for this 
policy instrument (Interview Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 2002). Their introduction 
and massive use (partly covering up to 80 percent of the private investment), however, 
changes the investment behaviour and incentives structure of the market, since public 
guarantees affect the risk return relationship for the investor. On the one hand investors, 
who target a low minimum rate of return and are covered by guarantees, receive a 
sufficient risk reduction to go ahead with an investment project. This quantitative 
argument is supported by the lower targeted and realised return rate in Germany despite 
the fact that German venture capital companies invest a larger proportion of their funds 
in high technology manufacturing and early stage. These investments may otherwise not 
have happened. On the other hand guarantee programmes, where the public participates 
in losses but not profits, may also lead to riskier investment projects by reallocating 
funds for investment. This qualitative argument of adverse selection is partly supported 
by the larger share of venture capital companies in Germany whose investments turned 
sour in the critical year 2001 (table 4.14).
The survey shows that in comparison to the UK, German venture capital and private 
equity companies targeted and realised a lower return rates but German companies had 
nevertheless a higher failure rate in 2001. The losses for UK companies with a negative 
realised returns are, however, higher due to the lack of guarantees, yet losses for public 
budgets were clearly higher in Germany as guarantee disbursements have apparently 
exceeded €1 billion (Bundesrechungshof 2002). Even when public bodies may not be 
able to distinguish between investment projects investment project that would have 
gone ahead without guarantees and those that lead to additional investment, for private 
investors Germany’s state guarantee schemes for venture capital and private equity
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investment transform volatile assets into more stable assets as discussed in chapter 2 on 
the macroeconomics of financial systems. The arrangements in the venture capital and 
private equity market therefore reinforced the macroeconomic differences between 
financial systems in which changes in profit expectations in bank or intermediary based 
financial system exert a stronger influence on investment and economic activity.
Some authors argue that the provision of guarantees may simply lead to a more hands- 
off approach on the part of venture capital firms (Keuschnigg/Nielsen 2001, Schertler 
2002). The channels through which the policy instrument ‘risk mitigation’ is supposed 
to fulfil the policy objective and induce investment that otherwise would not occur 
requires therefore a more detailed analysis. The survey results suggest that German 
companies do indeed provide less managerial intervention in their investee firms, a 
feature even more marked for those firms in which public money accounts for half or 
more of their funding. Although the massive use of guarantees may induce these 
problems of moral hazard, public actors nevertheless seem to expect that lead investors 
should engage with management issues at the investee firm (Interview Project Manager, 
Public Co-Investment Institution).
Table 4.14: Failure Rate in the Portfolio of Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Companies in Relation to Number of Companies and Volume of Investment (2001)
Failure rates in percent
UK Germany
number o f  
com panies 
N = 46
volum e o f  
investm ent 
N=51
number o f  
com panies 
N =82
volum e o f  
investment 
N =93
0 - 5 % 43.5% 43.1% 40.2% 43.0%
5% - 1 0 % 32.6% 25.5% 22.0% 20.4%
10%- 15% 10.9% 19.6% 14.6% 18.3%
1 5 % - 2 5 % 8.7% 11.8% 15.9% 12.9%
>  25% 4.3% 0% 7.3% 5.4%
Source: Own Survey
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The effects of guarantees and many other factors influencing the investment behaviour 
of German venture capital and private equity companies cannot be fully understood via 
an analysis restricted to descriptive statistics.1 Kendalls’s rank correlation coefficient 
(tau) for the failure rate (related to the number of investee companies) and risk 
mitigation (guarantees) as an important aspect of public programmes for additional 
investment is -0.367 (p<0.0005, N=76).1 2 3Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) yields - 
0.328 (p=0.02) (see table in appendix D). In comparison to experimental research which 
designs the set-up in order to control for other factors involved, survey results become 
contaminated with these, so that the variance in one variable can hardly be explained by 
the variance of one single variable. There are many factors that determine the 
investment behaviour and the failure rate, some of which may not even be covered in 
the survey. However, risk mitigation as important aspect of public programmes that lead 
to additional investment yields clearly the strongest impact on the failure rate. 
Controlling for risk factors like ‘expected minimum return rate of return’, ‘investment 
allocation to seed and start-up’, and ‘investment allocation to high technology sectors’, 
and some further aspects of public programmes has hardly any effect on the results. The 
level of statistical significance is extremely high.
1 Going beyond these limits Appendix D presents correlation results for many o f  the factors involved. 
Appendix E provides some correlation results that focus on the relationship between guarantees and 
investment behaviour. Appendix F presents some partial correlation results controlling for factors that 
were correlated with the usage o f guarantees or the failure rate. Eventually, Appendix E contains a 
regression analysis and aims to quantify the effect o f guarantees on the failure rate. Appendix D 
provides zero-order bivariate correlation results for Germany. The variables appear in the order o f the 
questionnaire. The first table uses Pearson’s correlations coefficient (/*). There is a debate whether these 
should be used for ordinal data (O’Brien 1979). Furthermore, since the size o f ranges offered for the 
failure rates differ in the survey and upper or lower ranges for some variables are limitless, the 
characteristics o f some o f these variables also become more or less ordinal, when the range definitions 
are recoded into ‘cardinal’ numbers. Therefore, a table for rank correlations is added (without the 
variables measured as percentages but additionally with the ordinal variable about the involvement with 
public venture capital instead o f the share o f  public finance). As there are many tight groups the 
correlation coefficient and significance levels were derived using Kendall’s tau for these. The rank 
correlation coefficients produced are usually slightly smaller than with Spearman’ rho (Bryman/Cramer 
2001: 179).
2 The probability to derive at this result by chance is so low that the statistical software package presents 
the p-value as zero. SPSS delivers in general only p-values with three decimals, that means p is smaller 
than 0.05%.
3 A regression analysis with risk mitigation as independent variable and failure rate as dependant variable 
yields -0.328 for Beta (significance level is 0.004, adjusted R square is 0.095). In other words, 
companies that ticked just one lower number for the higher importance o f ‘risk mitigation (guarantees)’ 
classified from 1 to 6 move on average 0.328 increments up on the five ranges defined for the failure 
rates, according to the line o f  best fit for the regressions. This indicates a very strong impact o f  
guarantees.
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The second constraint with the largest difference in both countries ‘Difficulties in 
monitoring investee companies’ may indicate that German venture capital companies 
lack the means or experience to tackle the risks typically inherent in venture capital 
finance. A hands-on approach and intensive monitoring can reduce problems resulting 
from asymmetric information and moral hazard and provide managerial advice. Only 50 
percent (N=104) of German VC companies influence the management of the investee 
company. In the UK 90.9 percent (N=55) of the respondents to this question expressed 
to take a hands-on approach (question B8), Public guarantees in Germany may induce 
this behaviour because they also reduce the incentive to overcome monitoring 
difficulties, but the hypothesis, that guarantees do not effect a hands-on approach, could 
not be rejected (tau=0.072, p=0.225, N=93; see table in appendix D). The investment 
constraint ‘lack of experienced managers’ is also hardly related to a hands-on approach, 
so that an explanation of the large differences between both countries cannot solely rely 
on differences in the maturity of the markets.
Eventually, three factors remain that are significantly related to influencing the 
management of the investee company and can explain the differences between Germany 
and the UK. These are the expected minimum return rate (tau=0.416, p=0.000, N=89), a 
bank as the largest owner of the venture capital and private equity company (tau=- 
0.252, p=0.006, N=101) and access to refinancing loans as important aspect of public 
programmes (tau=-0.233, p=0.008, N=87). Apparently guarantees may not affect the 
management approach directly, but, with a significance level that indicates a strong 
impact, they do motivate venture capital and private equity companies, that normally 
target lower minimum return rates, to investments, that otherwise would not have 
happened (tau=0.356, p=0.000, N=82; Beta=0.401, significance=0.000, adjusted R 
square=0.151). And these companies, which target a lower minimum return rates, have 
banks as largest owner and have a relatively easy access to refinancing loans, typically 
provide less managerial input. Venture capital companies that have specialised in the 
high risk area of early stage and high technology investments have developed and use 
appropriate instruments to tackle the risks involved, so that they, somewhat 
surprisingly, perceive a prohibitively high risk as less of an investment barrier than 
other venture capital private equity companies do (KfW 2003: 40). A hands-on
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approach with the provision of managerial advice and intensive monitoring is one of 
these instruments. In credit markets relationship banking, a well known feature of the 
German financial system, can reduce credit rationing to smaller and start-up firms, that 
are generally less informationally transparent (Petersen/Rajan 1994). However, building 
relationships is costly and takes time. Guarantees have largely replaced the need for 
some venture capital and private equity companies to invest in these efforts. In 
comparison financial intermediaries in the so called market based financial system in 
the UK use these instruments for venture capital and private equity investment.
4.3.4 Co-Investment in Funds: An Analysis of the UK Government favourite Policy 
Instrument
In the UK by contrast a large venture capital industry already existed but there has been 
a long debate about whether and why the financial sector fails to provide SMEs with 
funding means. In one of the latest attempts to resolve this issue UK central government 
decided to directly increase the supply of venture capital to small firms via the new 
Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCFs). Its intervention is on a much smaller scale 
and not comparable to the over one thousand regional and national programmes for 
start-up companies in Germany, for which even experts hardly have an overview and 
lose track of new developments (Hannemann/Schmeisser 2001). In the UK the RVCSs 
aim to demonstrate to the private sector the potential profitability of investment in the 
(small firm and start-up) ‘equity gap’. The main element consists of the public co­
investment into these regional funds but there is also a risk mitigation aspect for the 
private investors since the first loss principle and the capped return for the public 
investment inhibit an asymmetric pay-out. This design smoothes somewhat the 
incentive effect along the range of potential returns. Guarantees come into effect at the 
point when an investment project starts to fail so that a manager could tend to divert 
efforts to other investment projects. The UK initiative is not open-ended. In the case of 
the RVCFs, the adoption of a fund-of-funds approach run as limited partnerships with a 
10-year limit and with the delegation of investment decisions to private managers. It 
involved £50 million of government funding. Since the UK government allocated a
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fixed specific amount to the regions (that was not driven by any re-distributional aim) 
there is no positive regional correlation of public money and private venture capital 
investment which is, on the contrary, the case in Germany. This result for Germany 
reflects the policy instruments used and the willingness of the German national 
government to increase planned budgets whenever demand overshot expectations 
(Interview Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft 2002).
In the UK, on the one hand, not each investment is scrutinised by public bodies, so that 
public co-investment in funds like these look less bureaucratic. A faster decision 
process and less bureaucracy is perceived as most important to improving public 
venture capital programmes in both countries (Germany: 0=2.03, N=92; UK: 0=2.10, 
N=29) (question D9). On the other hand the agency risk is higher in that the 
performance of each fund will depend primarily on the performance of each nominated 
manager. Furthermore, the funds are not available to all potential investee companies, 
the investment decisions depend exclusively on the regional fund manager so that these 
funds, without any competitors providing other opportunities of public support, may 
become regional monopolies of public monies. Although in both countries the 
governments largely refrain from picking winners, it is at least controversial which 
approach is more market oriented.
Whereas venture capital companies in Germany in general acknowledge the supportive 
function of public programmes and public private partnerships there is a widespread 
view in the UK that public initiatives compete with private investment and crowd it out. 
The dominant, though not unanimous view among the UK venture capital industry is 
that policies should demonstrate that commercial returns can be made from small firm 
funding and then withdraw, leaving private firms to fill the gap. The government 
followed suit. Although for example the new Regional Venture Capital Funds have 
defined target areas where there is supposed to be an equity gap, investee companies 
could still be in the position to attract private investments, but would be reluctant to do 
so if this happens on less favourable terms. The additionality or complementarity of 
these public funds is, however, not questionable when the fund managers engage in 
‘cherry picking’ by allocating investment proposals with promising return rates to a
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private fund and those, that would not have been financed with private monies alone, to 
the Regional Venture Capital Fund (Interview fund manager 2002). For three more 
reasons it looks unlikely that the demonstration effect will be successful in closing a gap 
after the public support is phased out. First, future good return rates could have many 
causes, for example favourable market conditions. Second, a regional infrastructure is 
created that depends solely on the experience gained by one manager. Finally, some 
transaction costs remain genuine and may not be overcome without public support: for 
example high fixed due diligence cost. It is advisable that the UK government conducts 
a cost-benefit analysis which includes regional positive spill-over effects on 
employment and productivity instead of simply hoping that the demonstration effect 
will suffice when the programme reaches the time of termination. A demonstration 
effect can only work effectively when there are two adjunct market gaps with different 
potential market actors who make their decisions independently. But it looks very 
unlikely that business angels, who are active in lower deal sizes, have waited for the 
Regional Venture Capital Funds for their investments in order to become dependant on 
the decisions of one particular manager for their potential exit option. The opinion of 
the UK survey respondents is split on this issue. 48.7 percent (N=39) believe that the 
demonstration effect is not likely to work (question D ll). However, ‘public co­
investment in funds’ is the single aspect of public programmes, that has led to 
investment that otherwise would not have occurred, with a better rating than in 
Germany (see table 4.13). This result also reflects the availability of instruments in both 
countries. The RVCs were being set-up at the time of the survey but similar initiatives 
were already in place, notably public co-investment in funds set up with European 
Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund. Furthermore, there are other 
specialised funds, for example the High Technology Fund, the Phoenix Fund, the Early 
Growth Fund, the University Challenge Fund and the Regional Innovation Fund.
The UK survey sample is rather small and hardly allows a detailed analysis beyond the 
limits of descriptive statistics. However, some significant correlations of the UK survey 
data support a critical view on the envisaged demonstration effect (appendix H). The 
realised return rate in 2001 is negatively correlated with the percentage share of the 
number of investments in the lowest deal size range below £100,000 (r=-0.418,
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p=0.009, N=32) and also in the range from £100,000 to £250,000, which was targeted 
by the RVCs (r=-0.380, p=0.016, N=32) (see table in appendix D). Similar relations 
show in the seed (r=-0.433, p=0.005, N=34) and start-up business stage (r=-0.393, 
p=0.011, N=34). Whereas in Germany 77.6 percent of the respondents were involved 
with public programmes in some form or another in the calendar years 1999 to 2001 
(N=107), this percentage drops to 40.4 percent for the UK (N=57). In comparison to 
other companies in the UK, venture capital and private equity companies that were 
involved with public venture capital programme and public investment also had a lower 
realised return rate in 2001 (tau=-0.310, p=0.022, N=34).
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4.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter presented survey results about equity funding gaps in Germany and the 
UK. Elaborated concepts were used and guided the design of the questionnaire, it is the 
first time that empirical survey results about funding gaps have been derived and linked 
to conceptual issues in this way. The addressees of the questionnaire were venture 
capital and private equity companies. Financial intermediaries are the best source since 
they perceive both potential supply and demand constraints. The survey indicated 
considerable equity gaps in both countries. However, the perceptions of ‘normative’ 
funding gaps, those that should be tackled by government policies, were more 
pronounced in Germany. German companies perceived ‘risk mitigation’ as the most 
effective policy instrument. In contrast in the market based financial system of the UK 
companies were rather critical towards government intervention, public co-investment 
in funds would be their first choice. The evaluation of policy instruments indicates the 
existence of a trade-off between potential positive spill-overs in employment and 
productivity on the one hand, and negative effects on failure rates and realised returns 
on the other. A proclaimed ‘demonstration effect’ for the new English Regional Venture 
Capital Funds is hence unlikely to operate.
In the bank based financial system of Germany, guarantees have significantly increased 
investment failures and also motivated private equity companies to invest in higher risk 
areas for which they have not developed adequate instruments, notably a hands-on 
approach with strict monitoring and managerial advice. And these companies, which 
target a lower minimum return rates and often with banks as largest owner and therefore 
with relative easy access to refinancing loans, typically provide less managerial input. 
On the one hand there are similarities between both countries. Financial intermediaries 
that build upon relationships for investment purposes exist in both countries, but they 
are active in different market segments that accordingly differ in their size. On the other 
hand Germany’s state guarantee schemes for venture capital and private equity 
investment transform volatile assets into more stable assets as discussed in chapter 2 on 
the macroeconomics of financial systems. The arrangements in the venture capital and 
private equity market therefore reinforced the macroeconomic differences between
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financial systems in which improvements in profit expectations in bank or intermediary 
based financial system exert a stronger influence on investment and economic activity. 
In a downturn public guarantee pay outs reduce losses for private investors and exert a 
stabilising effect on the industry, which may, however, form a barrier for a required 
restructuring of the industry.
In this chapter the following policy implications are derived: risk mitigation schemes 
are effective, though not necessarily efficient, in closing a venture capital, and potential 
public pay-outs may be large. With regard to their incentive effects they should not 
surpass certain limits and target venture capital and private equity companies that apply 
adequate instruments to tackle high risk investments. Public co-investment in funds is 
the least bureaucratic option. Once these funds are set-up the engagement of public 
bodies in scrutinizing investment projects can be largely withdrawn. The institutional 
risk is, however, high. It depends crucially on the competence of the fund manager. It is 
also important that several fund managers compete for investment proposals in the 
relevant market segments. Otherwise a monopolistic structure of public support would 
be created and public money would not be spent in a market oriented way. Eventually, 
the evaluation of policy instruments should be based on a proper and complete cost- 
benefit analysis which includes positive spill-overs to the economy. This analysis has to 
take account of available policy options in each country which depend on the current 
design of the financial system and the need to embody certain policies with existing 




5.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Whereas financial systems can in principle be compared with regard to numerous 
aspects this thesis has focussed on the transformation of volatile into stable assets and 
the role of different financial intermediaries. Existing differences of the institutional 
settings in both countries may on the one hand lead to distinctive macroeconomic 
fluctuation and require policies adopted to a given design of the financial system. One 
aim of the thesis was to apply the approach of traditional macroeconomic analysis to 
comparing financial systems and demonstrate its usefulness for this purpose. The 
second aim was to analyse the private equity and venture capital industry in both 
countries and national policies to promote this industry. The two areas of research 
appear quite distinct at first glance but they highlight both main differences between a 
bank and a market based financial system and are linked. In comparison the UK market 
based financial system Germany’s bank based financial systems transforms a larger 
amount of volatile assets into fixed income assets for private households. Typically the 
transformation function for these assets is performed to a lesser degree by banks in 
market based economies. Venture capital and private equity companies in particular 
regularly refrain from offering any degree of this kind of transformation in market based 
systems.
5.2 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ADVANCEMENT
In contrast to recent academic developments, which aim to integrate the latest findings 
made in the area of the Theory of Finance into macroeconomics, one aim of the thesis is 
to demonstrate the usefulness of traditional macroeconomic analysis. The traditional 
analysis is applied to financial systems and the differences between market and bank
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based systems by focussing on the role of financial intermediaries in transforming the 
volatility of assets. Implications and conclusions are derived in the opposite way in 
comparison to the approaches based on the Theory of Finance. It starts on the macro 
level and analyses available assets according to their importance in different financial 
systems. In comparison to the UK market based financial system Germany’s bank based 
financial systems transforms a larger amount of volatile assets into fixed income assets 
for private households. The traditional analysis can also be used for analysing the role 
of endogenous money and credit finance for autonomous demand, be it investment or 
consumption. A re-interpretation of the macroeconomic income multiplier, which 
equally permits autonomous consumption, adds a further theoretical aspect for 
analysing differences between financial systems. Both elements of the traditional 
analysis support the argument that the market based economic system of the UK is more 
consumption driven in comparison to the German bank based system. A re­
interpretation of the income multiplier which equally permits autonomous consumption 
changes its role so that consumption does not remain an appendix of the investment 
activity. In the theoretically extreme case of an economy where loans are only taken out 
for consumption or mortgage purposes, consumption would become the sole source of 
autonomous demand.
In the macroeconomic part a discrete-time portfolio model was developed which 
distinguished between bank (intermediary based) and market based economies via the 
share of credit financed or intermediary transformed investment. The financial sector is 
assumed to build up or draw on (hidden) reserves. Money is, as commonly understood, 
the reflex of bank lending, but it can also be the reflex of the investment by financial 
intermediaries who transform assets in more stable assets for households. It represents 
endogenous inside money, whereby financial intermediaries build up and draw on 
reserves. In comparison to Tobin’s and Brainhard’s approach the comparative static 
analyses of potential outcomes demonstrated that under common assumptions with 
regard to investment, consumption and portfolio behaviour perverse results do not 
happen. The comparison between intermediary or bank based and market based 
economies finally showed that the former are more sensitive to profit expectations, in 
other words, Keynes' marginal efficiency of capital, exerts a stronger influence on
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aggregate income as long as the capital gain effect on consumption is not the dominant 
factor. The analysis also provided a new dimension for comparing financial systems. 
Both equity finance and credit finance can be understood as being created ‘ex nihilo’, 
depending on the transformation by the financial intermediaries. The design of the 
model allows to understand the flipside of both forms of finance, credit and equity, as 
endogenous, it is only important that households are prepared to hold a transformed less 
volatile asset ‘ex post’.
Some important aspects of financial systems are neither captured in the comparative 
static model of chapter 2 nor in chapter 3 or 4. The model of chapter 2 cannot analyse 
internal finance, which is a feature of disequilibrium distributional effects. They may 
arise in between two comparative static constellations, but comparative static models 
only compare equilibrium constellations. A dynamic disequilibrium approach offers the 
advantage to combine Tobin's q, which is a stock concept, with the flow concept of Q- 
profits, developed by Keynes in his ‘Treatise’. Both can be linked, so that in a 
simultaneous equilibrium of the capital and good market Q = 0 is equivalent to q = 1. 
The additional advantage is the possibility to incorporate the most important source of 
finance, which are retained profits. In general they are a result of a situation in which 
aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply and in which there is a price effect in the 
commodity market that leads to a distributional effect in favour of productive units.
There seem to be quite important differences between these countries concerning how 
these profits are generated in the first instance. During phases of economic prosperity or 
recession the composition of aggregate demand exhibits different features in both types 
of economies. Thus it appears reasonable to interpret a market based system as partly 
consumption driven. The wealth effect of rising equity prices on consumption leads to a 
profit inflation and generates internal finance as an investment potential. A German- 
type economy on the other hand secures a stable consumption ratio via stable asset 
prices for the majority of households. Investment here is rather an arbitrage process of 
firms and banks possible through credit finance delivered by Hausbanken with 
relationship banking to SMEs. This initial investment raises aggregate demand and 
hence additional investment can be financed internally.
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Financial intermediaries in bank-based systems transform a larger amount of volatile 
assets into fixed income assets for private households. A transformation which does 
even happen by a bank that simply provides loans and collect deposits. Exactly these 
nominal fixed liabilities of banks create a main problem of banking (Goodhard 1987). 
Furthermore insurance companies and private banks also hold equities in companies and 
transform these assets into more fixed liabilities. Private banks that are quoted on the 
stock market play only a minor role in Germany with regard to their market share. The 
state banks, Sparkassen and Landesbanken, are owned by the state, the value of 
Genossenschaftsbanken is neither determined nor traded on the market. The result by 
Mayer (1988), that the role of stock markets as primary markets for the financing of 
investment (new emission of shares minus buy-backs and take) even in Anglo-Saxon 
countries can be neglected, because eventually households keep shares in their portfolio 
and their value may have increased by real investment that was financed by other means 
and especially by internal finance.
Households willing to take out loans can provide firms indirectly with finance means 
for investment and simply reduce firms’ requirements for newly borrowed external 
funds. A house market speculation and equity take outs may simply increase 
consumption and channel funds to firms for addition investment and production that is 
financed internally by retained profits. The overall quantitative effect on national 
income depends on the market situation and the ability of firms to raise prices. The 
price effect of a profit inflation is considerable reduced when new investments increase 
the productivity of the economy. If households, however, try to get rid of money 
balances via reallocations of their portfolios, the valuation of stock shares adjusts until 
households tend to accept their increased money balances. In the aggregate households 
are only successful to get rid of money balances on the stock market in as much as firms 
receive finance means via the emission of new equities. Although empirical evidence 
shows that new emission of shares play a minor role in the financing of firms even in 
Anglo-American economies, both effects together increase aggregate demand and 
income, so that eventually there is no ‘excess’ of money1. A quantitative relationship
1 The additional amount o f  money balances that firms need for the finance motive and transactions in an 
enlarged economy reduces the amount that households have to hold so that eventually households do not
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between loans, money and income does not necessarily break down when households 
and not firms that take out loans. In the end, aggregate demand and national income is 
still determined by the asset market, wealth and expected capital gains or losses. The 
main feature of Keynesian economics remains. At least from a paradigmatic point of 
view it does not matter whether the financial system channels funds directly or 
indirectly to the productive units, even though policy instruments to ensure full 
employment, growth and stability should adjust to developments and differences of 
financial systems and the different role units of the economy play. However, the 
endogenous money approach of Keynesian economics would still be valid.
The endogenous money approach of Keynesian economics is important for the 
understanding of the financial markets and monetary issues as it avoids a common 
dichotomy between money and the real word (Wray 1990, Dow 1997). It also 
contradicts the real balance effect which is supposed to demonstrate that a Keynesian 
equilibrium with unemployment is impossible with flexible wages (Patinkin 1965, Betz 
1993). There, the argument is that at one point of decreasing wages and prices one unit 
of the money stock could purchase the entire GDP and resources of an economy. 
However, in circuitist terms, the so called reflux mechanism reduces money balances in 
line with production. When loans are paid back and new loans are not taken out, money 
is destroyed and there is hardly any hope in the real balance effect.
A possible development towards more market based systems highlights the requirement 
to analyse investment that is typically not financed ‘ex nihilo’ but via venture capital 
and private equity companies. From a macroeconomic perspective the amount of 
finance means available to them is determined by loans taken out for other reasons but 
eventually ends up as purchasing power within these institutions.
need to end up with and accept all o f  the additional money balances that were created by their taking out 
loans.
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5.3 EMPERICAL FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A survey of venture capital and private equity companies in Germany and the UK, that 
was based on a discussion of theoretical and empirical issues of funding gaps, indicated 
considerable equity gaps in both countries. Although issues of uncertainty and risk are 
equally important for equity finance, it is usually omitted in Keynesian articles on 
finance. However, the risk perception of venture capital and private equity companies 
are crucial elements in the investment decision and may lead to persistent funding gaps. 
The work represents the first attempt to detect funding gaps and distinguish between 
positive and normative funding gaps via survey data. Survey data and hence self­
investigation can detect normative funding gaps which are those that should be tackled 
by government policies. Other economic approaches have so far only tried to detect 
positive equity gaps.
Policies supporting the venture capital industry often reallocate the risk of the private 
investors to the public sector. This is predominantly the case in Germany, where the 
government via its national institution provides guarantees after they appeared at the top 
of a priority list of venture capital and private equity companies. In case venture capital 
and private equity make use of these public instruments private investors benefit again 
from the transformation of volatile into stable assets and the differences between the 
financial systems are reinforced. The perceptions of ‘normative’ funding gaps, those 
that should be tackled by government policies, were more pronounced in the bank based 
financial system of Germany. German companies and banks, that are active in this 
market sector, perceived ‘risk mitigation’ as the most effective policy instrument. In 
contrast in the market based financial system of the UK companies were rather critical 
towards government intervention, public co-investment in funds would be their first 
choice. The evaluation of policy instruments indicates the existence of a trade-off 
between potential positive spill-overs in employment and productivity on the one hand, 
and negative effects on failure rates and realised returns on the other. A proclaimed 
‘demonstration effect’ for the new English Regional Venture Capital Funds is therefore 
unlikely to operate. In the bank based financial system of Germany, guarantees have 
significantly increased investment failures and also motivated private equity companies
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to invest in higher risk areas for which they have not developed adequate instruments, 
notably a hands-on approach with strict monitoring and managerial advice. And these 
companies, which normally target lower minimum return rates, often with banks as 
largest owner and therefore with relative easy access to refinancing loans, typically 
provide less managerial input for this form of finance.
On the one hand there are similarities between both countries. Financial intermediaries 
that build upon relationships for investment purposes exist in both countries, on the 
other hand they are active in different market segments that accordingly differ in their 
size. Germany is known for its relationship banking, the UK has a larger venture capital 
where relationship funding is applied. Furthermore, Germany’s state guarantee schemes 
for venture capital and private equity investment transform volatile assets into more 
stable assets as discussed in the macroeconomic analyses of financial systems. The 
arrangements in the venture capital and private equity market may therefore reinforce 
the macroeconomic differences between financial systems in which improvements in 
profit expectations in bank or intermediary based financial system exert a stronger 
influence on investment and economic activity. In a downturn, however, public 
guarantee pay outs reduce losses for private investors and exert a stabilising effect on 
the industry, which may, however, form a barrier for a required restructuring of the 
industry. The recent rise in the funding activities by these financial intermediaries did 
hence hardly push the German financial system towards a market based system.
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Section A General Characteristics of Your Business
iithissection we would like you to tell us something of the character of your business.
M. Your venture capital company is ...
(Please tick relevant box.)
□ a corporate venture capital I I an independent VC-company company (CVC) I___ Ij2 In what year did your firm begin trading in the UK?
13. Is your main office located in the UK?
M. Where is your main (UK) office located?
(Please enter the first three digits o f vour p o s tc o d e .)
1)5. How many additional offices does your firm have in the UK?








16. Where are all the company's branches/offices located? (P lease  e n te r the first three digits o f your postcod es.)
J__ I J___I J__L J__L
J_L J__L J__L












, other financial service companies □ □ □ □ □ □
your investee companies □ □ □ □ □ □
existing and potential investors
' □ □ □ □ □ □
research institutions □ □ □ □ □ □
1 a larger agglomeration area □ □ □ □ □ □
other 1 
; (please specify) \ in □ □ □ □ □
p8. Are there foreseeable changes in the future? (Please tick relevant boxes.)
| The number of our investment 1 1 increase 
> managers w ill... I___1 □ stay constant □ decrease
Our network of branches w ill... | j expand □ not change □ contract
•
We will have mergers & acquisitions, joint ventures or strategic 
alliances with other VC-companies. □ yes □ no
*9. What were your sources of invested capital in the year 2001? (in percent, sum =
' I I commercial banks I I insurance companies |
__I I___ (In %) ___I___I___ (in %) ___L
100%)
I Industry 
__I___ (in %) I___L
I pensions funds 
__I___ (in% J
I | internal finance of I I fund in fund
I I I I thfi company (in %) I I I I (in%) I i I public sector ___I____I (in %) Ll I Individuals __ I___I (in %)
A10. What are the characteristics of the ownership structure of your company? (P lease tick relevant box.)
□ no owner holds more than 20% of the | I one owner holds between 20%shares of our management company I___ I and 50% of the shares of ourmanagement company □
A11. is the largest owner of your company...
a bank an insurance company
| j yes J ~ j no j j yes |” “ j no
a (semi*)public body other (please specify)
□  yes □
one owner holds more than 
50% of the shares of 
our management company
an industrial company□ yes an individual □  yes j j no
no
Section B How Does Your Company Invest?
t̂his section we would like you to tell us something about how your company invests in firms.
81. How important are the following characteristics of your company for the acquisition of a deal and for your deal flow?
(Please tick a n um ber from  1 =  very im portant to 6  =  n o t im portant.) 1 : V 2 3 4 5 6
own track record □ □ □ □ □ □
( own reputation □ □ □ □ □
own networks □ □ □ □ □
knowledge of investee's technology problems □ □ □ □ □ □
personal relationship with investee □ □ □ □ ^ □ □
62. How many requests for finance did your company receive I I
in the year 2001 ? (P lease  e n te r th e  num ber.) I___I I l __ I
63. On how many of these requests for finance did you conduct I I
due diligence? (P lease e n te r  the  num ber.) I I I I I
B4. How many of these intensively checked requests did you accept? ] I
(Please enter the num ber.) I I I I
65. Please enter the average deal size during the last three calendar years. | I
(in million £) I j  I I - I I miiiinn p
And how did your average deal size change over the course of the last three years? It .»
(Please tick relevant box.) □  increased j j hardly changed □  decreased
B7. What approximate percentage share of the overall number of investments over the last three calendar years has 
been allocated to the following , I < £100,000 I I £ 100,000- I
classes of deal size? (in p e rce n t) \ , | j (in%) I i i I 250,000 (in %) l
£ 250,000- 
500,000 (in %)
I I £500 ,000- I I £ 1.0-3.33 million I I £ 3.33-33 million I I >  £33  million
I I I I 1,000,000 (in  %) I____I____________I I ( in % )  I__I___J__ I (in %) I___I___I___l ( in % )
88. Does your company, aside from its pure equity provision, influence the I ly e s  I I no
management of the investee company (take a hands-on approach)? I__ I I__ I
(39. Is there a minimum threshold size of a potential investee company for you to give it a careful consideration? (P lease tick relevant bo x.)
Yes, related to sales per year (take over) a company 
needs a minimum o f...
j j <  £ 3.33 million j j £3.33-10 million
| | £ 10-20 million | | £ 20-27 million j j £ 27-33 million | | £ 33-40 million
j“ j > £ 40 million j j No, there is no minimum threshold size for an investee company.
Bio. Please enter the average percentage of your gross investment represented by the following forms 
I of capital provided to investee companies during d ie last three years? (in percen t)
equity near mezzanine I I debt near mezzanine I I other
form (in  %) 1 I I I form (in % ) I___ l l 1 ( in % )
Bli. Please enter the share of gross investment allocated to different business stages during the last three calendar years?
(inpercent) i i see cj I | start-up I I expansion
I I I !  ( in % )  I I I I ( in % )  I___ I___ I___ I ( in % )
I I M B O /M B i | | bridge I I replacem ent I I turnaround
; I I I I ( in % ) 1 I I I ( in % )  L _ J ___I____I ( in % )  I___ I____ 1___ I ( in % )
812. Which minimum rate of return do you on average expect from new investment proposals in order to invest (gross = before tax and deductions
of a risk premium)? 
(Please tick relevant boxes .)
j j 6-12% j j 12-16%
j j 16-20% j j 20-24% j | 24-28% j j >28%
413. And what was your overall realised rate of return in the year 2001? 
j— j < 0% 0-4%
(P lease tick  relevant box.) 
j | 4-8% | | 8-12%
j  j~ j  12-16% | | 16-20% | j 20-24% j | >24%
P'4. What was the approximate failure rate in your company's portfolio in relation to number of companies and volume of investment 
V In the year 2001? (P lease  tic k  relevant boxes.)
volume: | | 0-5% | j 5-10% | | 10-15% j j 15-25% | | >25%
number: | | 0-5% |-----1 5-10% j | 10-15% | | 15-25% |-----1 >25%
gl5. Did your failure rate in the year 2001 in comparison to the year 1999 rather...
(Please tick relevant box.) ,----- 1 increase I— | stay constant
□ □ □ decrease
6. Please enter the share of gross investment within the UK allocated to different regions over the last three calendar years, (in percent, sum  =  100 











( in % )
Wales 
(in % )










Yorkshire & the 
Humber (in % )




8. If ‘yes”, did the share of your fore vestments relative to total investment over the last three calendar years rather.. 




B19. Please enter the share of gross investment allocated to different sectors of the economy over the last three calendar years, (in percent)
I j | IT, telecommunication, | j other business & j | manufacturing,
media (in %) personal services (in % ) J . 1
I I manufacturing, low 
___I___I___ tech, “old economv“ t in % >
I I life science 
___I___l___ r/n %) I M  I
Has your investment activity become more or less specialised over the last three years? (P lease tick relevant boxes.)









sectors: j | increased specialisation j j increased diversification | | neither
companies with a 
specific size:
| j increased specialisation | | increased diversification j | neither
Please enter the approximate size of your company's invested and also uninvested funds at 31.12.2001. (in m illion £)
high tech (in % )
other
( in % )
size of invested funds size of uninvested funds
m illion £ J___L J___L m illion £ J___L J___L
B22. Do you use a systematic rating instrument comparable to credit rating? yes
□
no












I for due diligence
□ □ □ □  □ □
for monitoring of target and m anagem ent advise
□ □ □ □  □ □
(Section C  T h e  V e n t u r e  C a p i t a l  M a r k e t
hthis section we would like you to  tell us something about the venture capital m arket.
C1. Are there any m arket segm ents or regions where you perceive there 
to be an under-supply of venture capital relative to demand? □
yes oc
□
|C2. i f  “y e s ” ,  where are these m arket gaps? ( P l e a s e  t i c k - m u l t i p l e  t i c k s  p o s s i b l e . )
Sectors r ~ l  IT. telecomm unication.
| I___1 m edia □
other business & 
personal services
I I manufacturing, 
I___ I high tech
1
I I manufacturing, low tech, 
I___ I “old econom y” □





start-up j j expansion
j |~ j  M B O /M B I | j replacem ent □ bridge | | turnaround
~ Deal Size in £ | | <  £  100,000
□
£ 100,000-250,000 j j £250,000-500,000
j— j £500,000-1,000 ,000 j | £ 1 .0 -3 .33  million
□
£ 3 .33-33  million | j >  £ 33 million
Companies with yearly 1 1 <  £ 10 million 




j j £ 33-67 million
□
>  £6 7  million










j j South East | | Southwest 





What are the main constraints on your company's investment activity? 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Please tick a  num ber from  1 -  very  im portant to 6 =  no t im p o rta n t)  
low dealflow □ □ □ □ □ □
lack of proposals with promising returns
□ □ □ □ □ □
perceived risk involved is prohibitively high
□ □ □ □ □ □
lack of information on potential investee companies
□ □ □ □ □ □
difficulties in monitoring investee companies
□ □ □ □ □ □
problems in fundraising
□ □ □ □ □
high (fix) due diligence cost
□ □ □ □ □ □
geographical remoteness of investee company
□ □ □ □ □ □
shortage of staff with VC experience
□ n □ □ □ □
exit problems
□ □ □ □ □
tax problems I
(please specify) I in □ □ □ □ □
other I
(please specify) I i n □ □ □ □ □
'Section D  P o l i c i e s
flnthis section we would like you to tell us something about your experience with and views on public venture capital policies.
Dl. Have you or your portfolio companies had any involvement with any 
i public venture capital programme or investment in the last three 
calendar years?
□ yes □ no
If‘yes', which are the institutions behind the programmes you used. (P lease  tick, m ultip le  ticks possib le.)
DTI□
□ other regional institutions (please specify)□ EU
□ local authority
| j other
(p lease  specify)
P Please tick the venture capital programmes you or your portfolio companies have been or are likely to become frequently involved with.
j j Budget for Flexible Support| | UK High Technology Fund
p le a s e
sp ec ify□ Regional Venture Capital Fund
□ Early Growth Fund p le a s e  sp ec ify| j University Challenge Fund
j | Regional Innovation Fund
□ HSBC Enterprise p le a s e  Fund s p ec ify
| j Investment Readiness Programme
| j Venture Capital Trust
I I Baring English p le a s e
1__1 Growth Fund sp e c ify
1 1 local authority 
1__I investment fund
p le a s e
sp e c ify
1 1 other programmes 
1__1 or risk instruments
p le a s e
sp e c ify
X. Which sources of information are important for public VC-programmes? (P lease tick  relevant box.)
| j support institutions | | ministries j | representative bodies
other (please specify) I
(BVCA, EVCA etc.)
D5. Which of the following aspects of public program m es have caused you to m ake investments which otherwise would not have occurred?
(Please lick a number from 1 = very important to 6 = not important.) 1 2 3 4 6
access to (not price reduced) refinancing loans
□ □ □ □  □ □
cheaper refinancing loans
□ □ □ □  □ □
•
risk-mitigation (guarantees)
□ □ □  . □  □ □
) public co-investment in investee companies
□ □ □ □  □ □
public co-investment in fund
□ □ □ □  □ □
other |
lolease SDecifv) ______________ J D □ □ □  □ □
J6. Please estimate the share of public finance (in the form of co-investment, re-finance or guarantees) 
your portfolio companies over the last three calendar years (in percent) i i
___I___I___ %
in the overall investment made by you or
57, In which regions and business stages did you very strongly refer to public finance? (Please tick-multiple ticks possible.)
Regions j j East Midlands j j East of England j j London
I j~ j North East | j Northwest
□
Northern Ireland | j Scotland
! j~~| South East 
| | Yorkshire & the Humber
j | South West
□





start-up j j expansion
3 |~ j MBO/MBI j j replacement
□
bridge j | turnaround
58. In which regions, phases, segments do you see a special need for public finance? (Please tick-multiple ticks possible.)
| Regions j j East Midlands j j East of Enaland j j London
| j North East | j Northern Ireland
□
Northwest j | Scotland
| j South East
' j~ j Yorkshire & the Humber
j | South West
□





start-up j | expansion
Q  MBO /  MBI j j replacement
□
bridge j | turnaround
Companies with veariv 
sales in £
j | <  £ 10 million
□
£ 10-20 million | | £ 20-33 million
| | £ 33-67 million
□
>  £ 67 million
Sectors I j IT, telecommunication, 
I___I media □
other business & 
personal services
I I manufacturing, 
I___I high tech
I I manufacturing, low tech, 
I___I “old economy” □
life science | j other
D9. Which of the following are important to improving public venture capital programmes? (P lease tick a  num ber from  1 -  very im portant to  6  =  no t im portant.)
: ! 2 4 5 : 6
the programmes of single institutions should be co-ordinated better 
with each other. □ □ □ □ □ □
information on single programmes should be more easily accessible. □ □ □ □ □ □
conditions of programmes should in general be much more attractive. □ □ □ □ □ □
especially the support/aid limits (e.g. maximum volume) should be less 
restrictive. □ □ □ □ □ □
the qualifying area (e.g. kind of financed proposal) should be wider 
defined. □ □ □ □ □ □
the publicly (re-)financed share should increase. □ □ □ □ □
decision process should be faster and less bureaucratic. □ □ □ □ □ □
the ratio of turned down proposals by the public institutions should 
decrease. □ □ □ □ □ □
the VC-programmes of this form should be stopped, because they are 
inefficient and /  or support inefficient VC-companies. □ □ □ □ □ □
other 1
(please specify) \ I D □ □ □ □ □
DIO. Do you have any suggestions as to how policy measures might enhance the venture capital market in the UK?
011. The DTI's new Regional Venture Capital Funds are designed to demonstrate that the provision of risk capital finance at the lower end of the 
? market can be profitable and thereby encourage a greater supply of 
funding. Do you believe that such a 'demonstration effect1 is likely to 
work? (Please briefly exp la in  yo u r reply.) □ yes □ no
iiank you for your help. Please return the com pleted questionnaire in the envelope provided.
SSenicht heften Oder lochen.
jStedeutlich in blau Oder schwarz ausfullen,
Stenicht beantwortete Fragen nicht durchstreichen.
TeilA Allgemeine Unternehmensinformationen
Mr bitten Sie hier um allgemeine Informationen uber ihr Untemehmen.
*l. Zu welcher der folgenden Arten von Beteiligungsgesellschaften zahlen Sie sich? 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie an.)
□ Corporate Venture Capital I I unabhangigeGesellschaft (CVC) I___I ~Beteiligungsgeselischaft □ Mittelstandische Beteiligungsgeselischaft (MBG)
n\2. Inwelchem Jahr hat Ihr Unternehmen in Deutschland 
die Geschaftstatigkeit aufgenommen?
A3. Liegt der Hauptsitz Ihres Unternehmens in Deutschland?
M. Wo befindet sich die (deutsche) Zentrale Ihres Unternehmens? 
(Bitte tragen Sie en tsprech en d  d ie  ersten d re i S te llen  d e r  P ostle itzah l e in .)













W. Wiewichtig ist Ihnen die raumliche Nahezu ... (Bitte kreuzen Sie auf einer Skaia von 1 = sehr wichttg bis 6
■■ 1 -  :.;-:2 ..
weiteren Beteiligungsgesellschaften | j j |
= unwichtig an.)
3 4□ □ 5□
6□
! anderen Rnanzdienstleistern □ □ □ □ □ □
Ihren Beteiligungsunternehmen □ □ □ □ □ □
tatsachlichen und potenziellen Kapitalgebern □ □ □ □ □ □
wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen □ □ □ □ □ □
einem groBeren Verdichtungsraum □ □ □ □ □ □
Sonstigem (Bitte I
, aenauer anaeben.) ________________________________________ in □ □ □ □ □
A8, Welche der folgenden Veranderungen stehen bei Ihnen kunftig an? (Bitte kreuzen Sie an.)
Wir werden die Anzahl 1 | aufstocken 1 1 konstant halten 
! unserer Investmentmanager... 1___1 1___1 □ abbauen
Wir werden unser 1 1 ausdehnen 
.Zweigstellennetz" raumlich ... 1___I □ beibehalten □ einschranken
Wirwerden fusionieren, Anteile anderer Beteiligungsgesellschaften erwerben, joint ventures und/oder strategische Ailianzen 
mitanderen Beteiligungsgesellschaften eingehen. j——j j a j^~J Nein
9. Woher stammte das Ihnen im Jahr 2001 zur Verfugung stehende Kapital in etwa? (A ngabe in  Prozent, Sum m e = 100%)
I Geschaftsbanken I I Versicherungen j I Industrie
I I l (in % ) I I I I (in % ) I L  I I (in % )
konzernirrterne 









*10. Durch welche Eigenschaften ist die Eigentumerstruktur (der Managementgesellschaft) Ihres Untemehmens gekennzeichnet? 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie an.) i | Kein Gesellschafter halt I I Ein Gesellschafter halt
I___ I Anteile an unserer Management- I___ I Anteile an unserer
gesellschaft von uber 20% Managementgesellschaft
zwischen 20% und 50%
*11. Ist der groBte Anteilseigner Ihres Untemehmens...
eine Geschaftsbank eine Versicherung ein fndustrieuntemehmen
Ja j j Nein j j Ja j j Nein j j Ja j j Nein
□
□ Ein Gesellschafter halt Anteile an unserer Managementgesellschaft 
von uber 50%
eine Privatperson 
j j Ja | j Nein
ein (halb-)offerrtlicher Trager 
r~ ] Ja I I Nein
Sonstiges (bitte an g e b e n )
leilB Zu Ihrer Investitionstatigkeit
iter bitten wir Sie urn Informationen fiber die Art Ihrer Investitionstatigkeit.
Wie wichtig schatzen Sie folgende Eigenschaften Ihres Unternehmens fur die Akquisition eines Deals bzw. fur Ihren Deal Flow ein?
(Bitte kreuzen Sie auf einer Skala von 1 = sehr wichtig bis 6 -  unwichtig an.) ■ I' : 2 3 4 5 6
eigener track record □ □ □ □ □ □
eigene Reputation □  ::: □ □ □ □ □
eigene Netzwerke □ □ □ □ □ □
Verstandnis fur technologische Probleme der Beteiligungsnehmer □ □ □ □ □ □
personliche Beziehung zu den Beteiligungsnehmern □ □ □ □ □ □
82. Wie viele Finanzierungsanfragen verzeichnete Ihr Untemehmen 
im Jahr 2001 insgesamt? (Bitte tragen Sie die Anzahl ein.)
B3. Wie viele Finanzierungsanfragen haben Sie davon einer intensiven 
Einzelfallprufung unterzogen? (Bitte tragen Sie die Anzahl ein.)
B4. Wie viele von den intensiv gepruften Anfragen aus dem Jahr 2001 
haben Sie fur akzeptabel befunden? (Bitte tragen Sie die Anzahl ein.)
B5. Wie hoch war in etwa Ihre durchschnittliche Investitionssumme pro 
Beteiligung (Deal Size) in den letzten drei Kalenderjahren? (in Mio €)
I i i , I
I , , I I
I , , I
I_______L ■..:..r ?4 - J  Mio €
Und wie hat sich die durchschnittliche Investitionssumme pro Beteiligung in den letzten drei Kalenderjahren entwickelt?
Der Deal Size hat tendenziell... 
(Bine kreuzen S ie  an.) □ zugenommen D . S sich nur unwesentlich verandert □abgenommen





1.500.000 (in % ) J___L
< €15 0 .00 0  
(in % )




€ 5 -5 0  Mio 





>  €  50 Mio
(in %)
Nimmt Ihr Unternehmen neben der reinen Kapitalbereitstellung bei den meisten Beteiligungen einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die 
Geschaftsfuhrung der Beteiligungsnehmer („hands on“-Betreuung)? |— j j a j^ J  Nein
Muss ein Kapital nachfragendes Untemehmen eine MindestgroBe aufweisen, damit Sie es fur ein Engagement ernsthaft in Betracht ziehen? 
(Bine kreuzen Sie an .) Ja, gemessen am Jahresumsatz muss ein | | < € 5 M io  | | € 5 -1 5  Mio
Untemehmen eine GroBe aufweisen von ...
|~ j €15-30 Mio 
j j > €  60 Mio
□  < €  5 Mio | |
j | €3 0 -4 0  Mio j j €  40-50 Mio | | € 5 0 -6 0  Mio
j j Nein, eine MindestgroBe von Beteiligungsunternehmen spielt keine Rolle.




Kommanditeinlage, Aktien) (in %)





(z.B. Stifle Beteiligungen) (in %)
Sonstiges 
(in % )
B11.Wie hoch war in etwa der prozentuale Anteil folgender Finanzierungsphasen an Ihren Bruttoinvestitionen in den letzten drei Kalenderjahren? 
(Angabe in Prozent) j | Seed I I Start-up I I Expansion
I I I I ( in % )  1 I I I ( in % )  I I I !  ( in % )
M B O /M B I







812. Welche Mindest-Bruttorendite, d.h. vor Steuem und Risikoabschlagen, muss ein Neuengagement in etwa durchschnittlich versprechen,
um von Ihnen Kapitai zu  erhalten?i— i 4_g% 
t (Bitte kreuzen Sie an .) |____|
| j 8-12% j j 12-16%
j— j 16-20% |------1 20-24% | | 24-28% | j >28%
813. Und wie hoch war im Jahr 2001 die von Ihnen Gber das gesamte Engagement realisierte Rendite? (Bitte kreuzen Sie an.)
□  <0% j j 0-4% | j 4-8% j j 8-12%
! j~J 12-16% j-----1 16-20% j j 20-24% □  >24%
314. Wie hoch war in Ihrem Gesamtportfolio Im Jahr 2001 die Ausfallrate bezogen auf das insgesamt ge- 
tatigte Investitionsvolumen und auf die entsprechende Anzahl von Unternehmen? (B itte kreuzen S ie  an.)
Volumen: | | 0-5% | | 5-10% | j 10-15% j j 15-25% □
Anzahl: | j 0-5% j j 5-10% | | 10-15% j | 15-25% □
>25%
>25%
. 1st Ihre Ausfallrate des Jahres 2001 gegenuber 1999 eh er...
(Bitte kreuzen Sie an.)
□
gestiegen □ gleich geblieben □ gesunken
6. Wie haben sich innerhalb Deutschlands in etwa Ihre Bruttoinvestitionen in den letzten drel Kalenderjahren raumlich verteilt? 


























( in % )
Rheinland-Pfalz
( in % )
Schleswig-Holstein












817. Sind Sie auch Beteiligungen im Ausland eingegangen? □ Ja □ Nein
,918. Yienn nja“, ist der Anteil Ihrer Auslandsengagements bezogen auf das Investitionsvolumen im Verlauf der letzten drel Kalenderjahre
(Bitte kreuzen S ie  an.) □ gestiegen □ gleich geblieben □ gesunken
B19. Wie hoch war in etwa der prozentuale Anteil folgender Sektoren an Ihren Bruttoinvestitionen in den letzten drel Kalenderjahren? (A ngabe in % )
I IT, Telekom m unikation, I I Andere
J____1____I M edien ( in % )  I I I I D ienstieistungen (in %)
Produzierendes Ge­
werbe, high tech (in %,
I Produzierendes Gewerbe, low I I Life Science
I I___ I tech, „old economy" (in %) 1 l l I (in % )
Andere Sektoren 
(in % )
320. Hat sich im Verlaufe der letzten drei Kalenderjahre bei der Ausrichtung Ihrer Investitionstatigkeit in puncto Spezialisierung /  Diversifizierung 
bezogen auf Finanzierungsphasen, Regionen, Sektoren und/oder UnternehmensgroBenklassen etwas geandert?
(Bitte kreuzen S ie  fur fo lgende  B ere iche  an.)
Finanzierunqs-
phasen:




Reoionen: | j zunehmende Spezialisierung | | zunehmende Diversifizierung □ weder noch
0w
0ffl
Sektoren: | | zunehmende Spezialisierung | | zunehmende Diversifizierung □ wedernoch
Untemehmen einer 
bestimmten GroBe:
| | zunehmende Spezialisierung | | zunehmende Diversifizierung □ weder noch
|B21. Bitte tragen Sie das ungefahre Volumen Ihrer investierten und nicht-investierten Fondsmittel per 31.12.2001 ein. (in M io  € )
! Investierte Mittel |
M i o €  I I I ■ I
B22. Nutzen Sie ein systematisches Ratinginstrument -  
vergleichbar dem eines Kreditrating?
Nicht-investierte Mittel 
□  Ja
M i o €  I I I
j | Nein
B23.1Venn „ ja “, wie wichtig ist fur Sie dieses Ratinginstrument... (Bitte kreuzen S ie a u fe in e r  Skala von 1 =  s e h r w ichtig b is  6  =  unwichtig an.)
5 zum Pre-Screening 
zur Due Diligence
 ̂ zum Monitoring und zur Betreuung der Targets
TeilC Zum Beteiligungsmarkt











□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
.Cl. Gibtes Ihrer Meinung nach Marktbereiche Oder Regionen, in denen relativ zur Nachfrage ein dauerhaftes Unterangebot 
I an Beteiligungskapital besteht? |“ ~J Ja j ~ j  Nein
ji. Wenn Ja“, wo konnen Sie gegebenenfalls derartige Marktlucken erkennen? (B itte kreuzen S ie  jew eiis  an, M ehrfachnennungen m dgiicb.)
i Sektoren I I IT, Telekommunikation, I I Andere I I Produzierendes
I___ i I I Medien L _ L _ _ J _ _ j  Dienstieistungen 1 i i 1 Gewerbe, high tech
I Produzierendes Gewerbe, I I Life Science I I Andere Sektoren
























€  1,5-5 Mio
□
€ 5 -5 0  Mio
□
> €  50 Mio
Untemehmen
mit Jahresumsatz in € □ <  €  15 Mio □€ 1 5 -3 0  Mio □€3 0 -5 0  Mio
□
€ 5 0 -1 0 0  Mio
□








j j Brandenburg □Bremen □ Hamburg □ Hessen















Wie sehr schranken folgende Faktoren die Investitionstatigkeit Ihres Unternehmens ein?
(Bitte kreuzen Sie auf einer Skala von 7 = sehr wichtig bis 6 = unwichtig an.) : 1 3 4 5 6
zu geringer Dealflow
□ □ □ □ □ □
Fehlen rentabler Deals
□ □ □ □ □ □
erwartetes Risiko liegt oberhalb der Toleranzgrenze
□ □ □ □ □ □
Probleme beim Erlangen von Informationen Gber Unternehmen
□ □ □ □ □ □
hoher Aufwand bei der Betreuung, Uberwachung und Kontrolle von 
Untemehmen □ □ □ □ □ □
Probleme beim Fundraising □ □ □ □ □ □
hohe (fixe) Kosten der Evaluierung bzw. der Untemehmensprufung □ □ □ □ □ □
zu groBe geografische Entfemung zu den Targets □ □ □ □ □ □
Fehlen von erfahrenen Investmentmanagem □ □ □ □ □ □
verstopfte Exitwege □ □ □ □ □ □
steuerliche
Probleme I
(bitte angehen) I in □ □ □ □ □
Sonstiges I
(bitte engahan) I in □ □ □ □ □
Teil D Zu Forderprogrammen
Bitte teilen Sie uns zuletzt Ihre Erfahrungen und Ansichten hinsichtlich offentlicher FordermaBnahmen mit.i
jOl. HabenSieim Verlaufder letzten drei Kalenderjahre offentliche I I Ja
Beteiligungsforderprogramme genutzt? I___I
j | Nein
&  Wenn „/a“ von welchen Anbietem haben Sie offentliche Programme genutzt? (B itte k reu zen S ie  an, M ehriachantw orten m dgiich.)
□ KfW I j DtA(tbg.gbb) I I Mittelstandische I I Bundes-/I__ I I__ I Beteiligungsgeseilschaften I___ I LandesministerienAndere Landerinstitute I
(bitte angeben) I_________________________________________________ _ _____________________________________________________________
□ EU Sonstige(bitte angeben)
)3. Geben Sie bitte an, welche der folgenden Programme Sie bzw. Ihre Portfoliounternehmen in den 
ietzten drei Kalenderjahren besonders haufig genutzt haben.





| Q  |-----1 KfW:
ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm
□ tbg: BTU-Beteiligungskapital fur kleineTechnologieunternehmen (Koinvestmentvariante)




a n g eb en
□
□ KfW: KfW-Risikokapitalpro- gramm (Garantieprogramm)
□ tbg: tbg-Programm „BTU Fruhphase"
□
|— | KfW: KfW-
Fondsfinanzierung
gbb: gbb Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsfonds (Ost)
M. Welche Quellen sind nach Ihrer Erfahrung besonders wichtig, um Informationen uber offentliche Beteiligungsprogramme zu erhalten?
(Bitte kreuzen S ie an.)
j j Forderinstitute 
Sonstige (bitte a ngeben)
□ Ministerien j j Verbande(BVK, EVCA o.a.)
)5. Welche der folgenden Forderaspekte bewegen Sie dazu, Beteiligungen einzugehen, die Sie sonst nicht eingehen wurden? 
(Bitte kreuzen S ie  au f e in e r  S ka la  von 1 =  s e h r w ich tig  b is  6  =  unw ichtig  an .)
Zugang zu (unverbilligten) Refinanzierungskrediten
Verbilligung bei der Refinanzierung 
Risikoentlastung (Haftungsfreisteliungen) 
offentliches Co-Investment in einzeine Untemehmen 













□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □
ID □ □ □ □ □
Wie hoch schatzen Sie den prozentualen Anteil offentlicher Finanzmittel (in Form von Beteiligungen, Refinanzierungen und Garantien) an den 
Gesamtinvestitionen ein, die Sie Oder Ihre Portfoliountemehmen im i ■
Verlauf der letzten drei Kalenderjahre getatigt haben? (A ngabe in % ) %
In welchen Bundeslandem und Finanzierungsphasen haben Sie in den ietzten drei Kalenderjahren besonders haufig offentiiche Finanzmittel 
eingesetzt? (Bitte kreuzen S ie  an, M ehrfachnennungen m oglich .)
Bundeslander | j Baden-Wurttemberg j j Bayern j j Berlin
j | Brandenburg j j Bremen j | Hamburg j j Hessen
I I Mecklenburg- 
I__I Vorpommern
j j Niedersachsen j j Nordrhein-Westfalen j j Rheinland-Pfalz
j j Saarland 
| j ThOringen
| | Sachsen j" j Sachsen-Anhalt j j Schleswig-Holstein
Flnanzierunasphase j j Seed | | Start-up | j Expansion
|~ | MBO / MBI j j Replacement | | Bridge j j Turnaround
In welchen Regionen, Finanzierungshasen und Marktsegmenten sehen 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie an, M eh rfachn en nun gen  m oglich.)
Sie besonderen Forderbedarf?
Bundeslander j | Baden-Wurttemberg | j Bayern j | Berlin
| j Brandenburg j | Bremen j j Hamburg j j Hessen
I I Mecklenburg- 
I__ I Vorpommern
j j Niedersachsen j j Nordrhein-Westfalen | j Rheinland-Pfalz
j | Saarland | j Sachsen j j Sachsen-Anhalt | | Schleswig-Holstein
□ Thuringen
Flnanzierunosphase j j Seed □Start-up □Expansion
j j MBO/MBI | j Replacement □Bridge □Turnaround
Untemehmen | I < € l 5 M i o  
mit Jahresumsatz in €  I I □€ 1 5 -3 0  Mio □€ 3 0 -5 0  Mio
| j €5 0 -1 0 0  Mio □ > € 1 0 0  Mio
Sektoren 1 I IT, Telekommunikatinn, | 1 Andere l 1 Produzierendes
I I 1 I Median I |__1___ Dienstleistunaen 1 i 1 1 Gfiwerhfi, high tech
I | Produzierendes Gewerbe, | 1 Life Science 1 Andere Sektoren
___1___1___ low tech. ..old economy' ___L i 1 1 i I 1
Wo sehen Sie besonderen Verbesserungsbedarf bei offentlichen Forderprogrammen?
(Bitte kreuzen Sie au f e in e r S ka la  von 1 =  seh r w ich tig  bis  6  =  un w ichtig  an .) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Die Programme einzelner Anbieter sollten besser aufeinander 
abgestimmt sein. □ □ □ □ □ □
Die Informationen uber einzelne Programme mussten leichter 
zuganglich sein. □ □ □ a □ □
Die Konditionen der Forderprogramme mussten insgesamt attraktiver 
gestaltetwerden. o □ □ □ □ □
Insbesondere sollten die Fdrderobergrenzen (z.B. die maximale 
Beteiligungssumme) weniger restriktiv sein. □ □ □ □ □ □
Der Anwendungsbereich (z.B. Art der finanzierten Vorhaben) sollte 
weiter gefasst werden. □ □ □ □ □ □
Der offentlich (re-)finanzierte Anteil sollte steigen. □ □ n □ □ □
Der Vergabeprozess sollte schneiler und unburokratischer erfolgen. □ □ □ □ □ □
Die Ablehnungsquote der Forderinstitute ist zu hoch. □ □ □ □ □ □
Die existierenden Beteiligungsprogramme sollten in dieser Form generell 
eingestellt werden, weil sie ineffizient sind und/oder unrentable 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften unterstutzen. □ □ □ □ □ □
Weiteres I I 
(bitte benennen) I______________________________________________ — J □ □ □ □ □ □
D10. Welche konkreten Vorschlage haben Sie zur Forderung des Beteiligungsmarktes in Deutschland?
i
Bitte senden Sie den ausgefullten Fragebogen im vorgesehenen RGckkuvert an uns zuruck.^en Dank.
APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE GAP PERCEPTION IN THE SURVEY AND
THEIR TREATMENT
Sets of questions, with combinations of ‘yes’ but without ‘no’ boxes, can be ambiguous. 
In the seldom case that someone wrote ‘none’ or ‘not applicable’ for a specific market 
category this was interpreted as ‘no’ for all segments of the category. However, when 
none is ticked, this may mean that the respondent actively does not find some of the set 
relevant or it may mean that it was carelessly forgotten, omitted, or that the respondent 
does not know the answer. If there were ‘no’ boxes one could distinguish between both 
cases and calculate the valid distribution with higher percentages by omitting those that 
were ‘missing’. This is not possible for the set of questions in C2, because ‘no’ boxes 
were here not entered in the questionnaire. It would not only have increased the space 
for the layout enormously but also the time required to fill out the questionnaire, so that 
respondents become reluctant to reply to these questions and go ’missing’. Only when 
there are optional ‘no’ boxes for each box offered, can one be absolutely precise about 
the issues involved to create a valid distribution.
The design of the questionnaire tends less towards precision with regard to this trade­
off. It could, for example, have offered a ‘no’ box for each category. Yet, even in this 
case it would not be fully clear, whether a respondent, who ticked for example only one 
segment of the category, actively omitted other segments of this category or did not 
know an answer for these. However, the questions Cl and C2 are linked and one should 
use the same number of valid responses as a base for the distributions presented by 
excluding those that did not answer question Cl, where a ‘no’ box exists, and hence did 
not answer any questions in C2 either. The original data sheet supports this assumption 
for 3 missing respondents in Cl in both countries. Altogether there were, however, 7 
respondents ‘missing’ in Cl. The remaining one of the 4 respondents ‘missing’ for 
Germany in Cl, did select several gaps in C2, so that the answer in Cl must correctly be 
‘yes’. The data file for the findings presented in chapter 4 was hence adjusted
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accordingly, so that there are only 3 missing for both countries. A further adjustment by 
deducting those respondents that answered ‘yes’ in Cl but did not select any segment in 
C2 could be incorrect. These respondents may perceive a supply gap, but not 
necessarily along the categories offered in C2. However, since all respondents who 
answered ‘yes’ in Cl ticked at least one segment in C2, such an adjustment was not 
only not possible, the response behaviour also demonstrates the high motivation of the 
survey respondents, verifies that the pre-defined categories were perceived as relevant 
and shows that the valid distributions used are appropriate. For coherency the same 
method and base was applied for the perceptions of normative funding gaps in D9 and 
for the strong reference to public finance in D7. The respondents, who were already 
missing in Cl, have here again not identified any relevant market segment or category.
KfW (2003) provides a descriptive overview about some German findings with regard 
to C2. The findings about the segments of categories are related to the 70 respondents 
who answered Cl with ‘yes’. Yet, 71 respondents answered to set of questions in C2, so 
that the correct result would be slightly lower. Important is, however, that these 
percentages can only provide an indication about the relative importance of categories 
or segments for one country. A comparison between both countries cannot be presented 
in this way because the percentages of respondents, who perceived a gap in one form or 
another (Cl or C2) are different in both countries. Hence these relative percentages 
could show a higher result in one country for a segment, even when the perception of a 
gap for this segment is lower.
For the relevance and rank of a category it is important that respondents who ticked 
‘yes’ for several segments of one category are only counted once for this category. 
Respondents who ticked at least one other segment of the category but not a specific 
one were coded as ‘no’ for this segment. The overall number of respondents for one 
category is hence the sum of ‘no’ and ‘yes’ coded answers, which is, of course, the 
same for each segment of the category. Respondents who did not tick any segment of 
the category were coded as ‘missing’ or as ‘n/a’ according to their answer in Cl.
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Finally, it should be noted that respondents may have had the impression that gaps only 
exist in specific combinations, for example an early stage gap in Wales. However, it is 
hardly possible to design a questionnaire on a reasonable number of pages that covers 
all aspects of the gap perception and additionally provides scope to detect all potential 
combinations of it. And the results of this survey would in this case still present a 
perception of some form of a gap in Wales and a perception of some form of a gap in 
the ‘early stage’ category.
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Appendix D (page I)
Correlations
Correlations
Geographic Allocation to Does your co Failure rate in Failure rate in Allocation to
proximity Largest Allocation to deal size influence the Allocation to Allocation to relation to relation to economy Doyouusea Constraints: Constraints: Constraints: Constraint: Constraints: Aspects: Aspects: Aspecto: Aspects: Reference to
Reference toimportant owner deal size das* management business business Expected Realised rate volume of number of sectors: systematic tack of Constrains: lack of difficulties in Constraints: Constraints: geographical shortage of access to cheeper Aspects: pubfic puble Share of pubfic
your investee Largest (semi-) public class < E150-375th of the investee stages: seed stages: minimum rate of return in investment in companies in manuf. high rating Constraints: proposals with perceived risk information on monitoring problems in high due remoteness of staff with VC Constraints: refinancing refinancing risk-mitigation conrivestment co-mvestmcnt public finance:seed public finance:
companies owner bank body E1S0th(%) <*> co? (*> start-up (%) of return 2001 2001 2001 tech (%) instrument? lewdeatftow good returns btoohigh company companies fundraising ffifigencecost company experience exit problems loans loans (guarantees) in companies in fund finance (%) stage start-up stage
Geographic proximity Pearson Correlation 1 ,004 -.133 *.129 *252** -.102 -.201* -.164* .388- .069 -204* -282* .081 -.109 .181* .052 .048 .081 .130 .120 .092 290" 249" .010 .139 236* .152 221* .155 -279* •204* -.317*
enportant your investee Sig. (1-tailed) .485 .090 .102 .006 .1S2 .021 .049 .000 280 .026 .005 211 .137 .033 202 216 207 .094 .117 .180 .001 .005 .461 .096 .011 .070 217 .070 .005 .005 .004
N 106 103 103 98 98 103 103 103 90 74 92 82 100 103 103 104 102 103 104 101 102 104 104 105 89 93 95 93 92 85 70 70
Largest owner bank Pearson Correlation .004 1 -262* -.015 -.007 -252* -.110 -.148 -289** -.135 .140 .132 -.009 -.004 .022 -.160 -245" -.151 -.163 .191* -.062 -.008 -.105 .037 .038 -.055 -.116 .198* .138 .006 .039 .098
Sig. (1-tsied) .485 .004 .441 .474 .005 .136 .070 .003 .127 .092 .122 .464 .483 .413 .054 .007 .066 .051 .029 269 .467 .148 .355 264 203 .134 ,030 .097 .478 274 209
N 103 104 104 96 96 101 101 101 90 73 91 80 98 101 101 102 101 101 102 99 100 102 102 103 87 91 93 91 90 83 71 71
Largest owner (semi-) Pearson Correlation -.133 -262** 1 -.027 .143 ..064 -.059 .045 ..064 -.108 -.056 -.008 -.066 .128 -.041 -.001 -.159 -212* -.172* .130 -.150 .142 .191* 209* 293 .016 -.096 -.115 ..088 287* -.130 .013
public body Sig. (1-taied) .ceo .004 .398 .082 202 278 227 274 .182 298 ,473 .259 .102 .341 .497 .056 217 .042 .100 .068 .078 .027 .017 .195 .439 .179 .140 .205 .004 .141 .457
103 104 104 96 96 101 101 101 90 73 91 80 98 101 101 102 101 101 102 99 too 102 102 103 87 91 93 91 90 83 71 71
Allocation to deal size Pearson Correlation -.129 -.015 -.027 1 273* -.181* .025 -.121 -.341*1 -.014 .006 .073 -.036 ..030 -.095 .063 -.014 -.025 -.007 -.057 .051 -.155 -.064 .153 -.093 -.193* •254" -.195* ..049 .457* .071 .143
dess < E150th (% ) Sig. (1-tailed) .102 .441 298 .003 .038 .403 .118 .001 .453 .477 .26S .364 284 .179 270 .448 .403 .473 293 .311 .065 208 .066 200 .035 .008 .035 225 .000 285 .127
N 98 96 96 99 99 97 98 98 84 71 87 77 95 96 96 97 96 96 97 94 95 97 97 98 84 88 89 87 87 80 66 66
ABoeation to deal size Pearson Correlation -.252*1 -.007 .143 273* 1 •319** .384** -.070 -•530*1 -.094 .026 .156 .232* .067 -.056 .053 -.093 -.112 -.108 -.122 -.172* •236* -.066 .139 .011 -.146 -.300" -.133 .068 .505" .046 ..023
class El50-375th (%) Sig. (1-taied) .006 .474 .082 .003 .001 .000 247 .000 217 .404 .088 .012 259 293 .302 .184 .139 .147 .122 .048 .010 259 .087 .462 .087 .002 .109 265 .000 256 .428
N 98 96 96 99 99 97 96 98 84 71 87 77 95 96 96 97 96 96 97 94 95 97 97 98 84 88 89 87 87 80 66 66
Does your co influence the Pearson Correlation -.102 *252*1 -.084 *.181* •219** 1 .137 201* .480*1 .057 .079 .075 -.013 .049 -.061 -.013 .113 .155 -.006 -.131 .099 .069 .019 -.177* -259" -.006 .088 -.059 -.191* •202* .180 -.021
management of the Sig. (1-tailed) .152 .005 202 .038 .001 ,036 .022 .000 .317 228 255 .449 213 272 .450 .132 .061 .478 .097 .163 244 .423 .037 .008 .476 201 290 .036 .003 .069 .430
N 103 101 101 97 97 104 101 101 69 73 90 80 98 101 101 102 100 101 102 99 100 102 102 103 87 91 S3 91 90 84 70 70
Aflocation to business Pearson Correlation •501* -.110 -.059 .025 284** .137 1 .011 -.019 -.046 .177* 293* .161 .013 .073 .137 .190* 216* .032 -258" -.069 -.072 -.090 -.146 -.112 .046 .019 -.026 -.100 .040 211* .065
stoges: seed (%) Sig. (1-taded) .021 .136 278 .403 .000 .086 .456 .431 .348 .046 .004 .054 .448 234 .085 .029 .015 .374 .005 247 237 .184 .070 .149 .331 .430 .404 .172 259 .000 296
N 103 101 101 98 98 101 104 104 69 73 92 81 100 101 101 102 100 101 102 99 101 102 102 103 88 92 93 91 91 83 70 70
Allocation to busmess Pearson Correlation -.164* -.148 .045 *.121 *.070 201* .011 1 205* -.145 256* 209* .196* .108 .060 .015 .195* .162 ..005 -.108 239“ -.036 -.031 -.186* -.073 -.014 .056 -.167 -.051 .034 271* .450*
stages: start-up (%) Sig. (1-tailed) .049 .070 .327 .118 247 .022 .456 .027 .110 .007 .031 .026 .141 276 .442 .026 .053 .480 .144 .006 260 278 .030 249 .445 298 .056 215 .379 .012 .000
N 103 101 101 98 98 101 104 104 69 73 92 81 too 101 tot 102 100 101 102 99 101 102 102 103 88 92 93 91 91 83 70 70
Expected minimum rate of Pearson Correlation .388* -289* -.064 -.341* ..530** .480** -.019 .205* 1 208* -.175 -.127 .031 -.130 .097 .051 219* 241* .196* -.009 .179* .097 .195* -288" -.023 205" .401" .047 -.197* -,539" .023 -.163
return Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .003 274 .001 .000 .000 .431 .027 .041 .055 .138 .389 .113 .184 .315 .021 .012 .032 .467 .048 .184 .033 .003 .421 .003 .000 .340 .040 .000 .430 .102
N 90 90 90 84 84 89 89 89 91 71 85 75 86 89 88 90 87 89 89 87 88 69 89 91 77 81 82 81 80 74 63 S3
Realised rate of return in Pearson Correlation .069 -.135 *.108 -.014 -.094 .057 -.046 -.145 208* 1 ♦224* -.176 .023 -.067 .094 225* .197* .098 257* -.101 -.019 -.057 -.059 -.065 -.194 -.133 .113 -.103 •236* -.031 .045 ..093
2001 Sig. (1-tailed) .280 .127 .182 .453 217 317 .348 .110 .041 .003 .083 .406 286 218 .028 249 207 .015 204 .439 218 212 293 .064 .142 .181 206 .028 .408 274 255
N 74 73 73 71 71 73 73 73 71 74 70 63 70 73 71 73 72 72 72 69 70 72 72 73 63 67 67 66 66 59 53 S3
Fafture rate in relation to Pearson Correlation -204* .140 -.056 .006 .026 .079 .177* 256* -.175 -.324" 1 271* -.080 ..009 .003 -.051 -.149 -.012 -.127 •247" .006 .045 -.162 -.184* -.132 -.077 •243* -.122 -.046 .141 .412* 262*
volume of investment in Sig. (1 -tailed) .026 .092 .298 .477 .404 228 .046 .007 .055 .003 .000 229 .467 .489 214 .080 .455 .114 .010 .477 236 .061 240 .118 239 .012 .132 238 .111 .000
2001 N 92 91 91 87 87 90 92 92 85 70 93 80 88 90 91 92 90 92 92 89 91 92 92 92 82 86 85 85 85 77 63 63
Failure rate in rotation to Pearson Correlation •282* .132 -.008 .073 .156 .075 2 9 3 - .209* -.127 -.176 .871" 1 ..113 -.024 .118 .081 -.061 .066 ..077 -.198* -.029 -.014 -.176 ..179 -.323" -.171 -228" -.188 ..169 .174 275" .318*
number of companies in Sig. (1-tailed) .005 .122 .473 265 .088 255 .004 .031 .138 .083 .000 .164 .417 .150 235 296 278 247 .040 299 .451 .059 .055 .003 269 .002 .053 .073 .077 .002 .008
2001 N 82 80 80 77 77 80 81 81 75 $3 80 82 77 79 80 81 79 81 81 79 81 81 61 81 73 76 76 75 75 68 56 $6
AJocation to economy Pearson Correlation .081 -.009 -.066 -.036 232* -.013 .161 .196* .031 .029 -.080 -.113 1 .050 .100 .144 223* .171* .090 .097 .183* .124 .006 .065 -.048 .035 .147 -.127 -.030 .066 .024
sectors: manuf, high tech Sig. (1-tailed) .211 .464 .259 .364 .012 .449 .054 .026 289 .406 229 ,164 212 .163 .078 .014 .046 .189 .173 .037 .111 .477 261 232 274 .084 .120 291 280
.423
(%) N 100 98 98 95 95 98 100 100 86 70 88 77 101 98 98 99 97 98 99 97 97 99 99 100 85 89 90 88 68 81
67
Do you use a systematic Pearson Correlation -.109 -.004 .128 -.030 .067 .049 .013 .108 -.130 -.067 -.009 -.024 .050 1 203* ..035 .074 -.021 .071 .000 .035 .004 -.138 -.028 .121 -.148 .060 .035
289 231" -.190 .050






.313 .448 .141 .113 286 .467 .417 .312 .021 .362 233 .419 239 .500 .364 .483 .063 289 .133 .080 .284 272 203
96 101 101 101 89 73 90 79 98 104 101 102 100 101 102 99 100 102 102 103 87 91 93 91 63
.022 -.041 -.095 -.056 -.061 ,073 .060 .097 .094 .003 .118 .100 203* 1 .536** 233* 263" .173* .023 ,049 .099 .068 ..060 .032 .023 .086
.083 -.005 .053 .049
244 232
Sig. (1-tailed) .033 .413 .341 .179 293 272 .234 276 .184 218 .489 .150 .163 .021 .000 .009 .004 .039 .410 213 .158 247 275 284 .412
204 214 216
101 101 101 88 71 91 80 98 101 104 103 101 103 104 100 101 104 104 103 89 93 94 93




.431 240proposals with good Sig. (1-tailed) .302 .054 .497 270
97
.302 .450 .085 .442 215 .028 .314 235 .078 262 .000 .000 .020 .007 .077 232 .124 266 219 234 .199 200 234
returns 97 102 102 102 90 73 92 81 99 102 103 105 102 104 104 100 101 104 104 104 89 85
69 69












,029 .026 .021 .049 .080 296 .014 233 .009 .000 .000 .000 212 .052 277 268 207 .086 .489
100 100 87 72 90 79 97 100 101 102 103 101 102 98 99 102 102 102 87












.053 .012 207 .455 278 .046 .419 .004 .020 .000 .000 207 .000 .004 .077 293
101 89 72 92 81 98 101 103 104 101 104 104 100 101 104 104 103 89 93 93
85 68 68









.033 .092 .054 .126 .408monitoring companies Sig. (1-tailed) .094 .051 .042 .473 .147 .478
102
.374 .480 .032 .015 .114 247 .189 239 .039 .007 .000 .000 231 .000 274 .036
102 102 89 72 92 81 99 102 104 104 102 104 105 101 102 105 105 104 89
85 69 69































































































































































































Constraints: shortage of 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































**• Correlation b significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
’• Correlation b  significant at the 0.05 level (1 -toiled).
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.248 ,139 .456 .132
N 103 104 104 101 90 73 91 80 101 101 102 101 101 102 99 100 102 102 103 87 91 93 91
90 71 71 104
Does your co influence the 




































































































































































































































FaSure rate in relation to 















































































Failure rate in relation to 




































































































































































































































Constraints: lack of 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constraints: shortage of 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1 -taied).
APPENDIX E
Correlations
Does your co 
influence the 
management 






rate of return 
in 2001
Failure rate 
















Does your co influence Pearson Correlation 1 ,480** ,057 ,079 ,075 ,049 ,088
the management of the Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,317 ,228 ,255 ,313 ,201
investee co? N 104 89 73 90 80 101 93
Expected minimum rate Pearson Correlation ,480** 1 ,208* -.175 -.127 -.130 a o *
of return Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,041 ,055 ,138 ,113 ,000
N 89 91 71 85 75 89 82
Realised rate of return in Pearson Correlation ,057 ,208* 1 -.324** -.176 -,067 ,113
2001 Sig. (1-tailed) ,317 ,041 . ,003 ,083 ,286 ,181
N
73 71 74 70 63 73 67
Failure rate in relation to Pearson Correlation ,079 -,175 -.324** 1 ,871** -.009 -.243*
volume of investment in Sig. (1-tailed) ,228 ,055 ,003 ,000 ,467 ,012
2001 N 90 85 70 93 80 90 85
Failure rate in relation to Pearson Correlation ,075 -.127 -,176 ,871** 1 -,024 -,328*-
number of companies in Sig. (1-tailed) ,255 ,138 ,083 ,000 i ,417 ,002
2001 N 80 75 63 80 82 79 76
Do you use a systematic Pearson Correlation ,049 -,130 -,067 -,009 -,024 1 ,060
rating instrument? Sig. (1-tailed) ,313 ,113 ,286 ,467 ,417 ,284
N 101 89 73 90 79 104 93
Aspects: risk-mitigation Pearson Correlation ,088 ,401** ,113 -.243* -,328** ,060 1
(guarantees) Sig. (1-tailed) ,201 ,000 ,181 ,012 ,002 ,284 ,
N 93 82 67 85 76 93 96
**• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
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Correlations
Does your co 
influence the 
management 






rate of return 
in 2001
Failure rate 
















Kendall's tau_b Does your co influence Correlation Coefficiei 1,000 ,416** -,024 ,054 ,041 ,049 ,072
the management of the sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,412 ,290 ,344 ,312 ,225
investee co? jg 104 89 73 90 80 101 93
Expected minimum rate Correlation Coefficie ,416** 1,000 ,064 -,176* -.139 -,107 ,356*
of return Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 i ,249 ,024 ,069 ,130 ,000
N 89 91 71 85 75 89 82
Realised rate of return i Correlation Coefficiei -,024 ,064 1,000 -,304** -,180* -,006 ,099
2001 sig. (1-tailed) ,412 ,249 * ,001 ,039 ,476 ,166
N
73 71 74 70 63 73 67
Failure rate in relation t< Correlation Coefficie ,054 -,176* -,304** 1,000 ,817*’ ,008 -,325*
volume of investment ir sig (1-tailed) ,290 ,024 ,001 ,000 ,466 ,000
2001 N
90 85 70 93 80 90 85
Failure rate in relation t< Correlation Coefficie ,041 -,139 -.180* ,817** 1,000 -.017 -.367*
number of companies ir sig (1-tailed) ,344 ,069 ,039 ,000 ,436 ,000
2001 N 80 75 63 80 82 79 76
Do you use a systemati Correlation Coefficie ,049 -,107 -,006 ,008 -.017 1,000 ,034
rating instrument? sig. (1-tailed) ,312 ,130 ,476 ,466 ,436 , ,362
N 101 89 73 90 79 104 93
Aspects: risk-mitigation Correlation Coefficie ,072 ,356** ,099 -.325** -.367** ,034 1,000
(guarantees) Sig. (1-tailed) ,225 ,000 ,166 ,000 ,000 ,362 i
N 93 82 67 85 76 93 96
**■ Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). 
*• Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
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APPENDIX F
Notation of variables for the partial correlation coefficients:
EXPRET = Expected minimum rate of return (question B12)
FAIL2 = Failure rate in relation to companies in 2001 (question B14)
INVPC31 = Investment allocation to business stage: seed (%) (question B11) 
INVPC32= Investment allocation to business stage: start-up (%)
PUB1 = Important Aspect: access to refinancing loans (question D5)
PUB2 = Important Aspect: access to cheaper refinancing loans
PUB3 = Important Aspect: risk mitigation (guarantees)
PUB4 = Important Aspect: public co-investment in companies
PUB5 = Important Aspect: public co-investment in fund




( 0) ( 66)
P= , P =  ,008
PUB3 -,2902 1,0000
( 66) ( 0)
P= ,008 P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)
1? IT
/ is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
_ _ _ _ _ P A R T I A L C O R R E L A T I O N  C O E F F I
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Controlling for.. INVPC31 INVPC32
FAIL 2 PUB3
FAIL2 1,0000 -,3850
( 0) ( 71)
P= , P= ,000
PUB3 -,3850 1,0000
( 71) ( 0)
P= ,000 P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.)i / 1-tailed Significance)
" , " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
- -  - P A R T I A L  C O R R E L A T I O N  C O E F F I C I E N T S
Controlling for.. PUB1 PUB2 PUB4 PUB5
FAIL2 PUB3
FAIL2 1,0000 -,2504
( 0) ( 67)
P= , P= ,019
PUB3 -,2504 1,0000
( 67) ( 0)
P= ,019 P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.)i / 1-tailed Significance)
" , " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
















P =  ,
1-tailed Significance)
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
- -  - P A R T I A L  C O R R E L A T I O N  C O E F F I C I E N T S
Controlling for. . PUB4
FAIL2 PUB3
FAIL2 1,0000 -,2758
( 0) ( 72)
P= , P= ,009
PUB3 -,2758 1,0000
( 72) ( 0)
P= ,009 P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)
" , " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed





( 0) ( 72)
P= , P= ,006
PUB3 -,2875 1,0000
( 72) ( 0)
P= ,006 P= ,
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 1-tailed Significance)















a- All requested variables entered.
b- Dependent Variable: Failure rate in 
relation to number of companies in 2001
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 ,328a ,107 ,095 1,286





Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 14,708 1 14,708 8,892 ,004a
Residual 122,398 74 1,654
Total 137,105 75
a. Predictors: (Constant), Aspects: risk-mitigation (guarantees)








Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 2,949 ,251 11,736 ,000
Aspects: risk-mitigation -.265 ,089 -.328 -2,982 ,004
(guarantees)
a. Dependent Variable: Failure rate in relation to number of companies in 2001
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APPENDIX H
C o rre la t io n s
A llo c a t io n  to 
d e a l s iz e  
c la s s  < 
£ 1 0 0 th  f% )
A llo c a t io n  to  
d e a l s iz e  
c la s s
£ 1 0 0 -2 5 0 th
r% t
A llo c a t io n  to  
b u s in e s s  
s ta g e s : 
s e e d  l% l
A llo c a t io n  to  
b u s in e s s  
s ta g e s : 
s ta r t-u o  (%1
E x p e c te d  
m in im u m  
ra te  o f  re tu rn
R e a lis e d  
ra te  o f  re tu rn  
in  2001
F a ilu r e  ra te  
in  re la t io n  to 
v o lu m e  o f 
in v e s tm e n t  
in  2001
F a ilu re  ra te  
in  re la t io n  to 
n u m b e r  o f 
c o m p a n ie s  
in  2 001
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